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ABSTRACT
In this study, I examined the viability of four mechanisms of land-value capture
under the public land-leasing systems, using Hong Kong as a case. Because the State
is the landowner under a leasehold system, it can capture the land value through four
ways: (1) at the initial establishment of land contracts, (2) by the collection of an
annual land rent, (3) during lease renewals, and (4) through modifications of lease
conditions. Although I found that the Hong Kong government raised a large amount
of revenues for infrastructure investment by leasing public land, not all four
mechanisms work equally well. From my case studies, I found that the government
captured 39 percent of the increased land value occurring between 1970 and 1991
from land sites leased in the 1970s. This captured value, which the government
collected mainly from the initial auctions, financed an average of 55 percent of the
average annual infrastructure expenditures in Hong Kong between 1970 and 1991. In
trying to capture the land value during lease renewals and modifications, the
government encountered political resistance from lessees and difficulties in negotiating
and enforcing lease agreements.
The findings from my study may have important implications on land policy
making in countries where officials are experimenting with leasehold systems.
Debates on the property-rights arrangements of land in some former socialist countries
and the People's Republic of China focus on whether the State should adopt a freehold
or a public leasehold system. One key issue is related to the capturing of the future
increases in land value by the State to finance public infrastructure investment. If
capturing land value after the initial establishment of leases is politically untenable,
officials should plan their land supply carefully. A rapid disposition of land when its
value is low may impede the possibility for the government to recoup the increased
land value in the future.
Moreover, I develop a framework that may guide policy makers to investigate
whether or not they should adopt the Hong Kong leasehold system. The framework is
composed of two parts. The first part is for identifying the potential problems of land
leasing and is based on the concept of transaction costs instigated by Coase,
Williamson, North, and other scholars. The second part is an extension of
Hirschman's exit-voice concept to analyze how the government and lessees can use
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different strategies--exit, voice, persuasion, and coercion--to revise the existing rules to
minimize transaction costs.
In applying this framework to the Hong Kong case, I found that neither law
nor the polity played a dominant role in minimizing transaction costs of land leasing
in Hong Kong. Instead, the diverse outcomes of land-value capture depended upon
the interplay of the parties' strategies chosen according to varying contexts. More
importantly, I found that it was through persuasive actions, rather than coercion, in the
form of a wise land policy that the government gained its legitimacy of being the
landowner.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the political and economic reforms of some former socialist countries and
the People's Republic of China (PRC) progress rapidly, policy makers and scholars are
facing an unprecedented challenge. This challenge is to transform their centrally
planned economies into more "market-oriented" economic systems. Among many
issues related to this transformation, the reassignment of property rights to land is
most sensitive. The sensitivity is mainly due to the controversy involved in the
distribution of the future increases in land value. On the one hand, governments want
to capture the "surplus land value" as revenue to finance public infrastructure and
other social services. (I will define surplus land value later.) On the other hand,
governments do not want the recouping of the increased land value to impede private
incentives to invest in land and real estate. Balancing these two objectives is not
always easy.
In this study, I explore how governments may deal with this dilemma by
leasing public land, using Hong Kong as a case study. Hong Kong is one of the few
cities in the world in which the State owns all land and land tenure is organized under
a leasehold system. Some scholars, such as Castells and Kwok (1990, pp. 40-47) and
Haggard (1990, p. 122), suggest that there may be an indirect relationship between the
Hong Kong miraculous economic growth and its land policy. Hence, the Hong Kong
experience of managing public land through land leasing has attracted attention from
policy makers in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Vietnam, and
the PRC. In all these countries, almost all the ownership of land is currently in the
hands of the State, and the option of leasing public land, rather than selling it,
becomes viable. Owing to the lack of thorough studies on whether land leasing will
allow the State to capture the future increases in land value, I examine the general
experience of land-value capture in Hong Kong. In my investigation, I focus on three
questions:
1. Does public land leasing allow the government of Hong Kong to
capture a major portion of the surplus land value to cover the costs of
infrastructure investment between 1970 and 1991?
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2. What are the "transaction costs" associated with the land-value capture
under the Hong Kong leasehold system?'
3. How do the government and other relevant parties minimize these
transaction costs by revising the existing "institutional arrangements"
that govern the allocation of the increased land value? 2
Because the above-mentioned countries are experimenting with leasehold systems,
answers to these questions may have important implications on land policy making,
not only in Hong Kong but also elsewhere.
This study is the first detailed examination of the land-value-capture experience
under the Hong Kong leasehold system. Moreover, as far as I know, no analysts have
even applied the "Coasian" concept of transaction costs to study land-value capture
through land contracting. In applying the transaction-costs concept, I also develop it
further by incorporating Hirschman's exit-voice idea and the potential costs of
government's involvement into the analytical framework in order to study public land
leasing in Hong Kong. In Chapters 2 and 3, I will explain thoroughly why the
Coasian concepts are relevant to public land leasing and how I extend them.
In this introductory chapter, I first review issues of capturing the surplus land
value and describe the general experiences of solving these problems in other
countries. This discussion will provide the context upon which the whole study is
based. Second, I briefly discuss how public land leasing can assist the government to
recoup the increased land value and state my argument. Third, I introduce the
theoretical framework that I will use to identify problems of land contracting and to
explain how the contracting parties rectify these problems. Fourth, I define the scope
1 Simply put, these transaction costs include the costs of delineating, negotiating,
and enforcing the parties' rights to benefit from land and of maintaining the
government's integrity of managing public land. I will discuss these costs in detail
later.
2 I define institutional arrangements as a set of rules that guide people's behavior
by providing incentives for socially desirable actions and constraints to prohibit rule
violation. These rules could be enforced by the State and courts or by other informal
mechanisms, such as social norms (North, 1990, pp. 3-8; Sj6strand, 1993, pp. 9-13).
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of this study and the methodology of my research. Finally, I illustrate how I organize
this study to examine in detail each of the issues introduced in this chapter.
Issues of Land-Value Capture
In the realm of land policy making, the distribution of the surplus land value is
one of the most controversial issues. The surplus land value is the portion of the
increased land value that is generated by changes in government land-use regulations,
public investments in infrastructure, urbanization, location advantages, and/or
population growth. This land value does not include the part of the increase that is
attributable to capital invested in land by private individuals, including the allowances
for holding costs and risks.3 Should private landowners be allowed to keep the
"unearned" land rent, or should the government and the community recapture some or
all of this increased land value? If the "public" should reap this benefit, analysts must
know what instruments a State should use, and how it balances the costs and benefits
of the capture in both economic and political terms. Scholars and analysts in both
developed and developing countries have debated these issues for many years and
have struggled with the implementation of various policies. Some countries have
experienced "success" in employing certain instruments, whereas others have
exacerbated the already politically sensitive property relations between the State and
private property owners. Before describing these experiences, I first explain why the
distribution of land-value increments is so problematic.
The fundamental cause of the problems is related to the multiple determinants
of land value. Dunkerly (1983, p. 23) and Hagman and Misczynski (1978, p. 15)
argue that multiple determinants of land value complicate the assignment of the
property rights to different claimants, so that they can derive benefits from land.
There are, at least, five factors that determine the changes in land value: (1) changes
in permitted land uses, (2) changes in locational advantages as towns and cities
3 Surplus land value is also referred to as a windfall, a land-value increment, and
an unearned land rent in the literature. I use these terms interchangeably here.
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expand, (3) execution of public works and improvements in social services, (4) the
growth of urban population through migration and urbanization, and (5) increases (or
decreases) in private investments in land. Three groups may benefit from increases in
land value, namely landowners, the government, and the community. Ideally,
landowners should be entitled to the portion of the increased land value that is due to
their investments in land and the willingness to bear the risks involved. The
government should obtain the portion that is generated by improvements of public
infrastructure and services. The rest of the "socially" created land value that is due to
urbanization and population growth should go to the community. The government,
normally, will also try to recoup this portion of the land value on behalf of the
community. In reality, to separate the exact amount of surplus land value from the
overall increases in land value is very difficult and controversial.
Although governments in most countries use a property tax to take back a
portion of this land value, most analysts consider that a property tax is not an effective
instrument to achieve this objective. Doebele, Grimes, and Linn (1979, p. 90) argue
that calculations of an "appropriate" tax rate to capture the surplus land value are very
complex and require an expertise that may not be available in most developing
countries. Similarly, the experiences of capturing the land-value increments using
various tax instruments in developed countries were mostly "unsatisfactory" (Alterman,
1982, pp. 44-47). There are, at least, three reasons.
First, based on the experiences of value capture in Britain, Israel, and the
United States, Alterman (1982. p. vi) argues that the implementation of various types
of value-capture policy has been "weak." The difficulties are related mainly to
designing policies that can achieve the objective of capturing the surplus land value
and, at the same time, fulfilling the goals of income redistribution and urban growth
management. For instance, some landuse controls, such as a restriction on the height
of buildings in, say, a commercial district, may achieve the goals of maintaining
public safety and limiting urban growth. Yet, this restriction will also limit the
potential increases in land and property values and, in turn, reduce the amount of tax
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revenues that the government can collect from the property owners. The issue of how
a government can juggle different policy objectives is difficult.
Second, increasing property taxes is politically unpopular, especially in urban
areas (Fowler, 1974, p. 83; Doebele, 1991, p. 103). In the United States, people voted
to establish legal constraints on the amount of property taxes that local governments
could impose on their citizens. For instance, in California, an amendment was made
to the state constitution in 1978, known as Proposition 13, to limit the ad valorem tax
on property to one percent of the full "cash" value of the property and prohibit any
additional property tax (Kemp, 1980, p. 11-14). Similar legislation--Proposition
2 1/2--was passed in Massachusetts in 1980 to reduce property taxes. The law
prohibited property taxes from exceeding 2.5 percent of the cash value of the local tax
base (Susskind and Serio, 1983, p. 3-4). These amendments to the constitution of the
two states have weakened the ability of their local governments to raise public funds
through the collection of property taxes.
Third, the collection of property taxes is administratively complex and
expensive (Doebele, 1991). Governments have to establish and maintain cadastral
records. They also have to reevaluate properties (continuously if values are changing
rapidly) and enforce tax collection. Owing to these difficulties, in most cases, the
increased land value benefits private landowners more than it contributes to
government revenues for recovering the costs of public infrastructure investment.
In some instances, the inability of governments to capture the surplus land
value creates two problems, especially in developing countries. The first problem is
that it worsens the already uneven distribution of income. Landowners, in some
countries, are able to accumulate considerable wealth through increases in land prices
that are due either to rapid urbanization or increases in public works. If ownership to
land is unevenly distributed, the newly created wealth will be concentrated in the
hands of a small percentage of the population. Although landowners are able to
benefit financially from the rapid land development, the "landless" are not even able to
obtain affordable housing. The deterioration of income distribution may generate
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conflicts among income groups and undermine the political stability of these countries,
which, in turn, will hinder their social and economic development.
The second problem is that the inability to capture the surplus land value may
also weaken the fiscal capability of governments to provide public goods, such as
infrastructure and other social services. This problem is compounded by the nature of
public goods in that their consumption is mostly "joint" and "non-exclusive."
Government officials, normally, have difficulty in imposing charges on using, say, a
public road. In some instances, the revenue that they collect may not always justify
the costs incurred of establishing and enforcing a system to levy these charges.
Unable to balance the revenues and costs in public projects, some governments
encounter a fiscal crisis. With a weak financial ability to supply public services and
infrastructure to match the demand generated by rapid urbanization, governments in
some developed and developing countries face problems, such as a housing crisis and
degradation of public services (Dunkerley, 1983, p. 6). Urban residents in low-income
neighborhoods, normally, bear the highest costs of unclear water, poor living
environment, and air and land pollution. These conditions, in turn, aggravate the
already difficult livelihood of the poor.
Owing to these unsuccessful experiences of trying to capture the increased land
value through taxation, analysts are searching for alternatives. Hagman and
Misczynski (1978) and Alterman (1982) have provided some comprehensive reviews
of land-value-capture techniques. The most commonly used methods besides property
taxes in the United States and developing countries are special assessments
(Misczynski, 1978, pp. 311-335), exactions (Altshuler and G6mez-Ibaiez, 1993;
Jacobson and McHenry, 1978, pp. 342-366), valorization charges (Shoup, 1978,
p. 1-84; Doebele et al, 1979, pp. 73-92), and land readjustment (Doebele, 1982;
Acharya, 1988, pp. 103-117), which I review briefly in Appendix A. Although
governments have used these techniques to recover part of the costs of infrastructure
investment, there are, at least, two common drawbacks of these techniques that public
land leasing could avoid, if it is applied to all land in a city or a state.
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First, all these alternatives are project-specific, meaning that the provision of
infrastructure is restricted to a particular locale. These methods could not solve the
financial difficulty of funding large-scale public projects and services, such as
highways, seaports, education, and low-income housing.
Second, these techniques are not designed to target poor neighborhoods.
Indeed, incentives to initiate schemes, such as valorization charges and land
readjustment, are dependent upon the conditions of the real estate market. It would
only be profitable for the government and property owners to cooperate in
infrastructure development when the land prices are increasing. Poor areas with low
land values or potential for growth will not attract any investment and, thus, the
accompanying infrastructure. The issues of how governments can raise funds from
land to build public infrastructure and services for the poor remain unresolved.
Among many suggestions, some analysts propose the adaptation of the public
leasehold systems. In the remainder of this study, I will examine whether land leasing
is a viable alternative to all these methods.
Public Leasehold Systems
Under public leasehold systems, in general, the involved parties perceive
property rights to land as a "bundle" of rights. This bundle is composed of the rights
to use, develop, transfer, and inherit land, and the right to derive benefits from these
land transactions. The government can assign each element of the bundle to different
parties through land leasing. The State may retain the right to own land and lease the
right to develop land to private developers. In theory, there should be no problem for
the government to capture the land-value increments as long as it retains the right to
own and benefit from a certain portion of the future increases in land value. Most
scholars, such as Bristow (1984), Farvacque and McAuslan (1992, p. 43), Archer
(1973, p. 8; 1994, p. 24), and Yeh (1994, p. 8), propose that the State can capture the
land value by collecting payments from lessees: (1) at the initial auctions, (2) through
lease modifications, (3) during lease renewals, and (4) an annual rent. I call these the
four land-value-capture mechanisms (or just four mechanisms) in this study. (I will
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discuss these four mechanisms in detail in Chapter 4.) The major objective of this
study is to evaluate how these land-value-capture mechanisms work in practice under
the Hong Kong leasehold system. In the coming chapters, I will show that the Hong
Kong government was able to capture a large portion of the increased land value by
leasing public land. Yet, it relied mainly on the initial auctions, not the other three
mechanisms, to recoup the land-value increments.
Theoretical Framework
In explaining why the four mechanisms work differently, I apply the idea of
transaction costs, originated by Coase (1960, pp. 1-44), to identify the problems of
recouping the surplus land value through land leasing. The connection between
Coase's idea of transaction costs and land-value capture is that both are related to the
issue of externality. In short, the surplus land value is a "positive" externality for the
property owners that is generated by factors related neither to their decisions nor
investments in land. In his most renowned article The Problem of Social Cost, Coase
(1960, pp. 1-44) discusses how transaction costs could affect the "internalization" of
negative externalities. In a world of zero transaction costs, the parties involved in a
dispute arising from the presence of an externality could settle their conflict through
contracting their property rights.
For the public leasehold systems, some scholars have applied this Coasian
reasoning implicitly to argue that a government can delineate and assign the surplus
land value by negotiating with leaseholders costlessly. Assume that transaction costs
are minimal, the parties of a contract would determine in advance and in detail the
best possible actions to allocate the land value and account for every contingency that
might arise in the future.
Many scholars, such as Coase (1960), Williamson (1985, p. 15-29), and North
(1990, pp, 27-35), emphasize that transaction costs are never zero in reality.
Capturing land value through land contracting in Hong Kong is no exception. By
expanding Coase's idea, I have identified at least four types of transaction costs: (1)
maintaining the legitimacy of government as a representative of society in negotiating
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land contracts; (2) delineating the parties' rights to benefit from land; (3) deriving
mutual agreements in negotiations; and (4) enforcing and administering the established
agreements. (I will define these transactions costs in Chapter 2.)
When transaction costs are not zero, institutions matter. Scholars, such as
Williamson (1985), North (1990), and Eggertsson (1990), have expanded on Coase's
transaction-costs concept and have begun to investigate how institutions can minimize
transaction costs. Because transaction costs of land leasing in Hong Kong are not
minimal, I investigate how the relevant parties devised institutions to lower these
costs. The literature on the State and law within this school of thought is particularly
relevant to the Hong Kong case. In terms of explaining the role of the State, scholars
seem to conclude consistently that the involvement of the State will increase
transaction costs rather than reduce them (Cheung, 1982, pp. 42-64; Burton, 1978, pp.
71-91; North, 1979, pp. 249-259; 1981, p. 23). For law, scholars, such as Williamson
(1985, pp. 164-166 & 250-252) and Ellickson (1986, pp. 623-686; 1991, pp. 280-283),
argue that legal rules are deficient in minimizing the transaction costs of contracting.
In this study, I will show that the argument about the State in the transaction-
costs literature is not helpful in explaining the role of the Hong Kong government in
land contracting. Despite the fact that the State owns all land and controls its
allocation, there is no evidence of an attempt by government officials to maximize
their own benefits at the expense of impeding the private incentives to invest in land
and real estate. I will also study how the parties in Hong Kong use law and litigations
to lower transaction costs. I will argue that the effectiveness of law in reducing
transaction costs is dependent upon contexts and the interplay of strategies used by the
parties. Put differently, an understanding of the process of transaction-costs
minimization matters.
In order to examine thoroughly the process of how the Hong Kong government
and lessees have revised rules to reduce transaction costs, I develop a framework
based on the work of Hirschman (1970). I use the framework to identify the parties'
choices of strategy to revise the existing rules. These strategies include "exit,"
"voice," "persuasion," and "coercion." (I define and discuss all these terms thoroughly
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in Chapter 3.) By examining the different strategies employed by the parties to
influence each other's behaviors and decisions, I attempt to trace how new rules are
derived, and how these activities of rule reformulation are connected to the domain of
the State, law, and civil society.
Research Methodology
To support my arguments, I used both quantitative and qualitative methods of
analysis. I collected data from two sources to perform a quantitative analysis on
whether the Hong Kong government captured a major portion of the increased land
value for infrastructure investment. First, I gathered primary data from my "contract-
based" case studies. The contract-based case studies were detailed examinations of
some randomly selected land leases for specific land parcels in Hong Kong. From
these cases, I assembled data on the total amount of money and land rent that the
government collected from these land contracts. I then used these data to calculate the
percentages of land value captured by the government. These calculations are
instrumental in showing how successful the Hong Kong government was in recouping
the land-value increments through land contracting. I will explain the method of
selecting my samples for the contract-based case studies and calculating the
percentages in detail in Chapter 5.
Second, to determine how significant the captured land value was in financing
public infrastructure in Hong Kong in comparison to selected U.S. cities, I compiled
secondary data published by the Hong Kong and the U.S. government. I used these
data to illustrate some general relationships between government infrastructure
expenditures and land revenues in Hong Kong and the selected U.S. cities.
To identify the transaction costs of capturing land value through land leasing, I
use two "incident-based" case studies. The main purpose of conducting these case
studies is to examine qualitatively the major incidents in the history of Hong Kong
that had profound impacts on the government's policy in allocating the increased land
value during lease renewals and modifications. I reviewed all the major revisions of
the land policy from 1970 to 1991 and found two cases. Both of them were about .
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prolonged controversies that happened in the 1970s related to lease-renewal policies.
Through the examination of these historical incidents, I show how "politics" hindered
the ability of the government to demand payments from lessees when they renewed
their leases.
To supplement the information gathered from the incident-based case studies
and to cross-check its consistency, I conducted personal interviews with government
officials, land developers, and experts in Hong Kong. These interviews were
conducted in the summers of 1992 and 1993 and the fall of 1994. Within the public
sector, I interviewed three administrative officials who are responsible for formulating
the general land policy of Hong Kong. I also interviewed fifteen officials in the
professional branches who carry out the day-to-day practice of land leasing. To learn
the perspectives of the lessees, I talked to five key land and real estate developers in
Hong Kong. Last, but not least, other important sources of information were from my
many discussions with Hong Kong scholars who teach at major universities there and
review of the existing literature concerning the Hong Kong land-leasing system.
Scope of the Study
The topic of land management under the public leasehold system is vast. It
includes how public land leasing affects: (1) the allocation of land resources, (2) the
land-value capture, (3) urban-growth management, (4) urban economic development,
(5) urban renewal, and (6) urban design. The aim of my investigation of the Hong
Kong leasehold system is only to provide a detailed study of the second issue--the
Hong Kong experience of land-value capture. Indeed, all the above-mentioned issues
are interrelated. I will try to identify their connections with the issue of land-value
capture, but will not discuss them in detail. In the concluding chapter, I will propose
future research on the other important subjects.
Moreover, the conclusions of this study may not apply to all areas of Hong
Kong. The city of Hong Kong is composed of four major districts--Hong Kong
Island, Kowloon peninsula, New Kowloon, and the New Territories. (See Appendix
B.) My discussion of the Hong Kong leasehold system focuses on the first three
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districts, which are the most urbanized areas. The reason for omitting the New
Territories is that land-tenure arrangements in this district are very distinct from the
rest of the colony. When the British leased the New Territories, it was inhabited by
villagers. According to agreements between the British and the Ching government as
stated in the Nanking Treaty, the British had to observe all land rights of the
inhabitants. In essence, they must resolve any land disputes based upon the traditional
Chinese land law and customary rules (Cruden, 1986; Selby, 1991, pp. 45-77; Faure,
1986). The government has preserved these special conditions in the land policy that
governs the allocation of land rights to "indigenous villagers" in the New Territories
(Hong Kong government, 1992). Because of this unique policy, conclusions derived
from the study of the other three districts may not be applicable to the New
Territories. To simplify my discussion, I thus exclude the New Territories in my
study.
Finally, my study period is from 1970 to 1991. The Hong Kong experience of
land-value capture outside this period could be different. More importantly, I do not
analyze in detail the impacts on land leasing of the return of Hong Kong to the PRC.
Political events that occurred after 1982 were unique, and lessons learned from this
special situation would not be applicable to other countries. In 1984, the British and
the PRC governments signed a Sino-British Joint Declaration. According to the
declaration, the Hong Kong government agreed to limit the amount of land disposition
to 50 hectares annually. Besides, the existing government retains half of the land
revenues collected from land transactions. For the other half, the PRC government
must save it for public infrastructure expenditures after 1997. All these agreements
and the political atmosphere in the 1980s, undoubtedly, affected land contracting in
Hong Kong. Throughout this study, I will just identify how these political changes
may affect my analysis, whenever it is appropriate.
Organization of the Study
This study is composed of eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter,
I discuss the connection between the problems of the land-value capture in Hong Kong
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and the idea of transaction costs in Chapter 2. I then present my analytical framework
of analyzing the Hong Kong case in Chapter 3. I will state how I combine the exit-
voice concept with transaction costs and how I modify Hirschman's original idea in
order to apply it to the Hong Kong case. These two chapters contain the key
theoretical discussions of this study.
In Chapter 4, I explain how the Hong Kong government has employed land
leasing to achieve three major policy objectives: (1) managing urban growth, (2)
stimulating industrial and public infrastructure development, and (3) capturing the
future increases in land value. The purpose of the discussion is to provide the
background information for my analysis of land-value capture in the other chapters.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 form the core of the empirical discussions of the Hong
Kong case. I discuss whether the government could capture a major portion of the
surplus land value in Chapter 5. I assert that the Hong Kong government seemed
capable of obtaining a significant portion of the increased land value and using it to
finance a large part of its infrastructure expenditures between 1970 and 1991.
To gain a deeper understanding of how the government captured this land
value, I examine the four mechanisms of land-value capture in Chapters 6 and 7. I
analyze revenues generated from the initial auctions and modifications of lease
conditions and then explain outcomes of the land-value capture by identifying the
transaction costs associated with these two mechanisms. In Chapter 7, I perform the
same analysis for land-value capture during lease renewals. Chapter 8 is a summary
of the major findings and a discussion of the policy implications of my arguments. I
also propose some potential future research.
Technical Note:
All Hong Kong dollars used in this study are adjusted to the 1991 value, when
HK$7.77 was equivalent to US$1.00.
CHAPTER 2
STUDYING LAND CONTRACTING FROM
A TRANSACTION-COSTS PERSPECTIVE
Many analysts have argued that land leasing will allow the State to capture the
surplus land value. For instance, Farvacque and McAuslan (1992, p. 43) and Archer
(1973, p. 8; 1994, p. 24) argue that because the State is the ultimate landowner, it can
share the benefits of land-value appreciation with land developers by, say,
renegotiating the level of rent with them regularly. Alternatively, when the land leases
expire, the State can obtain additional payments from developers in order to extend
their rights to use the leased land (Yeh, 1994, p. 8). There is, however, inadequate
empirical research on identifying the necessary institutional arrangements to allow the
state to do that. As far as I know, no analyst has examined the possible institutional
problems of: (1) delineating who has the right to benefit from the land-value
increments, (2) establishing contractual agreements on how to distribute them, and (3)
administering and enforcing the established agreements. In this chapter, I examine
these issues at a theoretical level.
I try to achieve two objectives. The first is to explain how I have applied the
idea of transaction costs, originated by Coase (1960, pp. 1-44) and extended by
Williamson (1975, 1985), North (1981, 1990), Eggertsson (1990) and many others, to
identify problems of land contracting in Hong Kong. I then propose four possible
"costs" of capturing the surplus land value through land leasing. One major argument
of these scholars is that when transaction costs are high, the involved parties will
devise an institution--a set of rules--to minimize these costs. Among the vast literature
related to the idea of transaction costs and institutions, I focus on the "property-rights
school" of the "New Institutional Economics."'
1 Scholars who participate in the study of transaction costs and the role of
institutions in reducing them have instituted the accumulated knowledge as the "New
Institutional Economics" (Furubotn and Richter, 1993, pp. 1-10). There are three sub-
disciplines within this school of thought: (1) the property-rights school, the law-and-
economics school, and (3) industrial-organization school. See Posner (1993, pp. 73-
87), Joskow (1991, pp. 51-83), Eggertsson (1990), and Williamson (1975, 1985, 1993,
- 26 -
The second objective is to discuss three aspects of the property-rights-school
literature that are related to the Hong Kong case: (1) the evolution of property-rights
arrangements, (2) the State, and (3) law as institutions in minimizing transaction costs.
The purpose of the discussions is to see whether the existing theories can help me to
explain the Hong Kong case. Literature on the subjects of the State and laws from
other disciplines, such as political sciences and legal studies, are vast. In this study, I
only discuss theories that have been applied to examine transaction costs and are
relevant to land contracting.
Land-Value Capture and the Coase Theorem
Under the leasehold systems, in general, the involved parties may distribute the
surplus land value through contractual agreements. These agreements are stated in
terms of annual rents and/or lump-sum payments paid at the time when the contracting
parties first establish, renew, or modify the land leases. Because this method of
allocating the land value is based on contracting, I review the literature related to this
subject. Coase (1937, pp. 386-405 ;1960 pp. 1-44), Williamson (1985), Hart and
Holmstrom (1987), and many other scholars have dealt extensively with similar issues
in business contracts and economic exchanges; but, as far as I know, no one has ever
applied their ideas to study public land leasing. In order to show the applicability of
these scholars' works in studying land leasing, I illustrate how I link the issues of
capturing land value to the "Coase Theorem."
The purpose of incorporating the Coase Theorem into this study is not to test
its validity using Hong Kong as a case. Empirical tests of the Coase Theorem are
rare, because to prove the validity of this theorem will require an abstract level of
analysis and the creation of a "never-never-world" of zero transaction costs. As I will
show later, public land leasing in Hong Kong is not operated under the condition of
minimal transaction costs.
pp. 99-118) for a discussion of the literature.
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Moreover, I do not try to evaluate the efficiency of land allocation and land-
value capture under the Hong Kong leasehold system based on the argument of the
Coase Theorem. It would be difficult to define empirically the "efficient" allocation of
resources in the Coasian terms. Efficient allocation, as defined in the Coase Theorem,
implies the condition of Pareto-optimality. That is to say, the allocation of resources
is in a condition in which the reassignment of resources to enhance the utility of an
individual can only be made by making someone else worse off. To operationalize
and test this condition empirically, I must have precise information regarding the
utility functions of all parties involved (Donohue, 1989, p. 551). I relate the Coasian
arguments to the Hong Kong case because the concept of transaction costs is
instrumental in identifying the potential problems of distributing the increased land
value through land leasing.
The first thing that leads me to examine the Coase Theorem in relation to land
contracting is that capturing the surplus land value is an issue connected to
"externalities." As I mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, the surplus land value is a
positive externality generated neither by the capital investment nor the decision of the
property owners.2 I have discussed the five determinants of increases in land value in
Chapter 1 and will not repeat them here. Because only one of the five factors that
affect land value--private investments--is under the control of land owners, a portion
of the increased land value is, thus, a positive externality to them. In dealing with
issues of both negative and positive externalities, the Pigovian argument and the Coase
Theorem are the two most influential ideas.
The Pigovian approach to internalizing an externality is through taxation. For
instance, a factory pollutes the river during its production process. Assume that the
2 Depending on which perspective a person takes to view the impacts of the
increased land value, it can be defined either as a negative or a positive externality.
For example, a renter may perceive increases in land value as a negative externality,
because the potential rises in rent are not related to his or her actions, but the general
increase in demand for housing in the neighborhood. Here, I view the land-value
increment as a financial gain or source of government revenue. Hence, I refer to it as
a positive externality.
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clean water in the river is an "open access" resource; thus, the costs of polluting the
river are not incorporated into the production costs of the factory.3 The pollution,
eventually, leads to high clean-up costs that may have to be imposed on the
community at large. Hence, the private costs of producing the commodity for the
factory diverge from the "social costs." To correct this divergence, Pigou (1920)
suggested that the government should impose a tax on the factory. The tax will
increase the private costs of manufacturing the good to the level where they are equal
to the social costs of production. In his most-celebrated article entitled "The Problem
of Social Cost," Coase (1960, pp. 1-44) challenges the Pigovian argument. Because
Coase's arguments are related to the issues of land leasing, I focus on his ideas here.
One major contribution of Coase's arguments is that the liability of eliminating
externalities is a problem of a reciprocal nature (Coase, 1960, p. 2; 1988, p. 96). He
argues that it is not always clear if the producer of an externality should be liable for
all damages caused, as economists who follow the Pigovian approach always assume
implicitly. In his famous example--the rancher versus the farmer, a liability rule that
prevents the rancher's strayed cattle from damaging the crops of his neighboring
farmer will also inflict harm on the rancher. The rancher may have to reduce the
number of cattle or move them to another location. Both arrangements will affect the
rancher's rights to use and profit from his property. He suggests that the most
"efficient" way to solve the problem is to allow the involved parties to establish a
mutually agreed-upon scheme to share the responsibility of "internalizing" the negative
externality, when the transaction costs are zero. These transaction costs include the
costs of: (1) identifying the appropriate contracting parties, (2) establishing
contractual agreements among participants, and (3) administering and enforcing the
established agreements.4 By knowing with whom to bargain, what amount to
3 I define an open-access resource as a pool of resources for which claims to the
resources are not delineated, assigned, or recognized.
* I will expand these three types of transaction costs to include the costs of
preserving the legitimacy and integrity of government in public land leasing later in
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compensate, and how to enforce the payment, the rancher could reimburse the farmer
the full value of the crops lost. Thus, the distribution of income would remain the
same in the long run.
Coase then applies the concept of transaction costs to examine the allocation of
property rights and its relation to resource uses. He argues that, in the world of zero
transaction costs, the efficiency of resource allocation is not dependent upon the initial
assignment of property rights (or liability of damages), but on the costless negotiations
between the involved parties. If negotiations are costless, the relevant parties will
allocate the scarce resources to individuals who are willing to pay the most for them
and will thus utilize them with utmost efficiency. Coase (1959) illustrates his
argument by using an example of a newly discovered cave. He asserts that whether
the new cave should belong to the person who discovers it, or to the person who owns
the surface of the land where the cave is located, is no doubt dependent on the law of
property. This initial assignment of property rights, however, will only determine the
person with whom it is necessary to establish a contract to use the cave. Once the
designated rights of that person to use, benefit, and exchange are well-defined and
-protected, it is the "unrestricted" exchange, not the law of property, that will direct
the resource to its most valuable use. Subsequently, Stigler (1966, p. 113) extends the
essence of Coase's arguments to the analysis of welfare economics and invents the
term Coase Theorem. Simply put, the theorem predicts that in a world of zero
transaction costs, the parties will bargain to efficient outcomes regardless of the initial
legal entitlement, and the negotiation will have no effect on the distribution of wealth.
Capturing Land Value Through Land Contracting: A Coasian Approach?
The problem of capturing the surplus land value is of a similar nature. Instead
of dealing with a negative externality, analysts can view the socially created land value
as a positive externality. Increases in land value will induce the government and
this chapter. Hence, there are totally four types of transaction costs of land-value
capture in this study.
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landowners to capture this financial gain by establishing a more-defined delineation
and assignment of the right to benefit from land. In delineating and assigning this
right, there is always uncertainty as to who has this right and what portion of the
increased land value should be allocated among the government, the community, and
landowners. Assume that a government, also on behalf of a community, imposes a
heavy property tax to capture the surplus land value. If the government sets the tax
rate too high, the reestablishment of the public's right to benefit from the increased
land value may also limit the landowners' right to profit from their properties. This
action may lead to political resistance from landowners and undermine the incentives
of private individuals to invest in land development. Land values may fall, and
benefits from land production will decrease for both the government and private
developers. If the government sets the property tax rate too low, it may not recover
even the costs of constructing the public infrastructure and recoup the socially created
land value for the community. As I argued in Chapter 1, a fiscal crisis and the
degradation of public infrastructure and social services may emerge.
Both distributive consequences have important implications on land
development. Public goods normally require heavy capital investment and thus incur
high fixed costs. If the government is responsible to provide these goods, it may serve
a large population. With a large quantity of production, the fixed costs per unit of
services of these public goods will be low. If private developers are responsible for
the provision of these services and infrastructure to a small number of residents in a
neighborhood, they may incur a higher fixed cost per unit of production. Conversely,
it may be more efficient for a private individual to develop his or her parcel of land.
This individual may have better information than the government about how the land
should be developed. If the government is responsible for all land and real estate
development, it will require a strong financial capability and a huge bureaucracy to
undertake and manage the massive investments. The productive allocation of land,
therefore, relies on the interdependency between the public and private investments.
The lack of incentive of either party to invest capital in land could impede land
development and uses. The distribution of the land-value increments is an important
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factor that determines the incentives and abilities for both the State and private
individuals to engage in land development. A mutually agreed-upon scheme on how
to divide the land benefits would, thus, have critical ramifications on the allocation of
land resources.
Following Coase's arguments, a possible way to derive agreements on land-
value allocation will be to allow the government and landowners to bargain, when
transaction costs are zero. Indeed, land leasing is a similar approach. Land leasing
from the public sector, in essence, is to contract the "multiple" rights of land from the
government to private developers. In these land contracts, the government and lessees
can establish explicit agreements on how to divide the future increases in land value.
From a Coasian point of view, analysts argue that the assignment of the multiple land
rights through land contracting may be efficient in allocating the increased land value,
when transaction costs are minimal. If these assumptions hold, it will not matter
whether a country establishes a private or public property-rights regime of land,
because the outcomes of the bargaining involved in the exchange of property rights are
independent of the initial assignments of the property-rights entitlement. Property
owners (either the State or private individuals) will be able to derive the most efficient
way of dividing the land-value increments by negotiating costlessly with others. In the
world of zero transaction costs, policy makers and analysts will not have to worry
about what types of land-tenure arrangements they should establish. Instead, they can
concentrate only on formulating mechanisms, such as a "free" land market, to facilitate
effective exchange and contracting of property rights of land.!
' Although Hoffman and Spitzer (1986, 1985, 1982), Harrison and Mckee (1985,
pp. 653-610), Schwab (1988, pp. 237-268), and Shogren (1992, pp. 153-169) have
generally supported the propositions of the Coase Theorem under the condition of zero
transaction costs, other economists remain skeptical of the arguments. Samuelson
(1966, p. 1411), for example, questions whether the condition of zero transaction costs
will be sufficient for two negotiating parties to establish mutual agreements that
maximize wealth. Bromley (1991) argues that a change in legal position affects the
distribution of wealth. Because the involved parties may have different consumption
patterns (or propensities to consume), a redistribution of income will alter their
demands and will thus change the allocation of resources. Cheung (1978, pp. 46-49)
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Following the same logic, many analysts, such as Farvacque and McAuslan
(1992, p. 43) and Archer (1994, p. 24), speculate that the State can capture the future
land-value increments through public land leasing. Their assertion, however, is based
on the assumption that public land leasing could be operated under the conditions of
a simple two-party negotiation and zero transaction costs. These conditions, certainly,
do not hold in the Hong Kong case.
In the literature, discussions of the Coase Theorem are normally confined to
contracting between two private individuals under a free market condition, with the
government, normally, acting as a third party to enforce and protect private property
rights. Moreover, scholars also assume that resources could be reallocated to different
uses easily. There are three aspects of the Hong Kong land-leasing system that
deviate from these conditions. First, the government is the sole landowner and a
contracting party. Because the government can control the supply of land, the
bargaining position between the government and lessees in Hong Kong is not
symmetrical as usually depicted in the literature.
Second, as I will show in Chapters 6 and 7, negotiations involved in land
leasing could be very complex, because there could be more than two bargaining
parties. In fact, the number of parties could be as large as 100. In Hong Kong, most
people live in multiple-storey buildings. In such a building, an owner of an apartment
is considered to be a sublessee of the lease for the land on which the building is
also provides a comprehensive discussion of the arguments against the assumptions of
zero transaction costs.
6 The major distinction between the contracting approach and uses of taxes and
other regulatory policies to capture the increased land value is that: while the former
approach relies on negotiations on property-rights arrangements among involved
parties to settle disputes, the latter is usually dependent upon the government's ability
to exercise its regulatory and taxing powers. I am not implying that land contracting
is a better approach to manage public land than taxation and rules and regulations.
Such an analysis will require some careful comparisons between the actual experiences
of managing public land under the leasehold system and other land-tenure
arrangements, which is beyond the scope of this study.
- 33 -
erected. It is not unusual for a building to have more than 100 units; hence, the land
lease for that building would have more than 100 leaseholders. Owing to this
multiple-holdership of land leases, the parties involved in negotiations would be
numerous.
Third, unlike the discussion in the literature that resources are easily
transferable from one use to another, such as changing the land use from grazing cattle
to growing crops, capital investments in land in Hong Kong are site specific. In other
words, a building designed for a particular land site is not transferable to another.
Demolition of the existing buildings would incur high costs. Because of the asset
specificity of investments in land, lessees who disagree with the government on the
terms of renewal when they try to renew their leases would not be able to reallocate
their capital investments to other uses without incurring high costs. This, in turn, may
undermine the bargaining position of the lessees. The government, however, does not
always have a better bargaining position. If the government takes back land from
lessees who cannot pay additional payments during lease renewals, the lessees may
resist the government's demand by organizing public protests. Political unrest may, in
turn, impede economic growth and the private incentive to invest capital in land
development. Due to all these situations, it would be inappropriate to assume that the
transaction costs of land contracting are insignificant in Hong Kong.
Indeed, many scholars, such as Williamson (1985), Barzel (1989), and North
(1990), have followed Coase's (1988, pp. 1-16) argument of treating the transaction
costs as a focus of analysis rather than assuming that they are zero. North (1990, p.
28) argues that more than 45 percent of national income in the United States between
1870 and 1970 was devoted to facilitating business transactions. These costs of
transacting include expenditures on banking, insurance, finance, legal counseling, and
retailing, etc. Vogel (1987, pp. 149-188), Ellickson (1989, pp. 611-630), and Donohue
(1989, pp. 549-610) conducted some empirical studies of the Coase Theorem; their
results show that transaction costs are high and depend on many factors, such as the
number of contracting parties involved, customary rules, and the role of law in society.
These scholars are not so concerned with the theoretical propositions of the Coase
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Theorem. Instead, they concentrate on applying the transaction-costs concept to
identify costs associated with economic exchanges. Under this framework, they
compare different types of institutional arrangements in terms of their effectiveness in
reducing the costs of transacting. This is the approach that I will take to analyze land
contracting in Hong Kong. In the following sections, I identify the transaction costs
of capturing land value through land leasing. After that, I will discuss whether or not
the existing literature can help me to understand how the parties devise institutions to
minimize these costs.
Transaction Costs of Land Contracting
There are, at least, four types of transaction costs (or problems) of capturing
the surplus land value, when land-tenure is organized under the leasehold systems.
First, there are costs of maintaining the legitimacy of government to negotiate land
contracts. In general, under the public leasehold systems, the government owns all
land. Because the State is managing land resources on behalf of society, there may be
problems associated with how citizens can ensure the State to act in their best
interests. There are costs of establishing some "formal" or "informal" mechanisms to
elect government officials as representatives of the community to negotiate land
contracts and to prevent the excessive use of power by the elected officials. This
critical point about public land leasing deserves a thorough discussion, and I will do
that later in this chapter.
Second, once the legitimacy of the contracting parties is established, there are
costs of defining the participants' property rights to derive benefits from the land-value
increments. Under the leasehold systems, these rights are defined in the land leases.
Using Hong Kong as an example, when the government leases the development rights
to a private developer, both parties agree that a leaseholder must pay a "premium" at
the time when the lease is first established.7 The premium is determined at the public
7 Premium is money collected from land leasing, including the payment received
by the government from a lessee when s/he first establishes the land contract, modifies
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auction. The lessee will also have to pay an additional premium when s/he modifies
the lease conditions or renews the lease. These payments, in theory, allow the
government to capture the increased land value periodically. In Chapters 6 and 7, I
will argue that, in practice, capturing the land value during lease renewals and through
contract modifications incurs high transaction costs in Hong Kong.
Although the lessees' rights to benefit from the surplus land value are stated
explicitly in land leases, there are always uncertainties that the terms of the leases
cannot cover. This is especially true when information is imperfect. Changes in
economic conditions may lead to a misalignment between the government's and
lessees' expectations on their rights to enjoy the benefits from land development.
Contracting parties must negotiate again and bear the costs of redefining their property
rights of land. As I will show in Chapter 7, the contracting parties in Hong Kong did
not anticipate some rapid increases in land value and, thus, argued later on how to
divide these land benefits when lessees renewed their leases.
Third, there are also costs of conducting a negotiation that leads to a bargain.
To avoid the potential conflicts arising from unexpected contingencies, some analysts
argue that contracts should be more detailed. Yet, writing detailed contracts without
ambiguity is difficult because of the limitations of language (Quine, 1960). People
may interpret the meanings of a sentence differently because words possess different
connotations in various contexts. Drawing up contracts with many fine distinctions
may just increase the likelihood that emerging events will fall into the areas of
ambiguity. This may lead to disagreements that will have to be resolved after the fact.
Contracts, therefore, can never specify exactly what actions are to be taken, and what
payments are to be made in all possible future contingencies (Llewellyn, 1931;
Macneil, 1978, pp. 854-906).
In addition, having a land-leasing system does not automatically mean that the
government and private developers will be willing to deal with each other. There has
the lease conditions, or renews her/his lease. I will provide a detailed discussion on
how the government collects the payment in Chapter 4.
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to be an interdependency between the involved parties for achieving some objectives
that are mutually beneficial to them. If one party does not rely on the cooperation of
the other, there will be no incentive for any negotiation.
In Hong Kong, the government subscribes to the idea of public-private
partnership in public land development. Although the government reserves the right to
own land in order to maintain its influence over land use and development and to
capture the surplus land value, it does not want its influence to subvert the incentives
of the private sector to invest capital in land. At the same time, the business
community and industrialists also recognize the role of the State in creating a
favorable environment for their investments, such as providing sufficient infrastructure
and social services to promote and support economic growth. The recognition of these
interdependencies between the government and the private sector helps to bring the
interested parties to the bargaining table.
Although both the government and the private sector see an opportunity for
cooperation, there are still problems of evaluating costs and benefits in a transaction.
If the parties possess very dissimilar views on what constitutes a cost or a benefit and
how it should be measured, they must make an additional effort to reconcile these
differences. A shared language for communication and a common method of
assessing the costs and benefits are needed. Related specifically to the issue of
capturing the surplus land value under the leasehold systems, the parties must
formulate some generally agreed-upon rules of appraising the property and land values
as they have been defined by the profession of real estate appraisal. These
assessments, in turn, will help the government and leaseholders to determine the
approximate amount of payment that lessees must pay to the State during lease
renewals and modifications.
Fourth, finally, there are also costs of administering and enforcing contractual
agreements. Agreements stated in the land contracts must be enforced as they impose
constraints on the behavior of the involved parties. Without any enforcement, it will
increase the uncertainty of whether the contracting parties will continue to observe
their agreements. There must be well-established legal and administrative institutions
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that help the involved parties to enforce their contracts. There are, at least, three types
of administration costs. First, the government must maintain a good record of land
contracts and precise boundaries. Keeping such registers and cadastral record can be
expensive. Second, in order to be able to negotiate with leaseholders on lease terms,
the government needs to reassess land and property values regularly. Constant
reevaluation of property values is also expensive. Third, administering the land-
leasing system requires expertise of the land market. Skilled administrators usually
demand high salaries.
To evaluate a leasehold system, we must know whether the "benefits" derived
from the land-tenure arrangements justify the "costs" incurred. In theory, quantifying
transaction costs is useful in determining whether the benefits from reducing these
costs outweigh the efforts and expenditures incurred. In practice, Williamson (1985,
pp. 390-391) and Cheung (1978, p. 54) recognize that these costs are not always
measurable. In this study, the purpose of using the transaction-costs idea is not to
measure these costs of capturing the surplus land value. Instead, I am interested in
examining what and how transaction costs may affect the land-value capture, and how
the parties involved attempt to reduce these costs. The purpose of bringing the
transaction-costs concept into my analysis is to identify potential complications in
public land leasing and not to quantify them.
Owing to the inherent difficulty of measuring transaction costs, I cannot
ascertain quantitatively whether or not these costs are minimized in my case studies.
If these costs were measurable, I could clearly identify the magnitude of the reduction.
Because I cannot quantify these costs, I assume that the parties minimize the
transaction costs when they invent some mutually agreed-upon rules to enable them to
transact with each other continuously. Conversely, I assume that transaction costs
remain high if the parties cannot generate a new rule from bargaining, or if the
negotiation leads to a stalemate so that the parties can no longer engage in further
dealings.
In this study, I will show that for the Hong Kong leasehold system as a whole,
the above-mentioned transaction costs do not inhibit totally the government's ability to
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capture the land value through land leasing. The system has persisted for the past one
hundred years. One reason, as I will argue in Chapters 6 and 7, is because the
relevant parties are able to invent rules to reduce the costs of land contracting. I
reviewed theories formulated by the New-Institutional-Economics scholars to explore
whether they can explain the Hong Kong case. Three arguments in the literature are
particularly relevant here. First, scholars argue that in order to lower the transaction
costs, the involved parties will adopt a more "efficient" property-rights arrangement,
such as a private property-rights regime. Second, some scholars assert that the
involvement of the State would increase transaction costs. Finally, they also maintain
that the judiciary system plays only a minor role in minimizing costs of transacting.
In the next three sections, I explore each of these propositions thoroughly and contrast
them with the actual experiences found in Hong Kong.
Property Rights as a Focus of Institutional Analysis
Before the early 1960s, classical and neoclassical economists were so absorbed
in their studies of the market institution that the issues of property rights received only
marginal attention.8 It is Alchian (1977, pp. 132-133) who introduces the legal
concept of property rights as a "bundle of rights" to economists, Demsetz (1967. pp.
347-359) who investigates the origin of private property of land among Indian hunters
in the eastern part of Canada, and Coase (1960, pp. 1-44) who indicates the
implications of positive transaction costs on the assignment of property rights and
resource allocation.9 From these pioneering efforts, a vast amount of research and
8 Furubotn and Pejovich (1972, pp. 1137-1162) provide a thorough survey of the
property-rights literature in economics. In their survey, there was no reference prior to
1960, and it might be possible that research on the economics of property rights did
not reemerge until the 1960s.
9 Alchian (1977, p. 132-133) describes the "partitioning" of property rights as:
... at the same time, several people may each possesses some portion of the rights to
use the land. A may possess the right to grow wheat on it. B may possess the right
to walk across it. C may possess the right to dump ashes and smoke on it. D may
possess the right to fly an airplane over it ... And each of these rights may be
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literature has accumulated.
Some scholars, such as Demsetz (1967) and Barzel (1989), argue that costs are
usually incurred in defining property rights and measuring the multiple attributes of
goods before people can engage in exchanges. They, therefore, assert that the
definition of transaction costs will have to include the costs of delineating, assigning,
and policing property rights. Under this broader definition of transaction costs, Barzel
(1989, pp. 2-3) argues that, in reality, where transaction costs are never zero, property
rights are never absolutely defined. Because property rights are not well-defined,
some resources will be placed in the public domain. When the value of the resources
increases, people will be willing to spend time and money to capture the increased
value of these resources by delineating their property rights as explicitly as possible.
As long as the costs of delineating and protecting property rights are not higher than
the benefits captured from these increased values, exchanges between individuals will
lead to a finer delineation of property rights in society. Applying this logic to the
evolution of private property rights of land due to the emergence of fur trade in
Canada, Demsetz (1967) argues that when farming or hunting became commercialized,
the values of products increased. The relevant parties thus established exclusive rights
to capture the benefits.
Following the same rationale, Anderson and Hill (1975, pp. 163-179) propose a
theory of property rights to analyze the evolution of private property rights of land,
water, and cattle on the Great Plains of the American West during the second half of
the nineteenth century. In their analysis, decisions of actors on whether to establish
exclusive rights were dependent upon the marginal costs and marginal benefits of the
delineation and enforcement of property rights. If there was a fall in prices of inputs
in, say, fencing, the marginal costs of exclusion would reduce and, ceteris paribus,
generate the incentives to establish private property rights. Similarly, if the value of
transferable. In sum, private property rights to various partitioned uses of land are
'owned' by different person."
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an asset or the possibility of encroachment by outsiders increased, the marginal
benefits of delimiting an explicit right to exclude would rise.
Examining the change of property-rights institutions based solely on this
cost-benefit analysis will unavoidably lead to the conclusion that private property
rights will be established to minimize the costs of transacting when economic activity
expands. Anderson and Hill do not consider the roles of the State and other legal or
extra-legal institutions in reducing the transaction costs. The omission of these factors
in their analysis eliminates the possibility of other property-rights arrangements.
North and Thomas (1977, pp. 229-241) and North (1981, Ch. 7) use a similar
rationale to make a broad generalization about changes in property-rights institutions
in "prehistoric" times. North and Thomas (1971, pp. 240-241) describe that when
human beings shifted from nomadic hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture,
there was no change in the property-rights arrangements. When plants and animals
were abundant, the costs of establishing exclusive rights were higher than the potential
gains. Hence, open-access regimes persisted at that time, and there was little incentive
for the acquisition of better technology and learning. When population grew and the
value of resources increased, private property rights emerged. With an exclusive right
over resources, owners realized the direct benefits to improve efficiency and
productivity. North and Thomas then argue that the establishment of private property
explains the rapid progress of human history in the last 10,000 years.
The evolution of the "private-property-rights argument" is not limited to the
study of early human history. Williamson (1975) studies the problems of contracting
between firms. He argues that some business exchanges among independent firms
involve extremely high transaction costs due to information asymmetry, asset
specificity, and opportunism. To minimize these costs of contracting, a firm may
acquire suppliers of its intermediate inputs and control their operations within the
hierarchy of the company. The purpose of vertical integration of independent firms is,
therefore, not to create a monopoly, but to minimize the costs of contracting.
One implication of his arguments on the internalization of externality, though
not always feasible, is that generators of pollution can internalize the negative effects
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by purchasing properties in areas that are affected by their pollution, if the transaction
costs of negotiating a dispute settlement, such as compensations, legal fees, and time,
are higher than the costs of buying these properties. When a polluter becomes the
owner of these properties, s/he can pollute without inflicting a harm on other people.
S/he will continue to pollute until the harm that s/he inflicts upon himself or herself is
higher than the benefits derived from the activity that generates the pollutants. By a
finer delineation of the ownership over property, the parties can resolve the conflict
arising from an externality.
One common theme appears in almost all of these early studies; these scholars
imply that there is a natural tendency for society to develop a "more efficient"
property-rights structure to minimize the costs of transacting. This more efficient
structure is, according to these scholars, private property with well-delineated private
exclusive rights to resources.10 Eggertsson (1990, p. 250) called this assertion a
"naive theory of property rights," because it does not incorporate the influences of
social and political institutions in modeling the emergence of private property.
Besides, I think that the theory is also deterministic; it implies that the development of
property-rights institutions will always be directed towards the private property-rights
regime. It thus eliminates the possibility of the wide range of property-rights
arrangements that human beings actually establish to organize production, initiate
contracts, and distribute the benefits of economic activities.
10 There are, at least, three exceptions. In Cheung's (1969) analysis of three
share-tenancy structures in agriculture in the People's Republic of China, he concludes
that different contractual arrangements on the assignment of property rights between
landlords and tenants depends on the gain from risk dispersion and have no effect on
resource uses. The emergence of different land-tenure arrangements is mainly due to
choices of the parties involved to minimize transaction costs under distinct conditions.
Ellickson (1990) made a similar argument about risk-sharing that affects the land-
tenure choices in Jamestown colony, the Israeli Kibbutz, and the medieval open-field
village. Field (1989, pp. 319-345) argues that population growth does not always lead
to the establishment of private property; common and private property may coexist.
The choice between private and common property is dependent on the costs and
benefits of exclusion.
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If I apply the private-property-rights argument to the land-leasing system in
Hong Kong, the rapid increases in land value and the transaction costs of land
contracting should have transformed its land tenure from the public leasehold system
to a private property-rights regime. If the evolution of property-rights institutions
follows a predetermined path that leads to a private property rights, we must explain
why the leasehold system of Hong Kong persists. North (1990, pp. 7-9) argues that
"inefficient" property-rights institutions, such as non-private property-rights system,
can survive for a long time; yet, the persistent of these inefficient arrangements will
hinder economic development." This is a major reason that North provides to
explain the different economic growth rates among countries.
For Hong Kong, public ownership of land does not seem to impede the
economic growth of this city state. In Table 2-1, I show the average annual rates of
growth for selected countries in the 1970s. Hong Kong had a higher growth rate (6.9
percent) than many developing and developed countries, except Korea and Singapore.
In this study, I do not attempt to establish the correlation between public ownership of
land and economic growth, because the topic is beyond the scope of the research.
What the Hong Kong case seems to indicate is that economic growth does not
necessarily require the privatization of land, which is the most scarce and important
factor of production in this city-state.
One shortcoming of these theories of property rights is the treatment of social
and political institutions, such as norms and the polity, as exogenous factors and the
negligence of other feasible property-rights arrangements, such as communal and
public property-rights regimes, as effective institutions to minimize transaction costs.
" North does not state explicitly that an efficient property-rights regime is private
ownership. Yet, in his historical exploration of the economic development of the
United States, he implies that the emergence of private property rights explains the
rapid growth of this country. This renders the situation that his readers may relate all
efficient property-rights institutions to private property rights. In his most recent
article, North (1994, p. 366) admits that "privatization is not a panacea for solving
poor economic performance" in some developing countries and the Eastern European
economies.
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Table 2-1
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH IN GDP PER CAPITA
(at constant prices in selected countries)
Annual rate of
Country Period growth (percent)1
Korea*
Singapore*
Hong Kong*
Taiwan**
Indonesia*
Japan*
Philippines*
West Germany*
United States*
Britain*
1970 - 1978
1970 - 1977
1970 - 1980
1970 - 1974
1970 - 1978
1970 - 1978
1970 - 1980
1970 - 1978
1970 - 1978
1970 - 1978
Source: *Cheng Tong Yung. 1982. The Economy of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong: Far East Publications, p. 132.
**Lethbridge, David G. 1980. The Business Environment
in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, p. 5.
Note: (1) These annual growth rates are ranked in descending
order.
8.5
7.0
6.9
5.4
5.1
3.7
3.3
2.4
2.2
2.0
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Because of these problems, the arguments provided by the above-mentioned scholars
are not helpful for me to understand the Hong Kong case. If the transformation of
property-rights arrangements is not the answer for how the transaction costs of
capturing land value in Hong Kong are reduced, the parties must rely on other
institutional arrangements. I discuss the role of the State in the next section.
The New-Institutional-Economic Analysis of the State
There are two reasons why I examine the role of the State in public land
leasing. First, under the public leasehold systems, the State normally will be the
landowner and thus manages all uses and the supply of land. If a government does
not represent public interests, delegating the ownership of public land to the State may
create opportunities for corruption and misuses of power. The State's effectiveness in
allocating land-value increments and its integrity in upholding public interests are
crucial.
Second, the State as a contracting party will affect the other three transaction
costs. If the State has the uncontestable power to assign the property rights of land,
impose its will during the negotiation, and ignore sanctions against noncompliance to
the contractual agreements, land contracting may not provide the necessary mutual
gains and incentives to private developers to continue dealings with the government.
In private land contracting, for example, there are existing legal doctrines and
conventions that define the process of contract making and the enforcement of
contractual agreements. There is also a "third-party"--presumably the government
and/or a judiciary system--that will enforce these rules. If the government is a
contracting party, this may create a "third-party problem." The party that designs and
enforces the rules of contracting is also the bargaining party involved in contracting.
Analysts may argue that the "government" in most countries is not a monolithic
entity. In the United States, various branches of government are responsible for the
legislative, administrative, and judicial operations. The separation of these
responsibilities, to some extent, creates a system of checks and balances. Yet, in some
developing countries, the balance of governmental power is usually not well
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established. In this circumstance, when the government engages in land contracting, it
may have the ability to define and modify rules and can dictate the process and the
terms of exchange. If one party has a better bargaining position than the other party
in land leasing, the outcomes of negotiation may not necessarily be mutually beneficial
to all involved parties. This unequal power in contracting is particularly problematic
when government officials are only concerned with the pursuit of self-interest. These
officials may sacrifice the public interest for handsome bribes.
Most scholars are skeptical of state intervention; scholars writing in the New
Institutional Economics are no exception. Most analysts conclude implicitly that
government intervention will increase transaction costs, if we include the costs of
safeguarding the State from formulating inefficient rules to intervene in the allocation
of resources. Indeed, one of the reasons why Coase's arguments have attracted so
much attention is that they question the wisdom of the Pigovian tradition. As I have
mentioned earlier, Pigou (1920) argued that government intervention is required to
correct the divergence between marginal private and marginal social costs in society as
markets fail to incorporate the social costs of production and consumption into the
decision rules of individual behavior.
Coase (1960), on the contrary, argues that government actions that are not
subjected to the "discipline" of markets may lead to inefficiency. He urges that
analysts should always weigh the benefits of government intervention against its costs.
If the government's action generates more harm than good, society will be better off
without the intervention. Some scholars who follow Coase's argument derive too
hastily the judgment that the government should play a minimum role in the economy,
except to protect private property rights by maintaining the courts and orders in
society (Cheung, 1978, pp. 62-64; Burton, 1978, pp. 71-91; De Alessi, 1980, pp. 1-47).
An evaluation of the costs and benefits of government involvement is not always
carried out by scholars carefully.
The two different attitudes towards the State between the Pigovian and Coasian
traditions create an interesting dichotomy. On the one hand, Pigou implied that the
State is fully informed in estimating the divergence between the private and social
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marginal costs and calculating the marginal tax. On the other hand, some scholars
argue that the State is totally ignorant in dealing with the problems (Buchanan, 1984,
pp. 159-173). Apparently, Coase (1988, pp. 118-119) is correct in emphasizing that
scholars must examine explicitly the costs and benefits of state intervention in
economic transactions in their analyses rather than assume that state action will
increase transaction costs and reduce social welfare. In the next section, I review why
some scholars believe that there is an inherent problem of state involvement in the
assignment and enforcement of property rights.
The State and Property Rights
As I argued earlier, when transaction costs of contracting property rights among
individuals are not zero, an impartial third party may be needed to safeguard any
opportunistic behavior of participants in exchanges." Whether or not the State can
eliminate opportunistic behavior will depend on enforcement. To have a credible and
effective enforcement mechanism, the parties involved must surrender part of their
rights and delegate certain power to the enforcer. For instance, we must pay taxes to
the government so that it can set up a judiciary system and a police force to protect
our property. Besides, we sometimes subordinate part of our liberty and rights to the
decisions of the courts in settling disputes.
These power relationships between the State and its constituents create the
fundamental dilemma: a government that is strong enough to protect private property
is also capable of confiscating the wealth of its citizens (Hobbes, 1928; North, 1981,
p. 20; Weingast, 1993, pp. 286-311). Moreover, when a political system becomes
more complex, the power that citizens delegate to officials will be further assigned to
bureaucrats who work at different levels of government. Within an intricate system of
assigning power and duties to elected officials and their agents, how can the principles
12 Certainly, there are other institutions, such as social norms, that can prevent the
contracting parties from violating the contractual agreements (Ellickson, 1991;
Williamson, 1985). In this section, I focus on the role of the State as a third party to
lower the chance of opportunistic behavior.
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(citizens) ensure that their agents (bureaucrats) will make decisions that serve their
interests? Political scientists and economists, such as Brennan and Buchanan (1985),
Buchanan (1985, 1991), March and Olsen (1989), Ostrom (1987; 1993, pp. 43-68), and
Moe and Caldwell (1994, pp. 171-195) have argued for the establishment of a
constitution to restrict the power of the State. Other scholars, such as North (1981,
1990) and Weingast and Marshall (1988, pp. 132-163), have applied the concept of
transaction costs to examine these political problems.
North (1981, pp. 20-32) asserts that the study of property rights cannot be
divorced from the State. In his analysis, North follows the assumption that
government officials are interested only in maximizing their own "rents" (Tullock,
1965; Krueger, 1974, pp. 291-303). According to North, a rent-seeking ruler has two
objectives. The first is to establish a structure of property rights that facilitates
economic exchanges and growth in order to accumulate rents for the ruler. The
second is to provide public goods and services, such as law, justice, and defense,
designed to lower the costs of specifying, negotiating, and enforcing contracts. The
lowering of transaction costs will promote economic growth and, in turn, expand the
tax revenue for the State.
North (1981, p. 28) argues that the first objective is, however, inconsistent with
the second. A rent-seeking ruler may not always supply appropriate public services to
lower transaction costs. Instead, to maximize rents and maintain its power, a State
may tolerate and even contrive an inefficient property-rights institution that favors the
politically powerful groups in society. In the absence of enforceable private property
rights, there will be no incentive for individuals to invent new knowledge and adopt
them to create more efficient production processes. Inefficiencies may occur and, in
turn, hinder the development of an economy.
North (1993b, p. 11-12) argues that "throughout most of history and in much of
the present world, institutions have not provided the credible commitment necessary
for the development of low-cost transacting in capital and other markets." Using this
logic, he then explains why some economies suffered from prolonged stagnation,
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whereas economies in the Western World that were built upon some democratic
political structures and private property could experience rapid growth.
Similar to North's argument, Libecap (1989, pp. 115-116) sees the State as a
vehicle for the political influential groups of a society to protect their property rights.
If the distributive consequences of the institutional change will jeopardize the welfare
of the powerful groups, they will lobby politicians to block the change. Politicians
who try to maximize votes and political and financial support will be more responsive
to demands from the most influential interest groups. In analyzing the allocation of
"common" resources, such as oil reservoirs and federal mineral, timber, and range land
in the United States, he finds that legal precedents and the prohibition of defining
exclusive rights to natural resources are mostly outcomes of lobbying congressional
politicians and government officials by various interest groups. These lobbying efforts
make any modification of property-rights institutions difficult.
Scholars have proposed the idea of federalism to ensure the representation of
the government and to limit its power (Tiebout,1956; Weingast, 1993). Even under
such a system, there are still problems of constraining the State to play a role of
protecting and enforcing property rights and not abusing its power in pursuing its own
interests. These problems include "political free ridership" (North, 1981, p. 31),
transaction costs of "logrolling" or "vote trading" (Shepsle, 1989, 131-147; Weingast
and Marshall, 1988, pp. 132-163; Becker, 1983, pp. 371-400; Tullock, 1981, pp. 189-
202), and the inflexibility of the Congressional committee system to meet the change
in public preferences (Shepsle, 1992, pp. 245-263).
The problems of creating a polity with a system of checks and balances seems,
at least according to the above-mentioned scholars, intractable. North (1993b, pp. 11-
23), Williamson (1994), and Shepsle (1992, pp. 245-263), argue that "credible
commitment" is the fundamental issue.13 At present, there has been very little
"3 Shepsle (1992, p. 247) has proposed a very interesting definition of credible
commitment: "A commitment is credible in either of two senses--the motivational and
the imperative respectively . . . a commitment is credible in the motivational sense if
subsequently (at the time of performance) the committee continues to want to honor
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progress in postulating a theory or proposing some practical programs that can help
policy makers to build an accountable and effective government. As North (1994,
p. 366) indicated in his 1993 Nobel Prize lecture:
Polities significantly shape economic performance because they define and
enforce the economic rules. Therefore, an essential part of development policy
is the creation of polities that will create and enforce efficient property rights.
However, we know very little about how to create such polities.
The current difficulties that scholars and analysts are facing in reforming the political
and economic institutions in Russia and some Central and Eastern European countries
are examples. As the 21st Century approaches, the problem of public commitment
remains a continuing challenge.
As some scholars are struggling with the issues of creating institutional
mechanisms to bind officials to their commitments of pursuing public interests, others
are searching for alternatives from a totally different direction. There is growing
dissatisfaction with the assumption that the pursuit-of-self-interest doctrine uses to
depict the nature of human beings (Sabel, 1993, pp. 80-86). Some scholars, such as
Polanyi (1944), Granovetter (1985, pp. 481-510), and Tendler and Freedheim (1994,
pp. 176-209), argue that human beings do not always seek to maximize their own
well-being. Instead, whether they will behave as rent-seekers or public-minded beings
depends on the context in which they "socialize" with each other. According to these
scholars, many of our economic and social behaviors are "embedded" in social norms
(Granovetter, 1985).
The Hong Kong Government
Although all these ideas show how a country under a democratic political
system may restrict the power of the State, they do not provide an explanation for the
that commitment; a commitment is motivationally credible because it is incentive-
compatible and hence self-enforcing. It is credible in the imperative sense, on the
other hand, if the committee is unable to act otherwise, whether he or she wants to do
or not . . . because performance is coerced or discretion to do otherwise is disabled."
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Hong Kong case. The Hong Kong political system is not founded on democracy
(Miners, 1991). The Governor of Hong Kong is not publicly elected. In addition,
there is no explicit statement in the Constitution of Hong Kong that requires the
Governor to seek consent from or consult with members of the legislative and
administrative councils when he decides on a piece of legislation and other public
policy. The judicial system plays no role in constraining the power of the Governor.
In the past, courts never struck down any legislation. Ordinances were disallowed, but
this was due to a political action taken by the British Parliament in London and not a
decision made by judges in Hong Kong (Miner, 1991, p. 59). In sum, there is no
formal mechanism of checks and balances against the power of the State in the Hong
Kong political system.
Given these characteristics of the Hong Kong government, the theories of the
State provided by the property-rights school would predict that the government could
exploit its control over public land by extracting as much rent as possible from
leaseholders. The government could act as a predator or allocate land benefits only to
the powerful interest groups to maintain their support for the regime. In Chapter 6, I
will show that this prediction did not materialize empirically. Despite the fact that the
government is endowed with tremendous political and legal power, lessees are able to
express their dissatisfaction with the government land policy through litigations and
public protests with varying degree of success.
The major deficiency of the New-Institutional-Economic theory of the State in
explaining the Hong Kong situation is that scholars perceive the State either as being a
predator or an instrument of oppression of one class by another. Because they assume
that power is the key element of social control, the State that is the enforcer of the
formal rules is believed to be extremely powerful. Yet, there are always opposing
views in every sphere of our life. No matter how oppressive a political regime is,
there are countering forces that attempt constantly to undermine the power of an
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exploitative government." The task at hand is to understand how the interplay of
these forces solves (or complicates) the problems of social and economic exchanges. I
will show in this study that the capability of the State to capture the land value does
not depends solely on the exercise of governmental power or the legal power of being
a landowner. Instead, the outcomes of the capture are also dependent upon the
strategies that lessees used to resist the government's demands. I will discuss these
strategies in detail in Chapter 3.
Another institution that the New Institutional economists and other scholars
have studied in related to the minimization of transaction costs is law. Law is related
closely with the issues of the State and private property rights. According to Hobbes
(1928, p.94), the enforcement of law must require "some coercive power to compel
men equally to perform their covenants," and he assumed that the State will exercise
this power. Bentham also (1978, p. 51) asserted that "property and law are born
together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away
laws, and property ceases." I investigate the role of law in minimizing transaction
costs in the Hong Kong case next.
Laws and Transaction-Costs Minimization
The roots of the movement for combining the study of law and economics
dated back to the 1950s when antitrust law, corporate law, public utility regulation,
and federal taxation were brought under the scrutiny of economics (Posner, 1993, pp.
82-85). At that time, economists rediscovered the importance of legal institutions; and
the legal profession was attracted by an experimental theory of institutional analysis
based on economic reasoning. This trend shifted the attention of some economists to
the writings of political economists, such as Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons
(Rutherford, 1990). Commons (1934) recognizes the potential conflicts that emerge
" See De Soto (1989) and Razzaz (1993, pp. 341-355) for some examples of how
citizens who appear powerless in society challenge the land and housing policies of
the state in Jordan and Peru.
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from collective actions and asserts that the reconciliation of these conflicts is
dependent on the interaction between individuals and collective decision-making
processes of which governmental and judicial institutions play some important roles.
According to Coase (1988, pp. 119-120), when transaction costs are positive in
contracting, the parties may rely on laws to settle disputes arising from economic
exchanges. Inspired by the works of Commons and Coase, scholars have developed a
new area of study called "Law and Economics."
Many scholars have examined the role of law in contracting. Macaulay (1963,
pp. 55-69) investigates the contractual relationships among businessmen in Wisconsin
and finds that "non-contractual" relations dominated the commercial practice in this
community. Non-contractual relations, as defined by Macaulay, are based on: (1)
general written agreements that cover as many foreseeable contingencies as possible
and (2) non-legal sanctions to induce desirable performance. Businessmen, in his
study, find formal contract and contract law unnecessary because nonlegal sanctions,
such as commitments to honor promises and produce high quality commodities, exist.
With repetitive dealings, the reputation of upholding these commitments becomes the
most important asset of a business person. The protection of one's reputation, in turn,
acts as an effective enforcement of acting responsibly to pledges and quality in
business transactions.
Following a similar argument, Williamson (1979, pp. 236-238) asserts that
"relational," instead of detailed, contracts are more often used in business agreements.
Because the involved parties cannot foresee all future contingencies in contracting,
most contracts are incomplete and imperfect documents. He maintains that the parties
usually insert some "general clauses" in the contracts that form a framework of
contemplating means to settle unexpected disputes. Under these clauses, parties will
try to use bilateral efforts or arbitration rather than court ordering to resolve conflicts.
Even if the bilateral efforts and arbitration fail, Williamson emphasizes that the
contract laws and courts are still deficient in dealing with problems of contracting
among firms because judges are not better informed about the nature of the dispute
than the parties involved. Knowledge about the circumstance and plausible solutions
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can only be communicated to the court at great costs. He proposes to reorganize the
horizontal networks among firms that supply and consume each other's products into a
hierarchical structure. The hierarchy of the firm would then become its own court of
appeal.15
In his study of how members of a small community in Shasta County of
California handle the "classic" cattle-trespassing disputes, Ellickson (1991, pp. 280-
282) finds that the presence of transaction costs leads people to ignore, rather than
resort to, law. The social norms within this community emphasize the notion that
being a "good" neighbor is to settle disputes "informally." These norms, in turn, make
residents pay little attention to law. It is costly to obtain information about laws and
to settle disputes in courts in an isolated place such as the Shasta County. Local
residents, therefore, decide to solve their communal problems based on social norms.
In this study, I will show that law plays a "mixed" role in reducing transaction
costs of allocating the land-value increments. In settling the disputes over the
allocation of the increased land value, courts' rulings did not dictate the outcome.
Although judges found that the Hong Kong government had the legal right to demand
a large payment from lessees for renewing their leases, these legal decisions were
challenged in the political sphere. Despite backing from the judiciary system, the
government, eventually, had to yield to the demands of the public.
When lessees could not agree among themselves on the conditions of renewing
their land contract with the government, the government legislated a new law to
reduce the costs of negotiation. At present, the avoidance of the government to
exercise its legal power remains as a major incentive for the lessees to work out an
agreement among themselves. Simply put, in the Hong Kong case, law appeared to
play no significant role in minimizing transaction costs in one of my case studies, but
" Williamson's arguments do not ignore norms as a major mechanism for private
ordering. The "corporate culture"--norms of the entity--will certainly determine when
parties involved in a dispute will appeal to a higher authority within the company or
will "work things out" themselves.
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were effective in doing so in another. I will discuss all these cases thoroughly in
Chapter 7.
Summary
In this chapter, I expand the transaction-costs concept to include the costs of
preserving the government's legitimacy to act as a contracting party in leasing public
land. With the extension, I identify four types of transaction costs in capturing surplus
land value. In reviewing the literature on how the evolution of the property-rights
institution, the State, and law can reduce (or increase) these transaction costs, I found
that answers provided by scholars cannot explain fully the situation in Hong Kong.
First, I question the argument that the evolution of private property rights is a
natural tendency towards the reduction of transaction costs in economic exchanges. In
short, the contracting parties can only minimize costs of transacting by establishing
private property rights. In this study, I will show that in Hong Kong where land is
under public ownership, the government who is the landowner also has the incentive
to minimize the costs associated with the capturing of the increased land value. Put
differently, public land ownership does not necessarily mean transaction costs of land-
value capture are high, and the incentive to lower them is absent.
Second, I reexamine the argument of the State as an institution in increasing
transaction costs. Scholars of the New Institutional Economics usually implicitly or
explicitly conclude that government intervention will create high transaction costs.
According to the theory, the transaction costs of land leasing in Hong Kong would be
high and insurmountable, because the Hong Kong government, as a landowner, has
exerted tremendous influence over the allocation of land and land-value increments in
this city-state. Government intervention would have distorted the distribution of land
benefits and prohibited profitable land transactions. I will show in Chapter 6 that this
argument does not seem to apply to Hong Kong.
Third, the discussion of law in the literature as an institution to reduce
transaction costs also provides a partial explanation for the Hong Kong experience.
Scholars believe that laws and the courts are deficient in dealing with the problems of
contracting. In the Hong Kong case, the resolution of the conflict arising from the
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distribution of land value was not solely based on the court rulings. This seems to
affirm this argument. Yet, when negotiation costs among lessees on the terms of lease
renewal were high, the law becomes important in reducing these costs.
Although these theories do not explain the role of institutions in lowering (or
increasing) transaction costs, it does not mean that these theories are wrong because
Hong Kong is a special case.16 These theories just do not account for the unique
processes of how the parties in Hong Kong reduce the transaction costs of allocating
the increased land value. I develop an analytical framework in the next chapter to
study these processes.
16 One peculiarity of Hong Kong is that its government is British, and its economic
communities are largely Chinese. As I will show in Chapter 6, the separation of political
from economic interests was easier to achieve under such conditions. The British may
have perceived a greater benefit from stimulating a vibrant Chinese economy in Hong
Kong than from attempting to dominate it.
CHAPTER 3
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, I develop an analytical framework to analyze how the
contracting parties in Hong Kong used different strategies to reformulate rules so as to
minimize transaction costs and why they chose these strategies. I select four strategies
that the parties employed individually or jointly to influence rule revision. They are
"exit," "voice," "persuasion," and "coercion," which were the key tactics that the
government and lessees used in the Hong Kong case. (I will define and discuss each
of them in detail later.)
There are two reasons why a framework is needed. First, to understand the
process of how the parties selected their strategies when they faced different
transaction costs and institutional constraints, I need a framework to help me to ask
questions about the context and then identify the strategy that the parties used to
reduce transaction costs. Second, not only does the framework assist me to identify
various possible strategies, the knowledge about the potential consequences associated
with each strategy could have important policy implications. If a strategy can lead to
a more desirable outcome than the other tactics in a specific situation, government
officials can establish policy to make that strategy more attractive and the alternatives
less appealing to the contracting parties. In this way, officials may be able to shape
the outcome of their land policy initiatives.
I base my framework on the work of Hirschman (1970); therefore, I first
explain the connection between Hirschman's ideas of exit and voice and the issues of
minimizing transaction costs in the Hong Kong case. Second, I modify Hirschman's
exit-voice concept and argue for the incorporation of persuasion and coercion in his
framework.! Third, I show that the choice of strategy at the operational level is
1 Many scholars, such as Libecap (1989, pp. 10-28), North (1993a, pp. 35-46),
Ostrom (1990, pp. 182-216), Feeney (1993, pp. 159-212), and Polenske (1995) have
developed various frameworks to analyze institutional change and property-rights
relations. Not all of them focus explicitly on the different strategies that the involved
parties use to change institutions and lower transaction costs. Hence, I decided to use
a modified exit-voice framework.
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restricted and determined by the existing collective and constitutional rules. At the
end of this chapter, I combine the transaction-costs concept with the framework
developed here and explain how I will apply them to examine land-value capture in
Hong Kong.
Hirschman's Exit-Voice Concept and Institutional Change
In his book entitled Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman (1970, pp. 120-126)
illustrates how the interplay of exit and voice shapes the behavior of firms and
political organizations. Economists have typically assumed that consumers express
their dissatisfaction with an organization's products by withdrawing their demand
(exit). Political scientists, on the other hand, think that the same dissatisfaction could
be articulated through protests (voice). Hirschman skillfully brings these two
strategies into one framework and explains how the relevant parties can combine them
to convey their grievances more effectively to decision-makers of a deteriorating
organization. More importantly, he argues that exit could be a dominant mechanism
over voice in some conditions and vice versa at the others. (I will discuss
Hirschman's exit-voice concepts in detail later in this chapter.)
Hirschman's framework is very useful in studying institutional change because
it covers explicitly the context in which an actor selects a specific strategy to revise
rules and examines the effectiveness of her/his strategy in shaping other people's
behavior and decision. Many scholars have applied Hirschman's framework to
analyze various social and political issues including union bargaining (Freeman and
Medoff, 1984); administration of both health and educational services (Stevens, 1974);
movements of labor and capital as political actions (Hunting and Nelson, 1976;
Hirschman, 1993, pp. 173-202); formation of political parties (Hirschman, 1981);
marriage and divorce (Hirschman, 1992, pp. 77-101); adolescent development
(Gilligan, 1986, pp. 283-300); and politics and development (Peattie, 1994, pp. 118-
130).2 In this study, I add to this list by applying a "modified exit-voice" framework
2 See Hirschman (1992, pp. 77-101) for a summary of some applications.
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to examine how the parties minimize the transaction costs of land-value capture in
Hong Kong. To show that the exit-voice idea is applicable to the Hong Kong case, I
relate it to the issues of transaction costs in the next section.
Exit, Voice, and Transaction Costs
Hirschman (1992, pp. 85-87) indicates the usefulness of applying his exit-voice
idea to analyze whether economic activity should be conducted in the markets or
within an hierarchy of a firm--a central issue in the studies of the New Institutional
Economics. Williamson (1975) and Joskow (1991, pp. 51-83) argue that when the
transaction costs of contracting--information asymmetry, opportunism, and asset
specificity--are high, a firm will organize its manufacturing activities within its
hierarchy rather than subcontracting them out to an independent firm.
A reformulation of the issue in terms of Hirschman's exit-voice framework
yields some interesting insights to the argument. Assume that a company subcontracts
part of its production to an independent firm, if the subcontractor does not perform
according to the contract, the company can employ three strategies to correct the
problem. First, the company can terminate its contract with the subcontractor (exit)
and engage in another contracting relationship with another independent firm. Because
of imperfect information in drafting contracts, considerable apprenticing of the
subcontractor by the company, and dishonesty in revealing production problems, the
strategy of exit will never be effective in disciplining an independent subcontractor.
This leads the company to the second option--Voice. The firm may acquire the
subcontractor and turn it into a subdivision of the company. With the operation of the
subcontractor under the control of the firm, complaints about bad performances could
be resolved within its hierarchy, such as appealing to the top management.
Hirschman (1970, Ch. 7) proposes a third option--voice with the threat of exit
or loyalty. The company may feel a sense of loyalty and responsibility towards the
subcontractor and is willing to continue its dealing with the subcontractor on the
condition that it must improve its performance. Because of loyalty, the strategy of
total abandonment or voice would be replaced by the combination of the two. The
- 59 -
contractor will continue to use voice to try to improve the performance of the
subcontractor. If the performance continues to deteriorate beyond a certain threshold,
the contractor will terminate the contractual relationships. Loyalty, therefore, will
avoid overrapid exit and, in turn, give the subcontractor an opportunity to correct
her/his problems.
Hirschman's proposal depicts better the contractor-subcontractor relationships
in reality where monitoring of the parties performance is neither totally based on
competition in the markets nor the supervision within the hierarchy of a firm (Sabel,
1993, pp. 65-123). Trust relations, commitments, and reputation are elements that
allow the contractor-subcontractor relationships go beyond the extremes of "make" and
"buy" (Helper, 1991, pp. 781-824; Sabel, 1992, pp. 215-250). While the New
Institutional economists identify the transactions costs of organizing production and
provide an "idealized" solution based on cost-benefit analysis, Hirschman articulates
different strategies of reducing transaction costs and the possible outcomes associated
with each tactic. The former focuses on rationalizing the problems and plausible
solutions, the latter concentrates on the process of how the involved parties resolve the
predicaments.
Exit-Voice Framework and Land-Value Capture in Hong Kong
The exit-voice framework is applicable in explaining part of the experience of
land-value capture in Hong Kong. One reason why the government failed to capture
the land-value increments during lease renewals was because of the high transaction
costs of delineating its and the lessees' rights to benefit from land. According to the
agreements established in the "renewable" land leases before the 1970's, the
government could set rent for lease renewal based on the full market value of the
leased land. (I will explain what a renewable lease is in Chapter 4 and provide a
detailed account of the controversy in Chapter 7.) Owing to some unexpected rapid
increases in land prices, lessees whose leases were up for renewal would have to pay
an annual rent many times larger than the original amount. Because of this huge
increase in land rent, the government and the lessees disagreed on what the appropriate
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amount of rent for lease renewal should be. Negotiations involved in contract
renewals between the parties became problematic.
Unwilling to pay that rent, lessees tried to challenge the government's
demands. According to the exit-voice framework, the lessees could employ two
strategies. The first was exit, that is, to terminate the contractual relationship with the
government by not renewing their leases. This strategy would incur a very high cost
for the lessees. As I stated in Chapter 2, capital investments in land were asset- and
location-specific, because the design and the use of a building were usually tailored
towards the location and size and shape of the land. If a lessee did not renew the
contracts, s/he had to revert the land to the government. Although the government
would compensate her/him for the structure erected on the leased land, negotiation
costs, such as legal fees and time, of determining the amount of compensation and
relocation expenses could be high. In this situation, exit would not be a viable option.
The other strategy was to challenge the government authority by appealing to
the courts (voice). After several legal battles, the Privy Council in London--the
highest judicial body under the Hong Kong legal system--finally ruled that the
government had the legal right to determine the rent for lease renewal. Although the
government won the case, the outcome did not resolve the dispute. As the
government continued to charge a high rent to lessees, its policy began to affect more
leaseholders whose leases would expire soon. Because all these lessees faced the
same possibility of paying the high rent, the situation created a favorable environment
for the lessees to organize public protests, which is another form of voice. As the
criticism towards the government lease-renewal policy grew stronger, some business
groups threatened to relocate their operations overseas if the increases in rent would be
passed on to them in the form of high labor and capital costs. The combined strategy
of public protests (voice) and possible capital flight (exit) was effective in forcing the
government to change the rule of calculating the land rent for lease renewal.
Although Hirschman's exit-voice framework is useful in identifying the lessees'
strategy to revise the rules of land contracting, there are, at least, two issues that his
framework does not cover. First, his framework does not include the strategy that the
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lessees employed to enlist more people to join their protests. The effectiveness of
public protests depends on the number of participants. How did the lessees encourage
others, such as the business community and politicians, to join their protests? An
explicit consideration of this matter in a framework will me help to understand when
and why collective actions that determined the outcome of land-value capture were
possible.
Second, his framework does not lead me to examine why the government
yielded to the public pressures. I do not know what strategy the government used to
counter the challenges of leaseholders and why its strategy failed. To incorporate
these issues in my analysis, I must expand the exit-voice framework.
Extension of the Exit-Voice Framework
In applying Hirschman's framework, I make two modifications to its original
structure. First, I introduce persuasion and coercion as two other tactics. Second, I
add to the framework the three levels of analysis proposed by Kiser and Ostrom
(1982, pp. 179-222) and Ostrom (1990), namely the operational, collective-decision,
and constitutional levels. Before I explain the reasons for these changes, I restate
briefly Hirschman's original ideas of exit, voice, and loyalty.
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
In commodity exchanges, as I stated earlier, exit means that a person
withdraws from a transaction with a firm, because normally a better good or service is
available from other companies. Hirschman argues that exit is a "recuperation
mechanism" that consumers use to discipline managers who perform "badly." If Firm
A charges a higher price than its competitors, the well-informed consumers will leave
Firm A (exit) and buy from the other firms. The exit of one individual does not
necessarily generate pressure for change, because the loss of revenue will be
insufficient to induce any reconsideration of the firms' present business practice. Only
when more customers shift to its competitors will Firm A attempt to improve
efficiency to avoid bankruptcy.
- 62 -
The use of exit to influence decisions and behavior is not limited to
transactions carried out in the markets; it can also be applied in social and political
exchanges. People may migrate to other countries because of the deteriorating
economic and political conditions of their home country, provided that there is no
restriction on migration. Hirschman argues that total abandonment would undermine
voice and not improve the performance of a country or a political organization.
Instead, it may lead to a further deterioration of the troubling conditions. For
example, if dissents leave voluntarily or involuntarily a repressive country, the force to
challenge the existing regime will be weakened and eventually dissolved. Without any
political resistance, the government may become more, rather than less, oppressive.3
Unlike exit that may impair the chance of recovery of a deteriorating
organization, voice would normally improve the performance by providing a direct
feedback to the organization. According to Hirschman (1970, p. 30), voice is the
attempt to change the management through individual or collective petitions, appeals
to higher authority, or public protests. Voice, as Hirschman infers in his writing, is
the expression of dissatisfaction in the form of confrontation. Thus, although voice is
more effective than exit, it is neither pleasant nor easy. It may even be dangerous,
because many governments may not be willing to accept criticisms brought forth by
their citizens (Hirschman, 1992, p. 79). Besides, the effectiveness of voice is
dependent upon its "volume." Decision makers of a firm or a political organization
may not listen to a grievance unless the issue is conveyed to them collectively. In
comparison to exit, which is impersonal and requires no coordination, voice is costly
in terms of effort and time to organize.
The combination of exit and voice as a strategy can either supplement or
contradict each other. If exit is used as a threat to improve performance, it will
reinforce voice. Boycott is an example. I mentioned earlier that abandonment will
3 In his study of the political changes that occurred in East Germany in 1989,
Hirschman (1993, pp. 173-202) reformulates his original argument by arguing that out-
migration (exit) of East Germans to the West reinforced protest against the regime
(voice).
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undermine voice. Yet, Hirschman (1970, pp. 76-105) stresses that total abandonment
is impossible because of loyalty. Loyalty is a sense of belonging, trust, and
responsibility that members possess towards an organization or a country. This
attachment will delay immediate exit even though conditions are degenerating. If the
loyalty is not "blind," loyalists will try to improve the situation through voice.
Persuasion
Although Hirschman discusses the role of loyalty in reshaping the performance
of an organization, he does not show how this sentiment is developed among
members. Hirschman does not explain the process of how the parties generate a trust
relation and shared understanding among themselves and, in turn, become loyal to the
group. Indeed, the usage of voice in Hirschman's discussion has already limited the
possibility of loyalty. The emphasis on voice as a confrontational strategy implies that
the parties cannot derive consensus over disagreements through persuasive
communication and "reflexive discussion" (Lindblom, 1970, Ch 4; Habermas, 1984;
Sabel, 1993, 1994). Persuasive communication and reflexive discussion promote
mutual intelligibility and realignment of conflicting interests. Instead of raising voice
to one another, some scholars, such as Lindblom (1970), believe that people can
reconcile differences through writing, reading, talking, listening, acting, and observing.
If people communicate to influence each other's opinion or behavior, communication
must be persuasive. Talking is not a persuasive communication unless person A can:
(1) convey her ideas to person B clearly, and (2) convince person B that the
conversation has important meanings and, thus, shape his or her behavior. In essence,
persuasion is an indispensable element in communication and reflection if it is
employed as a strategy to shape people's actions (Lindblom, 1970; Sabel 1993).
I would argue that persuasion is one of the key strategies to generate loyalty.
In the business world, corporations use persuasive advertisements to create consumers'
loyalty towards their products. Politicians use propaganda, consultation, advice, and
education to engender trust relations with the public. The President of the United
States makes regular speeches in radio and television to solicit political supports for
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his proposed policy. By persuading the majority of the public that his policy is in
their best interests, the President may convince legislators who need votes from the
public to pass the bill in the Congress.
Persuasive communication is often used even in an authoritarian regime. A
dictator may try to establish blind trust by molding the minds of his or her subjects
through broadcasting, pageantry, and education. Hitler made as many as fifty
broadcasts to indoctrinate his ideas of racial supremacy and Nazism into the minds of
the German masses (Lindblom, 1977, p. 53). In Communist China, Mao spoke for
egalitarianism and the creation of the "new men." Without convincing the public that
duty, patriotism, and communal spirits would lead the country to modernization and
prosperity, the communist party would have to rely on other systems of social control,
such as coercion, to mobilize the huge population. These connections between
persuasion and loyalty is absent from the discussion in Hirschman's book.
Hirschman also does not discuss the role of persuasion in enhancing voice.
O'Donnell (1986, pp. 251-252) identifies this issue and draws the distinction between
"vertical" and "horizontal" voices. Vertical voice is the conveyance of discontent to
"the top" through public protests. Horizontal voice is the utterance and exchange of
opinion and concern among citizens. Horizontal voice is a necessary precondition to
mobilize vertical voice, because the effectiveness of public protests is dependent upon
the number of participants. Organizers, therefore, must persuade more people to join
their rally using horizontal voice. The more persuasive is the cause of their appeals,
the larger the number of people who will join. More supporters will, in turn, engender
the necessary "power" for them to shape public policy.
In the Hong Kong case, persuasion played an important role in shaping the
outcomes of land-value capture. For the conflict arising from lease renewal that I
discussed earlier, protestors used the mass media effectively to convince the public
and other major business groups that the new rent charged by the government was
unreasonable. As the number of participants in the protests grew larger, the
government's authority over its claim on the increased land value was undermined. A
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complete explanation of the result of this incident, thus, requires the incorporation of
persuasion as one of the strategies in my framework.
Coercion and Voice as Power Relation
I argue that power as a social relation is partly imbedded in the concept of
voice in Hirschman's discussion. He concentrates mainly on the vertical voice that
represents complaints, protests, and appeals to a higher authority from the public,
which is the use of power exerted from the civil society. Voice from the civil society,
however, is only one kind of power execution.
Power, according to Foucault (1978, pp. 92-94), can be exercised from
innumerable points, and there is no one system of domination. Power relations exist
within the family and workplace, between gender, among races, etc. Whenever a
person misuses her/his power, the action may generate resistance from other people.
Because power can be exerted from different spheres in society, such as the State or
the civil society, resistance is not confined in one single domain (Foucault, pp. 95-96).
Bowles and Gintis (1987, p. 97) provide a similar definition of power:4
Power is the capacity to render social action effective. It is coextensive with
neither the state, nor with physical force, nor with fact-to-face command.
Power may be exercised through the ability to overcome the resistance of
others ... but it may equally be exercised through the ability to avoid
resistance.
Using this definition, the State can also exercise power to achieve its objectives in
society. In most countries, people delegate a certain degree of their power to the State
for collective decisions, the provision of public goods, and the maintenance of public
orders. From the delegation of power, the State acquires authority. The plurality of
power and the resistance are only implicitly touched upon by Hirschman.
4 There is no one generally agreed-upon definition of power in the literature. See
Lukes (1986) for a collection of papers on the study of power. I select this definition
because it is most useful for my discussion of the Hong Kong case.
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A framework that contains only one kind of power--voice--would not be
sufficient to examine the experience of land-value capture in Hong Kong. Voice will
only identify the resistance from the lessees in the form of public protests to challenge
the government's rules of allocating the land-value increments. To account for the
power exercised by the government, I need a broader framework. Because power is a
structure or a relation, it cannot be treated as a strategy; instead, how and when to
exercise a person's power is a strategy. In this study, I call the government's strategy
to exert its legal or political power to force lessees to accept its rules for dividing land
value as coercion. For actions taken by lessees, I use voice to characterize the
exercise of their power.
Indeed, the interplay of the coercion-voice relations between the State and the
lessees had important implications on the outcome of capturing the surplus land value.
In the case of lease renewal, although the State had the legitimacy and the legal
backing to coerce lessees to accept its rules, voice forced the government to revise its
policy and make major concessions. A framework that includes the element of
coercion and voice will help to identify the question of how the public resistance (or
voice) to the coercion of the State shaped the outcome of land-value capture.
In sum, I choose exit, voice, persuasion, and coercion in my framework as four
key strategies that the parties used to revise rules of allocating land value. My
framework does not represent a total departure from the original framework of
Hirschman. It only expands the coverage of strategies to include government coercion
and the use of persuasion to influence the parties' decisions on rule revision. The
identification of these four strategies is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the
process of institutional change. I need to examine how different parties chose among
these four strategies to lower the transaction costs of land-value capture in Hong
Kong.
Choice of Strategy at Different Decision Levels
The choice of strategy is constrained by the existing institutional setting. This
institutional setting is a set of rules generated by the interactions among the political,
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legal, economic, and social institutions in society. In Hong Kong case, there were
formal and informal rules that guided the contracting parties's decision of selecting a
different strategy to allocate the increased land value. For instance, through a series of
court battles between the government and a lessee over the issues of land rent for
lease renewal, judges established the precedent that the government had the legal right
to set the land rent based on the full market value of the leased land. This precedent
narrowed the possibility for other lessees to challenge the government policy through
the legal system and, in turn, directed them to use persuasion and voice to resist the
government policy. Thus, the choice set of the four strategies was restricted by the
"macro" rules stipulated according to a specific institutional context. To identify these
constraints, I incorporate Ostrom's (1990) classification of the three-level division
rules in society, including the operational, collective-decision, and constitutional rules.
Operational rules are to guide decisions of individuals for the day-to-day
transactions. These "working" rules are those actually applied, monitored, and
enforced when individuals make decisions about actions they will take (Commons,
1934). Conditions that are specified in the land contract and are agreed upon between
the government and a lessee are some operational rules. When the government
demands additional payments from a leaseholder for lease renewal or modification, it
must act according to these rules. These rules are normally enforced by the legislation
and courts in Hong Kong.
Operational rules are changed by action taken at the collective-decision level.
Most conditions in the land leases are standardized and made at the collective level
with the inputs from officials in the various governmental departments, representatives
from the real estate sector, and other relevant parties. Lessees must follow the same
rules and procedures to estimate the necessary payment for renewing or modifying
their land contracts. Any change of these rules would require decision making at the
collective level, such as a court ruling or legislation, and the general approval of the
contracting parties. Disagreement among the parties over the change will create
difficulties in enforcement.
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The way in which collective rules are established and enforced is guided by the
constitutional order. The constitutional order is a set of rules for making rules.' In
the constitution of Hong Kong, there are rules that specify in some general terms the
structure of the government, its authority (and the limitations) for deciding on public
policy, and the power to enforce its decisions. Owing to the unique colonial history of
Hong Kong, there were rules issued by the British government dating back to the
1850s that explicitly stated who would have the ownership of land, how land rights
should be assigned, and what procedures private individuals should follow to conduct
land transactions. Without these constitutional rules, there will be no guideline for the
involved parties to make collective decisions. Unable to settle individuals' differences
collectively, costs of land contracting at the operational level will be very high.
Rules at the constitutional level are most difficult to alter. In most countries, it
is designed this way so as to increase the stability of mutual expectations among
individuals interacting according to a set of rules. In Hong Kong, people can
reinterpret the meanings of the constitution, but a formal amendment would require a
lengthy procedure. In the case of land ownership, it would be extremely difficult to
change the system from the leasehold to a freehold system, because, in principle, the
Crown owns all land. Because constitutional rules are relatively more "stable," I will
treat these rules in Hong Kong as given in my analysis. I, therefore, focus on how the
contracting parties use different strategies to revise the operational rules at the
collective-choice level. I explain the individual's choice of a strategy in relation to the
constraints imposed by the collective rules. In the next section, I summarize the
procedures of how I apply this framework to the Hong Kong case.
5 Rawls (1972), Brennan and Buchanan (1985), and many other scholars have
studied how individuals (or interest groups) who may possess incompatible and
irreconcilable doctrines, including religion, philosophy, and morality, can agree upon a
set of constitutional rules to endure a stable and just social order. Although this topic
is important for our understanding of the emergence and modification of a
constitutional order, it is beyond the scope of this study.
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Procedures of Applying the Framework
As a summary, I unify the idea of transaction costs that I discussed in
Chapter 2 with the analytical framework developed here. In examining the Hong
Kong case, I use each land-value-capture mechanism as a unit of analysis. I first
identify the four types of transaction costs of land-value capture. I then apply the
framework to study how the government and the lessees tried to modify the rules in
order to minimize these transaction costs. The framework helps me to focus on four
strategies, namely exit, voice, persuasion, and coercion. If the current operational
rules could not resolve the problems of transacting, the parties would try to use
different strategies to change them at the collective-decision level. Because the choice
among the four strategies was limited by the rules established at the collective level, I
examine how institutional settings determined the parties' choice of strategy. My last
step is to analyze how the interplay of the parties' strategies shaped the outcome of
land-value capture.
CHAPTER 4
LAND LEASING IN HONG KONG
Policy makers and real estate developers have been involved in land leasing in
many countries for a long time. At present, most researchers have focused their
analyses on land and property leasing mainly in the "private" sector (Bierman, 1988;
Copeland and Weston, 1982; McConnell and Schallheim, 1983; Brealey and Myers,
1984). The empirical and conceptual issues of land contracting between the state and
private developers, however, have remained understudied. In fact, many countries,
such as Singapore, Australia (Bourassa, Neutze, and Strong, 1994; Neutze, 1988,
pp. 1-34), India, Sweden (Doebele, 1983, pp. 84-88) and even the United States
(Sagalyn, 1993a, 1993b), have adopted land leasing to manage part of their public
land. Yet, among all these countries that employ the land-contracting system, only a
few of them have extended the system to manage all land in a city. Hong Kong is an
exceptional case. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the Hong Kong leasehold
system in order to establish the context and provide background information for my
discussion on the issues of land value capturing in this city-state.
Owing to the specific historical, political, and economic contexts of Hong
Kong, its land-tenure arrangements are unique. To pinpoint their uniqueness, I first
describe briefly the historical development of the Hong Kong leasehold system,
because many current features of land contracting were developed from the original
structure. Second, I describe in detail the three major policy objectives that the Hong
Kong government wants to achieve through land contracting: (1) managing land
development and urban growth, (2) stimulating industrial and housing development,
and (3) capturing the future increases in land value. I illustrate how the Hong Kong
government (hereafter referred to as the government) tries to achieve these different
policy goals using four different types of land contracts, including the Conditions of
Sale, the Conditions of Grant, the Conditions of Regrant, and the Conditions of
Exchange. (I will define each of them later.) Due to the limited scope of my study, I
discuss the first two policy objectives briefly and concentrate on the third. Readers
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who are interested in the first two issues can refer to Yeh (1994) and Bristow (1984)
for some general discussion.
The Hong Kong Leasehold System
Hong Kong is located on the south coast of the People's Republic of China
(PRC). The total land area of Hong Kong is about 1,070 km2. During the Ching
Dynasty, the British ceded Hong Kong Island and Kowloon peninsula and then leased
New Kowloon and the New Territories from the Chinese government. The lease for
New Kowloon and the New Territories will expire on 1997, and the British
government has agreed to return the sovereignty of all four districts to the PRC at that
time.'
With a population of approximately six million people in 1994, Hong Kong is
one of the most densely populated cities in the world.2 To the Western World, Hong
Kong is well known for its miraculous economic growth. Along with Singapore,
Taiwan, and Korea, all four countries (or city-states) are referred to as the "four little
dragons" in Asia. In the 1980s, these four Asian countries achieved economic growth
faster than most developing countries and even some developed countries. (See Table
2-1 in Chapter 2.) Some economists have argued that the economic success of Hong
Kong is mainly because of the British's "laissez-faire" approach to managing the
economy. Indeed, the government has maintained a minimum level of involvement in
regulating business practices and labor relations. There is no trade restriction on
goods or capital. Taxes are set at low levels to stimulate private investments. Owing
to these general principles in managing the economic affairs of Hong Kong, analysts
1 The four districts are the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, New
Kowloon, and the New Territories. See Chapter 1 for a brief discussion on the
differences among these districts.
2 A population of six million people was the official figure in 1994. Other
unofficial estimates were about 7 to 8 million.
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have been using Hong Kong as an example for a "free-market" strategy to economic
development.
Hidden under the label as being the most capitalist city-state in the world, there
is a less recognized fact about Hong Kong. The fact is that the state owns all land,
and land is the most valuable and scarce resource in this colony. When the British
government first occupied Hong Kong in 1841, it immediately proclaimed that all land
belonged to the "Crown." Only with the authorization of the Royal Majesty of Great
Britain through the "Letters Patent" could the Governor of Hong Kong distribute land
to private parties by granting them Crown leases (Wesley-Smith, 1983; Bristow, 1984).
Many features of the current leasehold system of Hong Kong came from the initial
land-leasing structure. A brief discussion of the origin of the Hong Kong leasehold
system will, thus, help the reader to understand the present land-contracting system.
The Origin of a Land-Leasing Structure: 1841-1898
In 1841, most parts of Hong kong were steep and uninhabited. Despite this
uninviting appearance and the vast amount of undeveloped land available, the British
government recognized immediately the importance of controlling land and the
possibility of raising public funds through the allocation of land resources. It,
therefore, proclaimed that the government should not allow any private ownership of
land. In May 1841, Captain Elliot, the first British official who was in charge of the
colony affairs, issued a public notice to set some guidelines upon which the
government would allot land to private individuals. According to the notice, the
government would: (1) lease land to the public based only on "actual needs," (2)
grant development rights of land through public auction, (3) set a minimum price
(called the "upset" price) for the land lot put up for auctioning, (4) grant leases to the
highest bidder in the auction, and (5) prohibit any private land transaction without
notifying the government (Hong Kong Annual Yearbook, 1963, p. 4). Subsequently,
these principles had become part of a constitution that governed land leasing in Hong
Kong. Based upon the constitution, the then Governor of Hong Kong established a
committee to survey and mark boundaries of land and a land court to settle disputes
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on land claims. Along with the delineation of land rights, the government also
legislated the Land Registration Ordinance of 1844, which required all land
transactions to be registered in the Land Office.
Under the land-leasing system, the government assigned property rights to land
based on contractual arrangements. These contracts specified the amount and type of
development rights that the government granted to private developers. They also
stated the period that developers could enjoy the granted rights. The government
possessed the right to own, and private developers bought from the government only
some specific development rights that lasted only through the duration of the leases.
Within that period, developers could transfer the development rights to other parties.
They also had the right to benefit from all land development and transactions, subject
to payments of land premia, rent, rate, and property tax to the government. In Hong
Kong, land premia are money collected by the government from the initial land
auctions, modifications of lease conditions, and contract renewals. The government
also levies a rate on owner-occupied properties based on their estimated "rateable"
value. The rateable value is the annual rent that property owners might reasonably
expect if they let their property in the open market. The government sets the level of
rate annually, depending on its financial needs. In 1990, the government set the rate
at 5.5 percent of the rateable value of properties. It was 11.5 percent in the 1970s.
The property tax is levied on income earned from commercial real estate. Currently,
the standard rate of the property tax is set at 17 percent.3
The implementation of the land-leasing policy was not without problems.
There were periods of confusion and conflict. Between 1841 and 1898, for example,
the duration of the leases was subjected to intensive debate. Initially, in 1843, the
Governor of Hong Kong set the lease term to 75 years without the option to renew.
3 Although a property tax of 17 percent may seem high comparing to the tax rates
in most cities in the United States, the tax is not levied on the capital value of the
property. Assume that an annual rental income of a property is about 10 percent of its
capital value, a tax rate of 17 percent on the rental value will be equivalent to 1.7
percent of the capital value of the building.
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Leaseholders, however, argued that the tenure was too short and made formal
complaints to the government.4 In response to complaints from lessees, the Governor
proposed to extend the lease term from 75 to 999 years in 1848 (Hong Kong Annual
Report, 1963, p. 11; Bristow, 1984, p. 27). The Secretary of State of Britain accepted
the Governor's proposal reluctantly due to the potential intensification of the
discontent among lessees and possible reduction in the collection of land rent. The
Governor then granted an extension of 924 years to all 75-year leases with no
additional charge. For the next 50 years, all land leases in Hong Kong, except a few
Kowloon peninsula lots, were granted for a period of 999 years. Indeed, some of the
most expensive land sites in the Central Business District of Hong Kong today were
granted at that time and had a lease term of 999 years.5
In 1898, the British government began to recognize that the long duration of
land leases would deprive it of the ability to share the financial benefits of the
increasing land value with lessees. Immediately, the British government ordered the
Governor of Hong Kong not to grant any additional 999-year leases. Instead, it would
offer land developers 75-year leases with an option to renew their leases for another
75 years without any additional payment or fine. The government would only require
lessees to pay a new level of rent determined by the Director of Public Works at the
date of expiry. The government called these leases "renewable leases." I was not able
to find any documents that described the reaction of the public at that time. I,
however, speculate that the option to renew was a way employed by the government
4 Unfortunately, as far as I know, there is no detailed account of how the
leaseholders conveyed their grievances and eventually persuaded the government to
change its policy.
' These 999-year land contracts are similar to perpetual leases. With agreements
between the British and the Chinese government established in the 1984 Sino-British
Joint Declaration, the future Hong Kong Government will recognize these leases as
legal contracts between the State and leaseholders. Yet, there is no explicit statement
of how these contracts will be renewed when they expire in 2847.
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to compromise with leaseholders for the drastic change in its land-leasing policy.
Following these events, 75 years became the standard duration of leases since 1898.
The history shows that the terms of the leases, which could be 75, 99, or 999
years, were partly determined by politics. Politics, as I use it here, was the constant
attempt of the involved parties to influence those who set and applied the rules. To
reconcile the different perceptions on what constitutes as secured tenure, the involved
parties used politics to shape the term of the leases. I will return to the issue of
politics for lease renewal in Chapter 7. The point here is that political exchanges
between the state and other related parties play an important role in shaping the land-
leasing policy in Hong Kong.
The Current Structure of the Hong Kong Leasehold System
Since 1898, the system of land leasing in Hong Kong has evolved into a
complex structure. Policy objectives that the government wants to achieve through
land leasing are also manifold. The government has been employing land leasing to:
(1) manage urban growth, (2) promote industrial development and subsidize affordable
housing, and (3) raise public funds. Depending upon its goals, the government will
structure the conditions of the leases differently. There are four types of land
contracts in Hong Kong. I summarize functions of each type of land contract in
Table 4-1. For instance, the Conditions of Regrant is the contract for lease renewal.
In principle, the establishment of this contract creates the opportunity for the
government to renegotiate additional lease payments with lessees and thus capture the
increased land value when leases expire.
In the following sections, I review the three major policy objectives of land
leasing in Hong Kong and identify how the government uses different types of land
contracts to achieve these goals. The discussion will be brief, because an in-depth
analysis of, say, the management of urban growth using the Conditions of Sale would
be a topic by itself. The purpose here is to illustrate that land-value capture is only
one of the three major functions of the Hong Kong leasehold system.
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Table 4-1. CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT LAND CONTRACTS
Method Duration Conditions
of of Of Policy
Land Contract Functions Assignment Contract Contract Goals
Conditions of Sale Facilitating initial
leasing of land
rights.
Public auction. Mostly 75 years.
Some have option
to renew for
another 75 years.
1. The minimum leasing
price.
2. The payment method
of premium (either in
one lump sum or in
installment.)
3. The amount of annual
rent.
4. The location and plot
size of the leased land.
5. The specific restrictions
on land uses, height,
and design of building.
6. Provision of streets
and parking facilities.
7. Timing of the completior
of the construction proje
according to the
conditions specified in
the land contract.
1. Capturing the increased
land value.
2. Managing urban growth.
Allocating land to Private treaties.
special industries
and organizations
that provide
affordable housing
and public utilities.
Conditions of Facilitating lease By application.
Exchange modifications
which involve:
1. readjusting the
boundaries of
the land lot
2. correcting the
land area
3. redeveloping
two separate
land lots under
different owner-
ships.
Conditions of Extending the By application.
Regrant nonrenewable
leases.
Crown Lease A legal title that
substitute for the
conditions of
sale.
15 to 21 years and Same as the Conditions
normally renewable. of sale.
Remaining of the
original terms of
the Conditions of
Sale.
Normally 75 years.
After lessees fulfill Remaining of the
the Conditions of original terms of
Sale, i.e., pay the the Conditions of
full amount of Sale.
premium and
complete the
construction of the
buildings.
Same as the Conditions
of Sale plus:
1. the amount of
premium for lease
modification
2. the new level of rent
3. new conditions
imposed on the
redeveloped property.
Same as the Conditions
of Sale plus:
1. premium for lease
extension
2. the new level of rent
3. updated land-use
regulations on the
property.
Same as the Conditions
of Sale.
1. Promoting the
development of key
industries and public
utilities.
2. Providing affordable
housing.
1. Capturing the increased
land value.
2. Managing urban growth.
1. Capturing the increased
land value.
2. Reserving the rights of
the state to take back
land when it is needed
for public purposes.
3. Incorporating the
updated land-use
regulations into old
land leases.
Restricting lessees to
mortgage and sublease
the leased land before the
completion of the project
so as to avoid land
speculation.
Source: Complied by the author.
Conditions of Grant
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Urban Land Management Through the Conditions of Sale
Two major objectives of urban land management under the Hong Kong
leasehold system are to allocate land resources to its best uses and to guide urban
development. I first discuss how the government allocates land to private individuals
by land contracting. I then review mechanisms of controlling land uses through
contractual agreements established in the land leases.
Land Allocation. When the government plans to lease a parcel of land to private
developers through public auctions, it will first prepare a Conditions of Sale.' In the
Conditions of Sale, the government specifies the location and the plot size of the
leased land and the other attached restrictions on the use, height, and design of the
building. It also states the minimum price and the method of paying the premium for
leasing the land. Currently, in preparing the Conditions of Sale, officials in the Land
Department will circulate a draft contract to different departments, such as the
Planning Department, the Transportation Department, and the Department of Public
Works. Officials in these departments will then review the conditions contained in the
contract and recommend appropriate changes. In this way, the government can ensure
that terms established in the contract will be sufficient to guide the uses of the leased
land according to the general comprehensive plan of the city. Besides, based on the
recommendations from other government departments, officials of the Land
Department can negotiate with potential developers for the private provision of, say,
streets and parking facilities.
After the preparation of the Conditions of Sale, the government sends the
contract to all interested land developers. Based on the conditions stated in the
contract, private developers estimate the leasing price and bid for the development
rights of land in the public auction. In the auction, competition among bidders
6 Information about the drafting of the Conditions of Sale and the installment-
payment methods for premia is from personal interviews with government officials in
Hong Kong. If information is from other sources, I will provide the appropriate
references accordingly.
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determines the premium paid to the government for leasing the land. Normally, the
government requires the bidder who gets the lease to pay 10 percent of the premium
as a downpayment at the closing of the auction. The lessee then has to pay the
remaining balance in one lump sum within 30 days.
Before 1981, the government gave lessees the option to pay their premia in
annual installments. The deferred-payment method was started in 1969. At that time,
the installment-payment system was only for nonindustrial land. The major purpose of
this scheme was to encourage investment in the property market that was very
sluggish during that period. Initially, the government only applied the scheme to
valuable land sites in the Central Business District where the amount of land premia
was HK$10 million or more (Hong Kong Annual Yearbook, 1970). Subsequently, the
government extended the installment-payment methods to all leasing of residential,
commercial, and industrial land. It offered leaseholders the option to pay their premia
in ten equal installments with an interest fee of 5 percent per annum.
All the installment-payment methods were generally successful in stimulating
land and real estate investments. With the low interest charged to leaseholders, the
government subsidized land development by providing low-cost financing. The
payment methods were deemed necessary in 1969, because the banking crisis made the
financing of land development difficult and excessively expensive to obtain. After the
Hong Kong economy recovered from the banking crisis, the government continued to
offer the option to leaseholders. These payment methods then became major features
of the government land-leasing policy until 1981. In that year, the government
abolished the deferred-payment method because of the increasing number of defaults
in paying the installments by lessees.
Controlling Land Uses. Besides helping the involved parties to assess the leasing
price of the land or the government to demand the provision of infrastructure from
lessees, the Conditions of Sale is also the major instrument to enforce land-use
regulations (Bristow, 1984, p. 161; Roberts, 1975, pp. 13-14). The Planning
Ordinance in Hong Kong is not as comprehensive as similar legislation found in other
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countries. It only provides the power to the Town Planning Board to prepare and
approve an "Outline Zoning Plan." The enforcement of the Outline Zoning Plan has
to rely on the Building (Planning) Regulations of the Buildings Ordinance and the
lease conditions. As I have mentioned earlier, the government stipulates the
restrictions on uses, height, plot ratio, and design of the buildings built on the leased
land in the conditions of the contract. In most situations, these contract conditions
give the Hong Kong Government the ability to control development in detail on a
case-by-case basis. Whenever leaseholders want to modify the conditions of their
leases, they have to apply to the Lands Department and the Buildings Department for
permission. Officials of these departments will approve those applications only if
modifications will not violate the Outline Zoning Plan or the Building Regulations. If
an application is approved, the government will reassess an additional premium and
impose a new set of covenants on the modified contract (Roberts, 1975).
The enforcement of the Outline Zoning Plan through lease conditions is not
without problems. Due to the distinct processes and the different periods that the
British government took over various parts of Hong Kong, the lease structures vary
among Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, New Kowloon, and the New
Territories. While some leases have explicit restrictions on the uses of the leased land,
others have unrestricted development rights (Roberts, 1975; Yeh, 1994). Bristow
(1984, p. 161) and Yeh (1994, pp. 13-18) argue that some old leases that have no
restrictions on land uses are now causing environmental problems and incompatible
land uses with the Outline Zoning Plan. The government cannot incorporate the new
restrictions on land uses into the land contracts, because it can only modify lease
conditions when the leases expire. The normal lease term in Hong Kong is 75 years.
Hence, the conditions of the leases established, say, fifty years ago may not agree with
the development control stated in the current Outline Zoning Plan. If the government
decides to impose the current land-use restrictions on lessees' properties, it will breach
the lease conditions. Its action may lead to court battles and possibly large payments
of compensation by the government to leaseholders. In other words, although the
contract conditions may have great flexibility in terms of controlling land development
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on an individual basis, they are extremely inflexible in adjusting to changes in the
overall zoning plan through time.
For developers, one advantage of the leasehold system is that land contracts
provide the certainty for the development potential of the leased land. With detailed
and explicit land-use restrictions specified in the land leases, developers can calculate
the appropriate premium for leasing the development rights. In principle, this will
reduce the risks due to changes in planning regulations (Yeh, 1994, p. 10).7 Yet,
given the continuous revisions of the Outline Zoning Plan, a condition allowed in the
land contracts may suddenly be restricted by the plan. This will cause confusion to
developers as to which planning standards they should follow as they make their
investments. The confusion may, in turn, undermine the certainty that the land
contracts can provide to developers. Currently, the government and members of the
planning professions are reviewing this issue. They cannot settle on whether or not
the government should pay compensation to leaseholders when changes of the zoning
plan infringe the lessees' land rights. This issue of growth management under the
leasehold system is an important topic that analysts should investigate thoroughly in
the future.
Developing Public Housing and Special Industries
Not all contracting of development rights of land is granted in the form of
Conditions of Sale. For land that the government provides to special industries and
nonprofit organizations, it normally grants the development rights to these institutions
using the Conditions of Grant. (See Table 4-1.) Unlike the Conditions of Sale, the
government uses "private treaties" rather than public auctions to determine premia in
these land contracts. To establish a private treaty, a potential lessee first submits an
application to the government for leasing the land rights. In the application, the lessee
7 I interviewed several major Hong Kong land and real estate developers in the
summer of 1992 and 1993. They concurred that land contracts provide a high degree
of certainty for land development.
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proposes the type of development and a financial plan for the development project. If
the government approves the application, it then negotiates with the lessee on the
amount of premium and the specific conditions of the land contract. Similar to the
Conditions of Sale, terms in the Conditions of Grant cover the restrictions imposed on
the development period, land use, and building design of the proposed building
project.
Depending upon how the government calculates the premium, there are three
types of Conditions of Grant: (1) nominal-premium grant, (2) reduced-premium grant,
and (3) full-market-value grant.' Lessees who obtain the nominal-premium grants
only have to pay a small amount of money to the government for leasing the land.
Before 1986, lessees who held the nominal-premium grants did not have to pay any
premium at all. After the government revised this rule, leaseholders of the nominal-
premium grants now pay a nominal amount of HK$1,000 to the government. Only
nonprofit organizations, such as schools, religious associations, child-care centers, and
hospitals, are qualified to apply. The lease term for the nominal-premium grants
ranges from 15 to 21 years, and these leases are normally renewable.
Provision of Public Housing. Through the nominal-premium grants, the
government subsidizes public housing by granting land to the Hong Kong Housing
Authority at a very low premium. The Housing Authority is a quasi-public agency
that is responsible for the provision of public housing to low-income groups in Hong
Kong. It is financially independent and has the autonomy of formulating strategies to
carry out the public-housing policy of the government. In Hong Kong, most public
housing is in the form of rental apartments. Rent for public housing is, on average,
set at 25 percent of the market value of the comparable rental apartments provided by
the private sector (Hong Kong Housing Authority, 1993, p. 56). The Housing
8 I gathered information about all these types of private treaty grants from
personal interviews with government officials of the Planning, Environment, and Land
Branches of Hong Kong in the summer of 1993.
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Authority also operates the Home Ownership Schemes that provide housing units for
the middle-income class to purchase at below-market value. It is estimated that the
housing programs of the Housing Authority cover three million people (about half of
the population) in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Housing Authority, 1993). With the rapid
increases in land prices, the Housing Authority can only build affordable housing for
the low- and middle-income groups by not having to pay the land premium at the full
market value.
The government also awards the reduced-premium grants to the Hong Kong
Housing Society. Like the Hong Kong Housing Authority, the Housing Society is a
nonprofit organization that operates several rental estates and the "Flat-for-Sale
Scheme" for the middle- and low-income groups. The government gives land sites to
the Housing Society through a reduced-premium grant for rental estates at premia that
are one-third of the full market value of the leased land. For sites that the Housing
Society uses for the Flat-for-Sale scheme, the government charges only half of the full
market value of the land.
Castells, Goh, and Kwok (1990) have argued that the leasehold system in Hong
Kong allows the state to subsidize public housing. When all the land is state-owned,
the government does not have to purchase land from private landowners and pay them
compensation. This, in turn, reduces the costs of providing public housing for the
poor. This is especially important for Hong Kong because land prices have been
increasing rapidly. If all land were privately owned, the government would have to be
financially very strong to be able to purchase land for the provision of public housing.
The ability to provide the public with a large amount of subsidized housing has
a significant implication on the economic development of this city-state. During the
early period of the industrialization of Hong Kong, the state provided affordable
housing and thus prevented the costs of living from increasing rapidly. Because the
costs of living remained stable, wages and salaries could be maintained at a low level.
By holding the costs of labor down, the government, in turn, enhanced the price
competitiveness of Hong Kong products in the world markets. With increases in the
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demand for the Hong Kong products in the international markets, industries and
businesses could expand rapidly (Castells, Goth, and Kwok, 1990).
Promoting Special Industries. The government also employs the full-market-value
grant to promote the development of special industries and transportation facilities.
Industries, including gas, telecommunication, oil refineries, and electricity, are usually
land-intensive and cannot be operated in multi-storey industrial buildings. Similarly,
transportation facilities, such as the railway and container terminal, require large
quantities of land. If these companies have to compete with other land developers for
leasing land in public auctions, they may have to pay high prices to obtain the
required land. The overhead costs of establishing and operating these businesses in
Hong Kong will then be extremely high. To attract the development of these
industries, the government leases the development rights of land to these companies
through the full-market-value grants. Although lessees of this type of land contract
have to pay their premia at the "full market value," they can pay them in installments.
Normally, these premia are paid over 20 years with an interest charge of 5 to 10
percent per annum. Besides, these premia are decided solely by negotiations between
the government and the potential grantees. There is no competitor to bid up the prices
for leasing the land. It is, therefore, unclear whether the negotiated payments are
comparable with the premia if they had been determined at public auctions. The
government uses the Conditions of Grant to allot land in order to foster industrial
growth and develop public utilities, not to capture the land-value increments. The
issue of whether lessees of the Conditions of Grant are paying the full market value of
the leased land is secondary under this situation.
Capturing Land-Value Increments
Another function of land leasing is to capture the future increases in land value.
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, there are four mechanisms of capturing the land value
under the Hong Kong leasehold system. The government employs the Conditions of
Sale and Conditions of Grant to facilitate the collection of the annual rent and premia
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from the initial auctions and private treaties. It may use the Conditions of Exchange
to recoup the increases in land value during lease modifications. For lease renewals, it
can utilize the Conditions of Regrant to recoup land-value increments. Because I have
discussed how premia for the Conditions of Sale and Conditions of Grant are
determined initially earlier, I only talk about land-value capturing during lease
modifications and renewals and the types of contracts involved here.
Lease Modification. When lessees want to improve or redevelop their properties,
they may need to remove the restrictions imposed on the development of the leased
land. These land-use restrictions are specified in the conditions of the land contracts.
For altering these conditions, lessees have to apply to the Lands Department for lease
modifications.' If the government approves the applications, it will demand an
additional premium for modifying the lease conditions. The premium is based upon
the potental increases in land value after the development restrictions are lifted. The
rationale for demanding more money is that when leaseholders revise the development
restrictions, they are requesting additional development rights from the government;
therefore, they should have to pay for the newly acquired land rights.
The government uses two methods to facilitate lease modifications: (1) issuing
a Conditions of Exchange or (2) attaching a document of modification to the existing
lease. If the modifications involve some drastic changes to the existing conditions of
the land contracts, the government will require lessees to surrender the old leases and
reissue a new one called the Conditions of Exchange to them. These circumstances
include: (1) a readjustment of the boundaries of the land lot, (2) a correction of the
registered land area with a discrepancy between the actual land size and the
9 If the proposed construction meets the minimum requirements of the conditions
specified in the land contract, the lessee does not need to modify the lease conditions.
Instead, the lessee has to submit a building plan to the Buildings Department. If the
design of the plan does not violate any regulations stated in the Building Ordinances,
the Buildings Department will issue a permit to the lessee that will allow her/him to
proceed with the redevelopment.
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government record of more than 0.1 percent, or (3) a joint development of two
separate land lots under different ownerships. For a modification that falls beyond
these three categories, the government normally issues a "Deed of Variation" or a
"modification Letter" and attaches it to the existing contract. The government does
not issue any new contract to the lessee. The Deed of Variation and the Modification
Letter state the nature of the modifications, the required premium, and additional
conditions for carrying out the lease revisions. All other conditions of the existing
land lease remain unchanged and effective.
The general principle of assessing the premia for lease modifications is that
lessees must pay the government any enhancement in the land value deriving from the
modifications. There are five ways that the government and the involved parties can
assess the potential increases in land value. These methods include the "comparative,"
"investment," "residual," "profits," and "contractor's" methods (Cruden, 1986, pp. 395-
422). All are standardized valuation principles established by the Hong Kong Institute
of Surveyors and the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. In Hong Kong, the most
commonly used techniques are the comparative and residual methods. I, therefore,
only elaborate on these two techniques.
The comparative method is to estimate the land value based on a recent leasing
price of a land parcel that possesses similar characteristics, such as the plot size, the
floor-area ratio, the location, and uses, with the appraised land (Roberts, 1974). After
assessing the property values before and after the modification, the difference between
the two estimates would be the premium for revising the lease conditions. For the
residual method, surveyors first estimate the current market value of the additional
structure built on the land parcel. They then subtract the construction costs and profits
for the building contractors and developers from the estimated property value to derive
the current market value of the land. Profits for the general contractors are about 20
percent of the total construction costs. Profits for developers are also about 20 percent
of the residual land value after the deduction of the construction costs and profits for
contractors. The result after the deduction of all these costs and profit margins is the
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assessed land-value increments. Again, this will be the premium that lessees need to
pay for changing their lease conditions to carry out the improvement project.
With either one of the two methods, the government and developers estimate
the premium independently. The premium calculated by the two parties can be
different for two reasons. First, the government and developers may use different
methods to appraise the increases in land value. Second, they may assess the property
value using different assumptions to project the future demand for the involved
property in the real estate market and thus come up with different land value
estimates. To reconcile these differences, the two parties negotiate with each other.
Depending upon the degree of complexity and the extent of disagreement on the
estimated premium, the time required for the negotiation can range from three months
to three years (Wan, 1985).
When the involved parties cannot assess the increases in land value by
applying the normal valuation principles, the government demands an "empirical"
premium. An empirical premium is a fixed charge for lease modifications, typically
involved in the increase in the number of flats and reduction of car parking
requirements. For example, for increasing the number of flats beyond the number
permitted in the lease conditions, the government may charge an empirical premium of
HK$250,000 in 1993 (equivalent to US$32,000). The empirical premium for reducing
the parking requirement is also HK$250,000. The government reviews the empirical
premium regularly during its Land Administration Meeting. The Principal Land
Agent, who is the third highest ranking official of the Lands Department, chairs the
meeting. She or he will invite other members of the Lands Department, such as the
District Land Agencies and Senior Estate Surveyors, to the meeting to set the
appropriate amount of empirical premium.
Besides an additional premium, lessees have to pay an administrative fee for
modifying their land leases. The administrative fee consists of two components: (1) a
fixed amount of HK$3,000 (equivalent to US$389) and (2) an extra $3,000 per one
million HK dollars of the land value after modification. The total administrative fee
for each modification cannot exceed HK$43,000 (about US$5,570).
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There are great variations in the empirical premium and the administrative fee
that the government collects from leaseholders for modifying their land leases. I will
not go into detail about these different payments charged for various lease
modifications here. The interesting thing is that the government has a set of very
detailed guidelines for calculating the empirical premium and the administration fee
for each specific type of modification. For instance, instructions are available for the
calculation of charges on lease modifications ranging from the removal of all
restrictions imposed on industrial land sites to the installation of an automatic teller
machine at a gas station. Another relevant example is the calculation of the
modification premium for the extension of time to fulfill the building covenants. As I
noted earlier, the government specifies the time that lessees need to complete the land
development. The purpose of this lease condition is to prevent developers from
holding on to the land for future appreciation of land prices. In this way, the
government may eliminate land speculation. If a developer wants to extend the time
to complete the development project, s/he must apply to the government for a lease
modification. The government has established a set of standardized rules to charge
such a premium. The government will charge a certain percentage of the current
market value of the land involved as follows:
Period of extension Percentage of Land value
1st year 2
2nd year 4
3rd year 8
4th year 14
5th year 22
6th year 32
With these institutionalized procedures and standardized calculations of charges for
different types of lease modification, the government can ensure that it will not treat
similar lease revisions differently.
Regrant of Nonrenewable Leases. Another opportunity for the government to
capture the increases in land value is during lease renewals. To explain how the Hong
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Kong government may achieve that, I start with the distinctions between the
nonrenewable and the renewable leases. The major distinction is that whereas the
nonrenewable leases contain no provision of renewal when they expire, the renewable
leases provide such an option.
When the nonrenewable leases expire, the lessees must apply to the
government for extending their land rights. This procedure is called the regrant of
nonrenewable leases. Up to 20 years before their leases expire, the lessees can apply
for an early regrant. The option for an early regrant is to avoid the negligence of
maintaining the buildings when leases are approaching their expiration date. No one
will spend money on preserving their properties if there are uncertainties on extending
the land leases.
If the government does not require the land for public purposes, it will issue a
new contract called the Conditions of Regrant to the lessee. In the Conditions of
Regrant, the government imposes new conditions, including the updated building
covenants, requirements for public infrastructure, and the additional premium for
regranting the land rights to the lessee. The premium for lease regrant represents the
full market value of the land either at the date of expiry or the date of application for
the extension.
If the government needs the leased land for public purposes, it can reject the
application. The government may pay compensation to leaseholders for the
infrastructure that has already been built. Cruden (1986, pp. 12-15) states that the
government can exercise its contractual right to take back land. It can also use the
statutory power defined in the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance to review all
retaking matters, especially the amount of compensation. Yet, the legal process
involved in taking back the leased land is very lengthy. Besides, the government runs
the risk of provoking confrontation from leaseholders (or the existing tenants). As far
as I know, there is no detailed study on whether the contractual right of "re-entry"
specified in the land contracts actually allows the government to take back land with
no (or little) compensation for the land. It is also unclear whether the state faces less
resistance from leaseholders because it has the contractual right to take back land.
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These are, again, important issues related to the leasehold system that deserve careful
analysis in the future.
Extension of Renewable Leases. Procedures involved in the renewal of the
renewable leases are different. As I discussed earlier, the government started to grant
the 75-year renewable leases to leaseholders in 1898 to replace the 999-year leases. In
the renewable leases, the government granted the right to lessees to renew their leases
for another 75 years with no additional premium or fee. When these leases were up
for renewal, lessees would only have to pay a new level of rent. Before 1973, the
Director of Public Works was responsible for determining the "new" rent for lease
renewal. Due to a massive public protest in 1973, the legislative Council in Hong
Kong decided to set the new land rent equal to 3 percent of the rental (or rateable)
value of the property built on the leased land. In Chapter 7, I will discuss in detail
this controversy and its implications on the government's ability to capture the surplus
land value in renewing these leases.
Currently, there is literally no distinction between the renewable and the
nonrenewable leases. In 1984, Britain and the PRC have agreed to renew all land
leases that expired on or before June 27, 1997 for another 50 years. To renew their
leases, lessees will not pay any additional premium. They are only required to pay a
new level of rent set at 3 percent of the rental value of their properties. The only
difference between the current and the future policy is that after 1997, the government
can adjust the level of rent whenever it reassesses the rental value of the properties.
Despite the growing interest in the experience of land-value capturing under the
land-contracting system of Hong Kong, there are only a few analysts who have
examined the issue empirically. Recently, Yeh (1994) and analysts of the World Bank
(1993) have studied the importance of land revenues generated through land leasing in
Hong Kong. Analysts in both studies, however, only show the importance of land
revenues in the total government budget. They do not tell what percentage of the
land-value increments the government can capture. More importantly, if land leasing
can (or cannot) help the government to retain the future increased land value, these
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analysts have not examined which mechanisms are most (or least) effective for the
government to achieve the objective. These are the issues that I will examine in the
remainder of this study.
Summary
The Hong Kong government has employed land leasing to achieve three policy
objectives. First, it uses the conditions specified in the land contracts to manage urban
growth. Second, through granting land rights to special industries and nonprofit
organizations with premia at below market value, the government stimulates economic
development and provides vital social services and infrastructure for the population.
Third, the state tries to capture the surplus land value by collecting premia from
developers during the initial auctions, lease modifications, and contract renewals.
These three policy objectives are not unrelated with each other. Accomplishing
one of these goals may, sometimes, be at the expense of the others. For example, the
amount of premia that the government can obtain from a land contract is influenced by
the restrictions imposed on the lease. If the conditions of a contract restrict the height
of the development to six stories, land developers will obviously pay less for this
contract than for the contract that would allow them to build a 20-story building. The
aim of raising revenues could, therefore, be incompatible with the objective of
directing the urban growth towards a low-density development. Besides, when the
government subsidizes special industries by granting land rights with premia at below
market value, it will lose the opportunity to capture the land-value increments for
other public services and investments. It may not be possible to achieve all three
policy objectives simultaneously. Hence, policy makers must weigh the tradeoffs
between these different goals in employing the various contractual instruments
available in land leasing.
Due to the interrelationships among these policy objectives, we must examine
all of them to assess how land contracting can help the state to accomplish its goals.
Yet, studying all these complex issues together is beyond the scope of my current
research. To make the study manageable, I focus on the issues of capturing the land-
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value increments under the Hong Kong leasehold system. In Chapter 5, I provide
some empirical evidence on the experience of land-value capture in Hong Kong. After
analyzing this experience, I examine each of the four mechanisms in Chapters 6 and 7
and investigate which mechanisms the government relied upon to capture the surplus
land value between 1970 and 1991.
CHAPTER 5
LAND-VALUE CAPTURE UNDER THE HONG KONG
LEASEHOLD SYSTEM: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In recent years, the financing of local government expenditures has changed
tremendously. Many of these changes involve the fiscal relationships between the
"central" and the "local" governments. In the United States, for example, with the
budget cuts initiated at both the federal and the state levels, some city governments
have to rely more on revenues raised within their own jurisdictions. This situation can
also be found in other developing countries, such as Indonesia and Kenya, where the
central governments have decentralized fiscal responsibilities to the provincial and city
levels. Similarly, with the former Soviet Union disintegrated into different sovereign
states, the newly established regimes suddenly have to face the responsibility of
financing the development of their own public infrastructure and social services. In all
these cases, as public funds from the central government are reduced or totally cut,
local officials are searching for alternative sources of revenue. Among many
proposals, local governments in some countries are trying to recoup the surplus land
value generated partly by public-infrastructure investment. Especially in some former
socialist countries where most land is still under the control of the state, officials are
thinking of using land leasing to raise public funds.
In Chapter 4, I discussed the three different functions of the Hong Kong
leasehold system. One function is to capture the surplus land value. The purpose here
is to present some empirical evidence of land-value capture in Hong Kong. I first
discuss my two main criteria for determining the level of success of land-value
capture. Second, I state how I estimate the percentages of land-value capture using
data gathered from my contract-based case studies. Third, I present the results of my
estimation. Fourth, I show the percentages of public infrastructure expenditures
financed by land revenues in Hong Kong from 1970 to 1991. Finally, based on the
two criteria, I evaluate the experience of land-value capture in Hong Kong.
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Two Criteria for Evaluating Land-Value Capture
As I stated in Chapter 1, analysts believe that a leasehold system would allow
the state to capture the future land-value increments because it retains the right to own
land. This conventional wisdom, however, has not been subjected to enough careful
scrutiny. In their studies, Yeh (1994, p. 9) and the World Bank's analysts (1993)
examine the importance of "land revenues" collected from land leasing as a percentage
of the total government budget. Yeh argues that total land revenues accounted for 8.6
percent of the total government budget between 1974 and 1990. The percentage for
individual years range from 0.3 to 35.6 percent. Based on these figures, he then
asserts that land revenues were an important source of revenue for the Hong Kong
government in selected years. Yet, this source of public funds was very unstable
(Yeh, 1994, p. 20).
World Bank's analysts (1993) take the same set of numbers for Hong Kong
and argue that the experience of this city-state does not show that land revenues
generated under a leasehold system are significant. They then caution policy makers
in other countries, specifically the People's Republic of China (PRC), against setting
the goal of raising substantial public funds through land contracting.
I will, however, argue that the percentage of land revenues in the total
government budget is not an adequate indicator to reflect the ability of the government
to capture the future increases in land value. For example, if the value for all land in
Hong Kong has increased, say, by HK$1 billion in a particular year, capturing 1
percent of this increase is HK$10 million. Depending on the size of the government
annual budget, the land revenues collected may appear to be an important source of
government revenue. Yet, in actuality, the government only captures 1 percent of a
huge increase in land value.
Conversely, the Hong Kong government may capture a large portion of the
increased land value. Although the percentage of land-value capture is large, the
amount of money collected may be insignificant because of a moderate increase in
land prices. In this case, the percentage of land revenues in the total government
budget will be small. Analysts, therefore, cannot settle the question of whether land
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leasing can help the government to capture future increases in land value by looking
just at the percentage of land revenues in the total government budget. Undeniably,
data are usually not available to calculate the percentage of land value captured by
different instruments under either the leasehold or the freehold system. Thus, analysts,
normally, use the percentage of land revenues in total government receipts or
expenditures as a proxy to measure the ability of the state to recoup the surplus land
value.
Owing to the inadequacy of the existing method of evaluating whether a
leasehold system can help the government financially, I propose two criteria: (1) the
average percentage of land value captured by a government using land leasing, and (2)
the proportion of the public "infrastructure expenditures" financed by the captured
value. (I will define infrastructure expenditures later.) Although the first criteria is
obvious, the purpose of the second criteria and its connection with the first needs
explanation.
The reason for wanting to know whether or not the captured land value
finances a major part of public works is related to issues of "sustainability" of public
infrastructure investment. I define a sustainable public investment as a project that
generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs and, possibly, allows a "reasonable"
return for governments. Because the consumption of most public infrastructure is non-
exclusive and joint, the burden of investment costs may not fall directly on persons
who enjoy the "benefits" of these goods. For example, a government builds a public
road that enhances the accessibility of a community. The officials may not establish a
system to charge the actual users of the road because it may incur high collection
costs. With higher accessibility to the community with no additional charge, the
demand for houses increases. Property values will rise. Under such a condition, the
financial benefit generated by public infrastructure expenditures is reflected partly in
higher property values. Although the government may use property taxes or other
instruments (discussed in Chapter 1 and Appendix A.) to recoup part of the windfall
gain, it normally does not collect as much as it could to cover the investment costs of
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the road. This, in turn, undermines the financial capability of the state to fund further
improvements of the road or other public works.
Under a sustainable system of financing public infrastructure investment, the
state should be able to recapture most of the land-value increments that its projects
generate. The captured land value should then pay for a large part of the
infrastructure expenditures. In this way, a public agency would be able to retain
profits from its investments to cover their costs and, possibly, reinvest the surplus for
additional infrastructure to support the ongoing urban growth and economic
development.
To illustrate my points further, I categorize the various possible combinations
of the percentage of land-value capture (PLVC) and the percentage of infrastructure
expenditures (PIE) financed by the captured value into four cases. I portray these
cases in Figure 5-1, which is a very rough summary of all possible outcomes.
Pigeonholing of some borderline cases is unavoidable. I use these cases only to show
the basic contrast among various mixes of PLVC and PIE.
In Quadrant I, both the PLVC and the PIE are small. There are two possible
situations that may occur. First, the low PLVC suggests that a government can
capture only a small percentage of the surplus land value. This leads to a small PIE
because the captured value is so insignificant that it cannot help the government to
fund public works. Second, a local government may depend heavily on "external"
funds to finance expenditures on public works. These external sources of money
could be from loans granted by the World Bank and other foreign aid agencies or
funds allocated from the central government. Land revenues, thus, account for only a
small percentage of infrastructure investment. The PIE is, thus, small. When public
infrastructure is financed by foreign debts, revenues generated from the investment
must be used to repay them. Instead of recovering the construction costs through
property taxes, the government may collect a fee directly from users. Because
financial returns of a project will not be captured as land revenues through property
taxes, the PLVC will be small.
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Figure 5-1.
PERCENTAGE OF LAND-VALUE CAPTURE AND
PERCENTAGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURES
FINANCED BY LAND REVENUES
PIE
Small
PLVC
Large
Small Large
Source: Author
Notes:
PIE = Percentage of Infrastructure Investment Financed by Land Revenues
PLVC = Percentage of Land-Value Capture
The State is not able Increases in land value
to capture the increased are large, and thus a
land value and thus is small percentage of land-
incapable of financing value capture can finance
infrastructure investment a large percentage of
through internally infrastructure investment.
generated funds.
IfI IV
The increases in land The State is capable of
value are small. capturing a large
Although the State can percentage of land-value
capture a large percentage increments, and the
of land-value increments, captured value can finance
the amount of land value a large percentage of
captured can finance only infrastructure investment.
a small percentage of
infrastructure investment.
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In both situations, a small PLVC and PIE signify that a government is unable
to fund infrastructure expenditures through internally generated land revenues. The
investment on public infrastructure depends upon a stable inflow of foreign aid or
money from the central government. Any reduction of these funds will affect the
sustainability of public infrastructure investment that is beyond the control of the local
government. I have described some changes of the fiscal relationships between the
central and the local governments in the beginning, which illustrate clearly that
external funds are not at all stable.
In Quadrant II, the PLVC is small, but the PIE is large. Under this situation,
the land values of a country may increase very fast. Owing to some large increases in
land value, a small PLVC can amount to a substantial amount of money. This fund
can then finance most of the infrastructure expenditures. In this case, public
investments will be considered to be sustainable because the captured value can cover
a large part of the investment costs. Yet, a small PLVC may imply that a government
does not capture fully the appreciation in property values. If the government takes a
more aggressive approach to retrieve the land value, it may obtain more land revenues
to recover further the costs of public investments.
In Quadrant III, while the PLVC is large, the PIE is small. There are also two
possible reasons for this outcome. First, it is possible that the development of the land
and real estate markets is still at an initial stage. At this stage, land value is usually
low. Although the government can capture a large percentage of the land-value
increments as revenues, they are insignificant because of the low land value. Second,
the capturing of land value through, say, property taxes may be so aggressive that it
discourages private investments in land. Because of the lack of private capital to
develop the land market, the land value remains low. Again, although the government
may recoup a large portion of the surplus land value, the captured value is so low that
it cannot pay for the expenditures on public works.
To make public infrastructure investment sustainable, a government should
design policies that will stimulate growth by attracting both domestic and international
investments in land and real estate. Simultaneously, the state should also reserve its
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rights to share the future capital appreciation in land with developers. Unless new
policies can induce increases in land value without foregoing the state's ability to
capture it, land revenues will not play an important role in financing public works.
Public infrastructure investment in the last case (Quadrant IV) is the most
sustainable. Both the PLVC and the PIE are large. This implies that the government
can recoup most of the surplus land value and use the captured value to finance a
large percentage of expenditures on public works. Under such a system, a government
can balance the revenue and costs of its projects. With sufficient funds collected as
land revenues, the government can undertake investments and improvements in public
infrastructure continuously. There will be no massive borrowing. The sources of
funds will be stable and within the control of the local governments. Besides, the
government will not have to allocate revenues from income and sale taxes to build
public infrastructure, but to use these funds for other economic and social purposes.
By analyzing the PLVC and PIE, analysts will understand better whether land
leasing can help the government financially. In the rest of Chapter 5, I evaluate the
experience of land-value capture in Hong Kong based on these two indicators. In the
next section, I estimate the PLVC with data gathered from my contract-based case
studies.
Contract-Based Case Studies
My major objective in conducting the contract-based case studies was to
examine the ability of the Hong Kong government to capture the surplus land value.
To do that, I chose 92 land parcels leased in the 1970s and estimated their increases in
values from 1970 to 1991. I then compared the estimated land value to revenues
collected by the government from these land parcels and calculated the percentages of
land-value capture. In this section, I stated my methods of: (1) selecting the sample
for my study and (2) estimating the percentages of the land-value capture.
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Selecting the Sample for the Contract-Based Case Studies
There are approximately 27,268 parcels of land in Hong Kong; and for each
parcel, the government issues a land contract to specify the type and the amount of
development rights granted to private developers. Among all these land sites, I
concentrated on those that the government leased to private developers through the
Conditions of Sale between 1970 and 1979.1 From these land contracts, I gathered
data about the total amount of premia collected by the government when it leases land
initially to developers in public auctions and subsequently modifies and renews land
leases. As I discussed in Chapter 4, when leaseholders modify their land contracts, the
government will attach a "letter of modification" to the back of their leases. If lessees
renew their leases, they surrender the old leases to the government. For the
nonrenewable leases, the government then issues a Conditions of Regrant to them. It
is therefore most logical to begin with the Conditions of Sale to examine any
subsequent changes or renewals of land contracts.
There are three reasons for selecting land sites leased between 1970 and 1979.
First, the demand for land before 1970 was mainly from the industrial sector. The
priority of the Hong Kong land policy then was to promote industrial development,
and the government disposed of land for industrial purposes partly through "private
treaty" grants. Land premia charged for the private treaty grants were normally lower
than the current market value of the leased land. Because the government might
deliberately lower the premia to stimulate industrial development, this action had a
dampening effect on prices for industrial land leased through the Conditions of Sale in
public auctions. Industrial land sites leased before 1970 are, therefore, not good
examples to learn whether land leasing would enable the government to capture the
land-value increments. From the beginning of the 1970s, the demand for land began
to shift from industrial to commercial and residential purposes (Annual Yearbook,
1969). Normally, the government charged premia for both commercial and residential
1 See Chapter 4 for the definitions for the Conditions of Sale, Conditions of
Regrant, nonrenewable leases, and private treaty grants.
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land sites at the full market value. Hence, a sample selected after 1969 is not only a
good mix of land contracts for different land uses, but also best represents the ability
of the government to capture the surplus land value.
Second, beginning in the 1970s, after years of experience in developing the
leasehold system, the Hong Kong government could use land contracts in a very
sophisticated way. The government was more conscious about using land leasing to
share with developers the financial benefits of the rapidly increasing land value. On
the contrary, some land contracts issued in the 1940s and the 1950s had no well-
specified conditions attached. They are sometimes called "open" or "unrestricted"
leases. Without any explicit restrictions imposed on these contracts, the ability of the
government to capture the increases in land value is undermined. For instance, a
developer may not have to pay an additional premium for, say, increasing the height
of the building up to the limit allowed by the Outline Zoning Plan because the
government did not specify a height restriction in the land contract. To get a good
sample for a "mature" land-leasing system, I decided to concentrate on the land
contracts established after 1969.
Third, in the 1980s, the return of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the PRC in
1997 significantly affected the land revenues collected by the Hong Kong government.
I have explained the reason for excluding these political influences in my study in
Chapter 1 and will not repeat them here.
After I decided which land leases should be included in my study, I studied
these contracts for 22 years. Specifically, I estimated the increases in land value
occurring between 1970 and 1991 for selected land sites. There are two reasons for
choosing a 22-year study period. First, to observe whether or not the government can
recoup the surplus land value when lessees modify their land contracts, I must
examine these leases for a period long enough to allow for the inclusion of lease
modifications. Because the building cycles in Hong Kong last about six to ten years
(Jao, 1974, p. 251), I must study these land contracts for more than ten years to
investigate if the government can recoup land-value increments through lease
- 101 -
modifications. For contracts issued in the late 1970s, I have to study them from the
dates that they were issued to, at least, 1991.
Second, for land contracts established in the 1970s, the government allowed
lessees to pay land premia in 20 annual installments. In other words, the collection of
land revenues from these contracts stretched from the 1970s to the 1990s. To analyze
how much infrastructure expenditure was financed by land value captured by these
leases, I must also examine the percentages of land revenues in annual infrastructure
expenditures in the 1980s. If I concentrate only on the period between 1970 and
1979, I will underestimate the percentages of infrastructure expenditures financed by
revenues generated from land leased in the 1970s.
Data for revenues collected in the 1980s from official documents will include
the premia and rent collected from contracts granted after the 1970s. This may then
overstate the percentages of infrastructure expenditures supported by land revenues
generated in the 1970s. Yet, the overestimation may not be a significant problem for
two reasons. First, according to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the existing
government cannot lease more than 50 hectares of land a year. (See Chapter 1 for a
brief description of the Declaration.) Second, the future government retains half of the
land revenues. Under this situation, infrastructure expenditures in the 1980s might still
rely mostly upon revenues collected from land leases established in the 1970s.
After I decided the period for my study, I examined a register compiled by the
Hong Kong Land Registry that lists all land leased through the Conditions of Sale
between 1970 and 1979. Within that period, the government leased 423 parcels of
land. I selected 120 land sites randomly (every fifth on the list) and eliminated 28 of
them because of incomplete information or unavailability of the actual land contracts.
The total number of cases in my sample is, therefore, 92. In Table 5-1, I illustrate the
distribution of the cases selected by district. I also show the representation of my
sample for all land sites in Hong Kong and those leased between 1970 and 1979. The
total number of the cases selected accounts for 21.7 percent of all land leased between
Table 5-1. REPRESENTATION OF SAMPLES FOR THE CONTRACT-BASED CASE STUDIES
Contracts Selected for Case Study
As a
Estimated Percentage As a Percentage
Number Percentage Contracts of Total Number of Percentage of Total Land
of of Total issued Land Contracts Selected of Total Contracts Issued
Land Lots* Land Lots 1970-1979** Issued Cases Land Lots 1970-1979
Hong Kong Inland Lots (1) 9,227 33.8 133 31.4 46 0.5 34.6
Kowloon Inland Lots 9,874 36.2 117 27.7 25 0.3 21.4
Kowloon Marine Lots 103 0.4 0 0.0 - - -
New Kowloon Inland Lots 6,031 22.1 118 27.9 21 0.3 17.8
Kung Tong Inland Lots 715 2.6 13 3.1 - - -
Yau Tong Inland Lots 38 0.1 27 6.4 - - -
Yau Tong Marine Lots 74 0.3 0 0.0 - - -
Aberdeen Marine Lots 25 0.1 2 0.5 - - -
Chai Wan Marine Lots 2 0.0 0 0.0 - - -
Shaukiwan Inland Lots 798 2.9 0 0.0 - - -
Shaukiwan Marine Lots 32 0.1 0 0.0 - - -
Shek Oi Inland Lots 95 0.3 2 0.5 - - -
Stanley Inland Lots 82 0.3 11 2.6 - - -
Tai Hang Inland Lots 172 0.6 0 0.0 - - -
Total 27,268 100.0 (2) 423 100.0 (2) 92 0.3 21.7
Sources: *The estimated number of land lots is obtained from Names of Streets and Buildings in Hong Kong Island and
and Names of Streets and Buildings in Kowloon and New Kowloon published by the Hong Kong Govemment.
**nformation related to contracts issued between 1970 and 1979 is obtained from the Hong Kong Land Registry.
Note: (1) Hong Kong Inland Lots include Aberdeen Inland Lots and Chai Wai Inland Lots.
(2) The column total may not add to 100 because of rounding.
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1970 and 1979.2 For these cases, I cover 34.6 percent of all land lots leased during
the study period for "Hong Kong Inland." For "Kowloon Inland" and "New Kowloon
Inland," the percentages are 21.4 and 17.8 percent, respectively.
Estimating the Land-Value Capture
To estimate the percentage of land-value capture by the government, I first
gathered information about the amount of premia collected from the land contract for
each selected land site. Data concerning the amount of premia paid by developers are
public information, and the Hong Kong Land Registry keeps all this information on
microfilm. By paying a nominal fee, I obtained the microfilms for most of my
selected cases. From these microfilms, I summed the total premia and rent charged
for each contract and computed the 1991 value of the amount. Based on the
assumption that the government would have to borrow the money to finance
infrastructure expenditures if it did not collect these revenues, I used the best lending
rates that the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank offered to its major corporate clients
between 1970 and 1991 as the discount rates to calculate the 1991 value of the premia
and rent collected.3 Next, I estimated the increases in land value occurring between
1970 and 1991 for selected land parcels. Owing to the way that I calculated the
percentage of land-value capture, I only needed to estimate the 1991 land value. The
equation for calculating the percentage of the land-value capture is:
2 Although the number of cases in my sample is small (only 0.3 percent) in
relation to the total number of land contracts in Hong Kong, the sample is still a good
representation for the land leases issued at the time when the Hong Kong leasehold
system was most well-developed and absent from unique political disturbances.
3 Information about the best lending rates is from the Hong Kong Statistical
Digest, 1992.
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(Prmil + Prmmgd + R)
PLVC =
LV9 1
where
PLVC = Percentage of Land-value Capture
Prms = Premium from Initial Public Auction
PrmMod = Premium from Lease Modification
R = Annual Rent
LV9 1  = Estimated 1991 land value
I provide the derivation of the equation in Appendix C.
I stated in Chapter 4 that in Hong Kong, there are two common ways to assess
the market value of land: (1) the comparative and (2) the residual methods (Roberts,
1974). For assessing the 1991 land value, I used the residual method. I began by
estimating the 1991 market value of properties built on the selected land parcels. I
then subtracted the construction costs and profits for the building contractors and
developers from the estimated property value to derive the 1991 market value of land.
I obtained the estimated 1991 property values for different types of buildings located
in different districts and for various land uses from the Hong Kong Property Review
(Rating and Valuation Department of Hong Kong, 1993). I also gathered information
concerning the 1991 construction costs for various types of buildings from the 1991
Survey of Building, Construction and Real Estate Sectors (Census and Statistics
Department of Hong Kong, 1993).
In fact, the residual method is far more complex than I have stated here. To
make the estimations manageable and possible with limited data, I had to rely on
several assumptions.
1. Property values for selected cases are equal to the average prices of the
same type of buildings located in a district.
2. The construction costs for residential buildings are the same within a
district. It is also true for the construction costs for commercial and
industrial buildings.
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3. In estimating the property values, saleable area is equal to the lot size
times the plot ratio. In other words, there is no common area, such as
open spaces or parking lots. This assumption may lead to an
overestimation of the property value because of the increase in the
saleable area in my calculation. This, in turn, will overstate the land
prices.
4. When a land site is specified for residential use, there is no retail shop
operating on the ground floor of the building built. This assumption
may lead to an underestimation of the land price because a retail shop
normally has a higher property value. This underestimation will, to
some extent, eliminate problems of assumption No. 3 that overstates the
land value.
Based on these assumptions, I produced two sets of estimates for each selected
land parcel: (1) the land premia and rent collected and (2) the assessed 1991 land
value, all in 1991 dollars. By dividing the total land premia by the estimated land-
value increments, I derived the percentages of the increases in land value captured by
the government for selected cases in my sample.
Percentage of Land-Value Capture
In Table 5-2, I illustrate the estimated percentages of land-value capture for the
92 cases. These percentages range from 5 to 111 percent. On average, the
government captured 39 percent of the land-value increments occurring between 1970
and 1991. It shows that, in terms of percentage, the government did retain a
significant portion of the increased land value occurring between 1970 and 1991 for
land sites leased in the 1970s. There are two caveats to this interpretation. First, does
an average of 39 percent of land-value capture within a 22-year period represent a
"significant" retainment of the surplus land value? Ideally, to determine the relative
significance of this percentage, I must conduct a comparative study. A comparative
study, however, is beyond the scope of my current study. Unfortunately, as far as I
know, there is no existing study that estimates the percentage of land-value capture in
other cities. Without any comparison, I cannot decide whether the percentage of
captured under the leasehold system is higher or lower than other land-tenure
TABLE 5-2. LAND CONTRACTS SELECTED FOR THE CONTRACT-BASED CASE STUDIES
Classifi- Lease Revenues Total Estimated Estimated
cation of Plot Premia Lease Land Value Percentage
File Name Lot Number Location District Land use sites Ratio Area Date Initial Modification Total Rent Revenue At 1991 of Land Value
(sq. M.) of Issue (HK Dollars value at date of Issue) (1991 HKS) (1991 HKS)* Capture
C/S11233 IL8469 Queensway, Central
C/S11253 KIL10602 TsimShaTsulEast
C/S10225
C/S11242
C/S10583
C/S10801
C/S10673
C/S10775
C/S10532
C/S10547
C/S10691
C/S10151
C/S9624
C/59607
C/59601
C/59653
C/S10963
C/S10878
C/S11244
C/S11211
C/Si 1066
C/S11100
C/S1 1340
C/S11282
C/S10974
C/S11049
C/S1 1279
C/S1 1194
C/S 11265
C/S10005
C/S1 1062
C/S10635
C/S10884
C/S10727
C/S10185
C/S10083
C/S10628
C/S10888
C/S11362
C/Si 1373
C/Si 1084
C/S10909
C/S11113
C/S10650
C/S11185
C/Si 1157
C/S9960
C/Si 1300
C/S11140
C/S10227
C/S10694
C/S10656
C/S9793
IL8294
IL8392
NKILS566
NKIL5623
NKIL5589
NKIL5490
NKIL5539
NKIL5540
NKILS493
IL7954
KIL9674
KIL9673
KIL9678
KIL9679
IL8415
IL8403
IL8453
IL8454
IL8389
IL8429
IL8497
IL8486
IL8390
IL8426
IL8480
IL8413
IL8412
IL8266
IL8425
KIL10275
IL8402
KIL10274
IL8300
KIL9909
KIL10216
IL8401
IL8506
IL8536
IL8424
IL8414
IL8267
KIL10547
IL8358
NKIL5735
NKIL5736
NKIL5395
NKIL5769
NKIL5734
KIL10146
IL8364
NKIL5598
IL8239
Central Bus terminal
Tsim Sha Tsui Hotel
Harcourt Rd., Central Central
Jun. of Harbor Rd. & Fleming Rd. , S.W. Sheung Wan
Lal Chi Kok Rd, Cheung Sha Wan C.S.W.
Cheung Sha Wan & Lal Chi Kok Rd C.S. W.
Cheung Sha Wan & Lal Chi Kok Rd C.S.W.
Cheung Sha Wan & Lal Chi Kok Rd C.S.W.
Cheung Sha Wan Rd, C.S.W. C.S.W.
Cheung Sha Wan Rd, C.S.W. C.S.W.
Lal Chi Kok Rd., Cheung Sha Wan C.S.W.
King's Rd., North Point North point
Chi Kiang St., Kwun Tong Kwun Tong
Chi Kiang St., Kwun Tong Kwun Tong
Yuk Yat St., Kwun Tong Kwun Tong
Yuk Yat St., Kwun Tong Kwun Tong
Upper Lascar Row & Hollywood Rd. Sheung Wan
Upper Lascar Row & Hollywood Rd. Sheung Wan
Upper Lascar Row, Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
Upper Lascar Row & Lok Ku Rd Sheung Wan
Gloucester Rd. & Harbor Rd., S. W. Sheung Wan
Queen's Rd. ctrl & Low Lascar Row Sheung Wan
Queen's Rd., Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
Queen's Road, West, Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
Gloucester Rd. & Harbor Rd., S. W. Sheung Wan
Queen's Rd Ctrl & Low Lascar Row Sheung Wan
Queen's Road, Central, Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
Hollywood Rd., Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
Jun. of Hollywood & Possession St. Sheung Wan
Electric Rd. & Wing Hing St., North Point North point
Lower Lascar Row, Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
938 Canton Rd, T.S.T. Tsim Sha Tsu
Upper Lascar Row & Hollywood Rd. Sheung Wan
810 Canton Rd. T.S.T. Tsim Sha Tsu
117 Wal Chai Rd., Wal Chal Wal Chal
130 Austin Rd, T.S.T. Tsim Sha Tsu
10 Observation Court T.S.T. Tsim Sha Tsu
Hollywood Rd., Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
2A New St., Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
Bonham Rd., Sheung Wan Sheung Wan
Queen's Rd Ctrl & Low Lascar Row Sheung Wan
Upper Lascar Row & Hollywood Rd. Sheung Wan
King's & Fortness Hill Rd, North Point North point
Ko Shan Rd., Kowloon City Hung Hom
Cloud View Rd, North Point North Point
Pak Tin, Shek Kip Mel Skek Kip Mel
Pak Tin, Shek Kip Mel Skek Kip Mel
Broadcast Dr., Kowloon Tong Kowloon Toni
15-21 La Salle Rd., Kowloon Tong* Kowloon Tonj
Po Kong Village Rd., Skek Kip Mel Skak Kip Mel
26 Battery St., Yau Ma Tel Yau Ma Tel
Cloud View Rd, North Point North Point
Hiu Kwong St., Kwan Tong Kwun Tong
Cloud Vlew Rd., North Point North point
Hotel
Hotel
Ind./Godown
Ind./Godown
Ind./Godown
Ind./Godown
Ind/Godown
Ind./Godown
Ind/Godown
Ind./Godown
Ind/Godown
Ind./Godown
Ind/Godown
Ind./Godown
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Offices
Residentall
Residentall
Residentall
Residentall
Residentall
Residentall
g Residentall
Residentall
Residentall
Residentall
Residentall
Resdentall
18.000
12.000
10.000
9.630
10.400
10.400
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
9.500
12.000
9.538
9.538
11.050
11.330
11.267
11.290
15.000
11.328
12.000
10.333
10.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
10.000
5.000
10.000
3.500
5.000
10.000
5.000
5.900
9.860
10.000
6.000
10.630
5.000
5.990
6.000
3.960
3.300
4.279
5.000
5.000
9.000
5.000
3,983.0
2,150.0
3,362.5
6,062.0
1,389.4
1,441.4
2,500.9
991.6
1,301.1
1,301.1
1,398.7
697.0
621
480
1,060
1,029
289.0
371.7
634.0
730.9
4,943.0
211.0
1,176.0
1,299.0
4,340.4
1,779.4
861.0
623.0
127.0
259.9
97.0
67.5
436.8
70.5
106.7
1,394.1
106.4
204.5
95.5
42.7
590.2
380.1
2,364.3
490.0
2,020.4
660.0
1,330.0
1,722
3,289.0
92.9
62.5
3,531.6
3,653.3
2,602.2
08/04/78 585,000,000
09/29/78 175,000,000
05/16/72 105,000,000
09/13/78 415,000,000
02/08/74 4,300,000
08/08/75 4,450,000
07/12/74 5,050,000
04/18/75 2,100,000
11/09/73 4,800,000
11/30/73 4,500,000
08/09/74 2,500,000
03/20/72 1,620,000
02/16/70 860,000
01/19/70 980,000
12/22/69 2,120,000
03/16/70 1,770,000
09/24/76 4,950,000
01/09/76 6,800.000
09/13/78 30.000,000
06/21/78 30,750,000
05/11/77 140,000,000
07/25/77 5,000,000
07/13/79 79,000,000
01/09/79 62,000,000
11/30/76 120,000,000
04/29/77 53,000,000
12/11/78 49,000,000
04/25/78 25.000,000
10/30/78 4,800,000
09/27/71 2,100,000
05/11/77 2,200.000
05/10/74 100,000
02/13/76 9,500,000
11/29/74 135,000
04/14/72 570,000
11/26/71 840,000
04/26/74 420,000
03/05/76 3,400,000
11/26/79 2,700,000
12/12/79 1,750,000
06/07/77 16,000,000
04/23/76 6,100,000
09/27/71 30,300,000
08/26/77 10,200,000
05/31/74 8,900,000
03/31/78 13,800,000
12/19/77 27,900,000
07/26/71 4,460,000
03/22/79 35,000,000
10/14/77 1,000,000
06/16/72 450,000
07/26/74 11,100,000
05/31/74 12,200,000
11/23/70 2,100,000
585,000,000 1,000
175,000,000 1,000
105,000,000 8,306
8,999 415,008,999 1,000
1,032,136 5,332,136 1,000
952 4,450,952 1.000
5,050,000 1,000
2,100,000 1,000
64,401 4,864,401 1,000
4,500,000 1,000
61,469 2,561,469 1,000
24,316 1,644,316 688
860,000 246
980,000 190
2,120,000 420
1,770,000 406
4,950,000 1,000
6,800,000 1,000
415,706 30,415,706 1,000
13,359 30,763,359 1,000
3,931,318 143,931,318 1,000
80,753 5,080,753 1,000
79,000,000 1,000
62,000.000 1,000
405,890 120,405,890 1,000
53,000,000 1,000
49,000.000 1,000
848,916 25,848,916 1,000
4,800,000 1,000
2,100,000 256
8,883 2,208,883 1,000
100,000 1,000
9,500,000 1,000
135,000 1,000
570,000 80
840,000 346
420.000 1,000
3,400,000 1,000
389,185 3,089,185 1,000
1,750,000 1,000
2,290,671 18,290,671 1,000
142,380 6,242,380 1,000
30,300,000 1,168
367,137 10,567,137 1,000
75,488 8,975,488 1,000
13,800,000 1,000
12,113 27,912,113 1,000
4,460,000 412
231,600 35,231,600 1,000
4,038 1,004,038 1,000
450,000 62
1,361,360 12,461,360 1,000
97,678 12,297,678 1,000
293,557 2,393,557 642
2,262.731,281 4,064.555,350
676,902,084 1,564,381,968
658,167,527 1,818,777,791
1,605,226,118 3,157,661,488
23,478,664 145,229,591
20,384,569 150,669,629
24,721,337 251,358,907
10.303,809 99,665,535
26,320,433 130,770,149
24,369,654 130,770,149
12,620,461 140,577,910
10,344.690 64,284,851
6,271,312 62,461,427
7,140,070 48,198,141
15,446,492 106,577,671
12,900,229 103,401,825
21,320,881 65,455,649
31,124,384 98,890,959
117,782,099 144,169,124
126,026,465 166,203,805
615,542,587 1,302,202,637
20.851.033 56,995,169
271,149,159 315,885,531
239.832,086 349,646,170
517,897,562 1,552,196,486
227,978,397 480,565,411
189.549,697 246,325,901
105,946,051 153.475,889
18,589,573 35,788,896
13,168,449 43,862,120
9,531,200 13,667,413
586,109 6,611,893
43,468,353 128,927,057
700,270 6,912,434
3,574,890 53,842,978
5,281,198 95,626,554
2,315,822 10,427,848
15,580,126 60,348,835
10,355,085 14,093,922
6,026,330 7,435,983
78,862,295 171,764,972
28,578,742 112,193,971
189,858,635 471,707,427
43,395,796 102,362,536
48,535,978 223,946,818
56,553,343 77,693,100
114,359,562 156.824,742
30,057,645 118,865.030
136,247,920 189,167,943
4,140,669 6,632,827
2,822,216 5,218,113
60,613,464 391,443,380
66,422,570 573,063,847
15,193,609 288,431,964
l
i
l
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TABLE 5-2. LAND CONTRACTS SELECTED FOR THE CONTRACT-BASED CASE STUDIES (Continued)
Classifi- Lease Revenues Total Estimated Estimated
cation of Plot Premia Lease Land Value Percentage
File Name Lot Number Location District Land use sites Ratio Area Date Initial Modification Total Rent Revenue At 1991 of Land Value(sq. M.) of Issue (HK Dollars value at date of Issue) (1991 HK$) (1991 HK$)* Capture
C/S9741 NKIL5290 Broadcast Dr., Kowloon Tong Kowloon Tong Residentall B 3.300 1,580 08/24/70 2,410.000 2,410,000 390 16,252,464 90,869,956 18%
C/S11048 KIL10364 11 Sham Chun St., Yau Ma Tel Yau Ma Tel Residentall B 6.000 100.5 04/29/77 1,850,000 1,850,000 1,000 7,988,138 10,061,391 111%
C/S10363 KIL10126 167 & 169 Shanghai St., Yau Ma Tel Yau Ma Tel Residentall B 5.000 142.5 11/24/72 1.460,000 1,460,000 140 8,553,961 11,886,133 72%
C/S10035 NKILS413 Fessenden Rd & Broadcast Dr., KowloonKowloon Tong Residentall B 3.900 1,850.4 10/29/71 4,500,000 4,500,000 458 28,212,967 125,776,630 22%
C/S10950 IL8416 King's Road, North Point North Point Residentall A 5.000 2,230.5 08/27/76 41,500,000 1,124,853 42,624,853 1,000 183,193,255 241,762,714 76%
C/S9867 NKIL5347 Hip Wo Rd., Kwun Tong KwunTong Residentail A 5.000 4,435 02/15/71 3,920,000 3,920,000 1,096 26,464,649 415,548,140 6%
C/S10477 NKIL5515 Kung Lok Rd, Kwan Tong Kwun Tong Residentall A 5.000 2,098.5 06/29/73 6,500,000 6,500,000 518 38,077,341 196,627,766 19%
C/S10764 IL8386 50 First St., Sheung Wan Sheung Wan Residentall A 5.000 64.3 03/14/75 220,000 220,000 1,000 1,115,690 6,970,825 16%
C/S10390 NKIL5436 Marconi Rd.. Kowloon Tong Kowloon Tong Residentall A 3.250 1,788.1 11/05/73 10,950,000 504,776 11,454,776 442 61,782,446 108,902,872 57%
C/SI 1368 IL8535 Hollywood Rd., Shueng Wan Sheung Wan Residentall A 3.800 63.5 12/12/79 1.600,000 1,600,000 1,000 5,511,528 6.882,783 80%
C/S9761 IL8223 Tin Hau Temple Rd., North Point North point Residentall A 4.400 5,381 09/28/70 7,100,000 296,267 7,396,267 1,330 49,834,998 513,262,241 10%
C/S10706 IL8357 Cloud View Rd, Norht Point North Point Residentall A 5.000 3,903.3 09/27/74 7,100,000 200,558 7,300,558 1.000 35,683,614 423,084,749 8%
C/S10364 NKILS415 Fessenden Rd., Kowloon Tong Kowloon Tong Residentall A 3.250 1,564.1 12/08/72 6,730,000 6,730,000 386 39,417,039 95,261,712 41%
C/E10804 IL8240-41 Cloud View Rd, North Point North Point Residentall A 5.000 6,566.0 05/21/75 7,720,000 80,480 7,800,480 2,000 38,204,236 711,688,989 5%
C/S10334 NKIL5392 Broadcast Dr., Kowloon Tong Kowloon Tong Residentall A 3.250 1,502.8 10/27(72 6,500,000 14,446 6,514,446 372 38,168,988 91,525,958 42%
C/S11310 KIL10639 460 Shanghai St., Mong Kok Mong Kok Residentall A 5.000 87.4 04/26/79 1,750,000 1,750,000 1,000 6,792,551 8,564,715 79%
C/S10780 NKILS620 Marconi Rd., Kowloon Tong Kowloon Tong Residentall A 2.400 1,698.9 04/18/75 4,500,000 5,769 4,505,769 1,000 22,060,755 76,407.913 29%
C/S11202 IL8359 off Tin Hau Ternple Rd., North Point North Point Residentall A 4.700 4,400.0 06/02/78 75,000,000 1,200 75,001,200 1,000 307,237,990 448,302,212 69%
C/S10419 KIL10220 Argyle St, Mong Kok Mong Kok Residentall A 5.000 1,487.0 01/26/73 16,600,000 13,462 16,613,462 588 97,288,549 145,716,654 67%
C/S10139 KIL10081 818 Canton Rd., Yau Ma Tel Yau Ma Tel Residentall A 5.000 1,474.9 03/20/72 300,000 300,000 50 1,881,969 6,584,570 29%
C/S10044 IL8238 Mount Butler Rd., Causeway Bay Causeway Bay Residentall A 4.500 3,741.6 10/2671 2,750,000 2,750,000 344 17,244,895 365,001,257 5%
C/S9930 KIL9850 Argyle Rd., Mong Kok Mong Kok Residentall A 3.500 1,787.2 06/2871 4,670,000 4,670,000 706 31,490,229 122,593,243 26%
C/S10526 KIL10277 Ho Man Tin Hill Rd, Ho Man Tin Ho Man Tin Residentall A 4.000 2,884.8 10/26(73 13,500,000 120,751 13,620,751 1,000 73,635,012 226,152,247 33%
C/S10368 KIL10138 39C Battery St., Yau Ma Tel Yau Ma Tel Residentall A 5.000 67.6 12/22(72 320,000 320,000 66 1,876,639 6,621,000 28%
C/S9782 IL8242 Mt. Davis Road. Western Westem Residentall A 0.75 1,766.0 11/23(70 350,000 6,479 356,479 436 2,266.228 28,709,322 8%
C/S10036 IL8237 Mount Butler Rd., Causeway Bay Causeway Bay Residentall A 4.320 1,850.4 10/2671 6,500,000 6,500,000 924 40,766,951 173,285,843 24%
C/S10436 KIL10137 14 Battery St., Yau Ma Tel Yau Ma Tel Residental A 5.000 68.2 03/30/73 500,000 500,000 68 2,930,460 6,684,752 44%
C/S11178 KIL10591 160 Shanghal St., Yau MaTe* Yau Ma Tel Residentall A 5.000 61.6 03/03/78 1,300,000 9,262 1,309,262 1,000 5,390,701 6,036,458 95%
C/S10112 IL8037 Tat Hang Rd., Causeway Bay Causeway Bay Residentall A 5.000 1,360.6 12/17/71 2,170,000 2,170,000 384 13,614,174 147,475,255 9%
C/S10700 IL8366 Cloud View Rd, Norht Point North Point Residentall A 5.000 5,111.5 08/23/74 10,000,000 275,188 10,275,188 1,000 50,274,121 554,039,552 9%
C/S10111 IL8036 Tal Hang Rd., Causeway Bay Causeway Bay Residentall A 5.000 280.3 12/1771 2,110,000 2,110,000 336 13,235,625 30,381,514 44%
C/S11092 KIL10548 Tsim Sha Tsut East Tsim Sha Tsui Retail C 8.666 2,656.5 06/07(77 68,000,000 146,679 68,146,679 1,000 292,543,149 1,455,799,674 20%
C/S10983 KIL10474 Tsim She Tsui East Tsim Sha Tsul Retail C 5.000 2,560.0 12/28/76 59,000,000 3,617,353 62,617,353 1,000 269,660,905 809,437,056 33%
C/S11162 KIL10587 Tsim Sha Tsui East Tsim Sha Tsul Retail C 8.250 1,550.0 01/17/78 80,000,000 80,000,000 1,000 327,713,891 808,646,590 41%
C/S11258 KIL10603 Tsim Sha Tsul East Tsim Sha Tsul Retail C 12.000 1,380.0 10/30(78 124,000,000 124,000,000 1,000 479,640,403 1,047,209,191 65%
C/S10343 IL8304 Shek Pal Wan Rd., Abredeen Aberdeen Supermarket C 2.400 2,078.1 11/24(72 9,900,000 9,900,000 514 57,981,235 282,748,950 21%
C/S10114 IL8287 Paridn's Rd., Causeway Bay Causeway Bay Supermarket A 0.700 1,552.0 01/17(72 1,830,000 1,668,439 3,498,439 364 18,980,055 61,593,158 31%
C/S10294 IL8303 Cloud View Rd., North Point North Point Supermarket A 1.200 993.5 09/15/72 4,700,000 109,687 4.809,687 246 28,221,222 67,589,138 42%
Mean 39%
Source: Collected by the author from 92 randomly selected land contracts Issued between 1970 and 1979. Information about these land contracts is gathered from microflims obtained from the Land Registry of Hong Kong.
Note: * The estimated 1991 land value is calculated using the residual method, and the description of the procedures is provided in the text.
Sq. m. - Square Meter
T.S.T. - Tsim Sha Tsui
C.W. - Chal Wai
C/S - Conditions of Sale
Ind/Godown - Industrial and Godown
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arrangements. Besides, there is no explicit policy statement from the Hong Kong
government on what percentage of the land-value increments they want to recoup
through land leasing. I, therefore, cannot judge whether the estimated average
percentage is "adequate" from a policy standpoint. Despite the lack of comparison,
the calculated percentage is still useful. When I combine this finding with the
percentage of infrastructure expenditures financed by the captured value, I can assess
the Hong Kong experience based on the two criteria established in the beginning of
this chapter.
Second, the 1991 land prices are approximated figures, the calculated
percentages of land-value capture will depend upon the accuracy of these estimates.
To test how sensitive the calculation of these percentages is to errors of estimating the
1991 land prices, I increased and decreased these estimates by 5 and 10 percent.
Table 5-3 shows the impacts of changing the land-value estimates on the average
percentage of land-value capture.
Increasing the 1991 land prices by 10 percent decreases the percentage of land-
value captured by 3.6 percent. Reducing the land prices by 10 percent will increase
the percentage by 4.3 percent. Effects of a 5-percent increase or decrease in the land
prices will not exceed 2.1 percent. Results of the sensitivity test indicate that if my
calculations for the 1991 land prices are not over- or under-estimated by more than 10
percent, the average percentage of land-value capture will fall within the range of 36
to 43 percent. These results indicate that errors within the range of 10 percent in
estimating the land values do not significantly affect the calculation of the average
percentage of land-value capture.
To analyze the data at a less aggregate level, I examined the estimated
percentages of land-value capture for land sites located in different districts and for
various land uses. I summarize the results in Table 5-4. By arranging the percentages
by district and land use, I am not trying to draw conclusions on what the percentages
of land-value capture will be for these categories. To do that, I need to construct a
stratified random sample for different districts. My purpose in presenting these figures
is to analyze further how the percentages for these different categories deviate from
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Table 5-3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE ESTIMATED LAND VALUES
(Percent)
Percentage Change in the Estimated Percentage of Land-value Capture
Estimated Land Values Actual Estimates Changes
Original with
No Change: 39.1
For the 1991 Land Value
Increase by:
10 35.5 (3.6)
5 37.2 (1.9)
Decrease by:
10 43.4 4.3
5 41.2 2.1
Source: Calculated by the author using data presented in Table 5-2.
Note:
(Prm-Ini + Prm-Mod + R)
PLVC =
where
PLVC
Prm-Ini
Prm-Mod
R
LV91
LV91
Percentage of Land-Value Capture
Premia from Initial Auctions
Premia from Lease Modifications
Annual Rent
Estimated 1991 Land Value
Table 5-4. PERCENTAGE OF LAND-VALUE CAPTURE FOR SELECTED LAND SITES
Residential Offices Industrial Bus
District A B C A B C Retails Hotel & Godown Supermarket Terminal District ** Average
COMMERICAL DISTRICTS:
In Hong Kong Island
Shueng Wan 48.0 47.6 60.8 58.0 50.8 * 54.8
Central 36.2 * 55.7 * 45.9
Wai Chal 6.6 * 6.6 34.2
In Kowloon
Tsim Sha Tsui 11.7 39.7 61.1 * 29.6
RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS:
In Hong Kong Island
Western 7.9 7-9
North Point 29.5 31.1 21.7* 30.0* 16.1 * 41.8 * 29.2
Causeway Bay 20.3 30.8 * 22.4
Abredeen 20.5 * 20.5
In Kowloon
Yau Ma Tei 49.0 78.9 61.8 42.6
Mong Kok 57.3 57.3
Hung Horn 90.1 90.1
Ho Man Tin 32.6* 32.6
In New Kowloon
Kowloon Tong 42.2 39.9 41.0
Shek Kip Mei 44.5 * 72.9 63.4
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS:
In New Kowloon
Kwun Tong 12.9 11.6 * 13.9 12.7
Cheung Sha Wan 13.9 13.9 13.3
Land uses ** 35.4 57.7 64.4 30.8 50.6 58.9 39.7 49.9 13.8 31.0 55.7 39.1
Average 5 46 .8
Note: * There is only one observation for the corresponding district and land use in the sample.
** Figures in the Land Use row and District column are not the weighted average of the numbers presented in the table.
Blank cell indicates that there is no observation for the corresponding district and land use in the sample.
Source: The author calculated these percentages using data gathered from 92 land sites selected from all contracts issued in Hong Kong between 1970 and 1979,
(Table 5-2).
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the overall mean. This, in turn, shows how instrumental the estimated average
percentage of land-value capture is.
Between 1970 and 1991, the government captured approximately 35 percent of
the increases in value for selected land sites leased for the development of Class A
residential buildings. The classification of residential property is based on the saleable
floor area as follows (Commissioner of Rating and Valuation, 1992, ANNEX F):
Class A--saleable area not exceeding 39.9 m2
Class B--saleable area of 40 m2 to 69.9 m2
Class C--saleable area of 70 m2 to 99.9 m2
Class D--saleable area of 100 m2 to 159.9 m2
Class E--saleable area of at least 160.0 m2
For land sites used for Class B residential development, the government
retained 58 percent of the land-value increments. For Class C, the percentage was 64
percent. On average, the percentage of land-value capture for residential land sites
was 52 percent. It was about 12 percent larger than the overall average of 39 percent.
The percentages of land-value capture for Class A, B, and C office buildings
were 31, 51, and 59 percent, respectively. The classification of office buildings is
based on the average size of the floor area of the property. Office buildings that have
an average size of 354, 84, and 47m 2 are classified as Class A, B, and C properties,
accordingly. In other words, the percentage of land-value capture for the smaller
office buildings was larger than bigger commercial properties. The average percentage
for land used for office buildings was 47 percent, which was reasonably close to the
overall average.
For industrial land sites, the percentages were small. They were about 14
percent for industrial land sites located either in Kwun Tong and Cheung Sha Wan. I
can explain these results by the general land policy in Hong Kong. To stimulate
industrial development, the government leased land to industrialists at a low premium
through the Conditions of Grant and that, in turn, led to a slower increase in industrial
land prices. It is, thus, not surprising to see that the percentages of land-value capture
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were relatively smaller from industrial land sites than land parcels for other types of
land use.
In terms of the different districts, the average percentage of land-value capture
in the commercial areas, such as Sheung Wan, Central, Wai Chai, and Tsim Sha Tsui,
was about 34 percent. For the residential districts, the average percentage was 43
percent. Some districts, such as Yau Ma Tei, Mong Kok, and Shek Kip Mei, had
approximately 60 percent of the surplus land value captured by the government. I
excluded Hung Hom because there is only one observation for this district in my
sample. Among these residential districts, the closer a district was to a commercial or
an industrial center, the higher the percentages.
In sum, the percentages of land-value capture for various types of land in
different locations are reasonably close to the overall average of 39 percent. The only
exception is the land sites used for residential and industrial purposes.
The Role of Land Revenues in Infrastructure Expenditures
Estimating what proportion of the increased land value the government
captured through land leasing tells only half of the story. We still need to know how
significant the captured value is in financing infrastructure expenditures. In Hong
Kong, the captured land value by leasing land only accounts for a portion of the total
land revenues. Here, I define land revenues as the total money collected from the
property tax, rates, rent, and land premia. (See Chapter 4 for the definition of the
property tax and rates.) In Table 5-5, I show that between 1970 and 1991, the average
annual amount of the property tax and rates collected accounted for 31 percent of the
average annual land revenues. The lease revenues, which are composed of land rent
and premia received from the initial auctions, lease modifications, and renewals,
accounted for the remaining 69 percent. Lease revenues are, thus, not a substitute for
the property tax and rates in Hong Kong. In fact, the four mechanisms available
under the leasehold system, at least in theory, provide additional ways for the
government to capture the land-value increments. The Hong Kong case indicates that
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Table 5-5. LAND AND LEASE REVENUES IN HONG KONG, 1970-1991(Million of 1991 U.S. Dollars)
Percentage of Average Annual
Type of Average Total Total Local Total Local Total
Land Annual Land Government Government Infrastructure
Revenues Amount Revenues Revenues Expenditures Expenditures
Property tax 130 9.1 1.8 2.0 7.2
Rates 307 21.5 4.3 4.7 17.1
Lease Revenues 990 69.4 14.0 15.1 55.2
Total 1,427.0 100.0 20.1 21.7 79.6
Sources: From Appendix D.
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these four mechanisms are not necessarily incompatible with the imposition of
property taxes that the government must use either one or the other.
I stated in Chapter 1 that according to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration,
the PRC government is keeping half of the revenues generated from land leasing for
infrastructure investment after 1997. The retained revenues were not included in the
data that I gathered from government publications. Hence, the PRC-British
arrangement may underestimate the proportion of lease revenues in the average annual
land revenues between 1984 and 1991.
For infrastructure expenditures, I included spending on highways, land, the
airport, seaports, parks and other recreational activities, parking facilities, utilities,
water and sewage, housing, and environmental protection. I emphasize these types of
government expenditures because part of the increases in land value is due to these
investments in public works. The government, therefore, has legitimacy in recouping
the part of the land-value increments generated by these investments.
In Table 5-5, I also show that the average annual land revenues generated from
the property tax and rates were, on average, about 24 percent of the infrastructure
expenditures in Hong Kong annually. The funds raised annually by leasing public
land financed an average of 55 percent of the public-work expenditures. Put
differently, the average annual land revenues covered about 80 percent of the average
annual infrastructure expenditures between 1970 and 1991.
In order to estimate the relative significance of the percentage of land revenues
in public infrastructure expenditures in Hong Kong. I compared the data for Hong
Kong with those for other cities. I calculated the percentage of land revenues in
infrastructure expenditures for Singapore and some cities in the United States. In
analyzing the sizes of total revenues and infrastructure expenditures of these cities, I
picked cities for which detailed infrastructure expenditures data are available. I
selected Singapore and seven cities in the United States, namely, Washington, DC,
New York City, Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. All these
cities had average annual revenues of more than US$2 billion between 1970 and 1991.
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(In this section, all monetary values are in constant 1991 U.S. dollars, unless otherwise
indicated.)
For the U.S. cities, due to data limitations, land revenues include only property
taxes and funds collected from special assessments. There will be few lease revenues
for these cities, because very few local governments in the United States use land
leasing to allocate public land. For Singapore, I obtained figures for both property
taxes and income from land sales. Because the Singapore government does not lease
all public land, I do not have data to separate lease revenues from the total land
revenues. I, therefore, treat the total amount as land revenues here. To calculate the
infrastructure expenditures for the selected cities, I employed the same definition as
for Hong Kong. Similar to Hong Kong, all these cities (except New York City and
Washington, DC) spent, on average, from US$1 to 4 billion annually on infrastructure.
I am not trying to determine whether Hong Kong can finance a higher
percentage of public works than in selected cities. This would require a careful
comparison between Hong Kong and these cities, which is not easy for three reasons.
First, the most common problem is the lack of relevant data. Information about
government revenues and expenditures at the city level is usually not available. If
these data are available, they are mostly from different sources. This, in turn, creates
the problem of consistency in comparing these data.
Second, different countries may have different definitions for land revenues and
infrastructure expenditures. In the United States, for example, revenues generated
from "exaction" are not counted as part of the property taxes. They are usually
referred to as "impact" or "development" fees (Altshuler and G6mez-Ibgez, 1993,
pp. 3-6). More importantly, exactions may be in-kind. In-kind exactions require
developers to construct public facilities, such as roads and parking spaces, as a
condition to obtain the development permits. These in-kind and monetary "receipts"
by the city governments usually do not show up as land revenues. In other words, if
land revenues as a percentage of infrastructure expenditures appears small for some
U.S. cities, it may only mean that these city governments rely on the private provision
of some public infrastructures.
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Third, in Hong Kong, the government is solely responsible for all infrastructure
expenditures. Yet, cities in other countries may rely partly or totally on the support of
the central government. Again, if the percentages are small in the U.S. cities, it does
not suggest that the city governments cannot capture the land-value increments as
revenues for infrastructure expenditures. These governments may just not have to
raise the money for these investments. All these factors, therefore, make cross-city
comparisons difficult. In view of these difficulties, the inclusion of selected cities in
my analysis is to highlight the experience of Hong Kong by showing what is
happening in other places in the world and not to draw any conclusion from the
comparison.
In Table 5-6, I present the results of my calculation. As I mentioned earlier,
between 1970 and 1991, the average land revenues as a percentage of the Hong Kong
government average total infrastructure expenditures annually were about 80 percent.
Of the other cities, Singapore and New York City had the largest percentages, which
were 62 and 59 percent, respectively. Yet, infrastructure expenditures in New York
City were US$10.9 billion, which was about ten times larger than in Singapore
(US$1.6 billion) and in Hong Kong (US$ 1.8 billion) for the same period. Los
Angeles had the smallest percentage, which was about 16 percent.
For cities that had a similar amount of annual infrastructure expenditures to
Hong Kong between 1970 and 1991, the differences in the percentages between Hong
Kong and these cities were more dramatic. These cities include Singapore, Chicago,
San Francisco, and Philadelphia. Among these cities, only Singapore could support
about 62 percent of its annual expenditures on public works. For Chicago, San
Francisco, and Philadelphia, the percentages were 43, 37, and 21 percent, respectively.
Similarly, the percentages of land revenues in total city government annual revenues
and expenditures in Hong Kong were also larger than in some of the selected cities.
Between 1970 and 1991, average annual land revenues in Hong Kong accounted for
20 percent of the average annual total government revenues. Chicago had a similar
percentage. For the other cities, the percentages ranged from 19 percent (for New
York City and Singapore) to only 11 percent (for Philadelphia). For the average
Table 5-6. THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND REVENUES IN GOVERNMENT REVENUES, TOTAL EXPENDITURES,
AND INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURES FOR SELECTED CITIES
(Million of 1991 U.S. Dollars)
Average Annual Land Revenues
Average Average Average as a Percentage of Average Annual
Average Annual Annual Annual
Annual Total Local Total Local Total Local Total Local Total Local Total Local
Total Land Government Government Infrastructure Government Government Infrastructure
City Years Revenues Revenues Expenditures Expenditures Revenues Expenditures Expenditures
Hong Kong 1970-1991 1,427.0 7,091.6 6,565.6 1,793.4 20.1 21.7 79.6
Singapore 1972-1991 994.7 5,329.0 4,095.8 1,615.6 18.7 24.3 61.6
New York City, New York 1970-1991 6,436.1 34,518.5 33,341.6 10,902.4 18.6 19.3 59.0
Washington, D.C. 1970-1991 512.4 3,658.8 3,862.6 893.7 14.0 13.3 57.3
Chicago, Illinois 1970-1991 657.6 3,295.2 3,239.4 1,524.3 20.0 20.3 43.1
San Francisco, California 1970-1991 443.8 2,464.6 2,310.1 1,201.1 18.0 19.2 36.9
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1970-1991 337.0 3,121.7 3,178.4 1,621.8 10.8 10.6 20.8
Los Angeles, California 1970-1991 611.9 4,893.1 4,562.2 3,939.5 12.5 13.4 15.5
Sources: From Appendix D.
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annual total expenditures, the percentages for Hong Kong and Singapore were 22 and
24 percent, respectively. Among selected cities, New York City, Chicago, and San
Francisco could finance close to an average of 20 percent of their total annual local
expenditures by land revenues.
All this information, though scattered, indicates that land revenues in Hong
Kong play an important role in financing total government expenditures, in general,
and infrastructure investment, in particular. Specifically, given the statistics of these
major cities in other parts of the world, the percentage of the average annual land
revenues in public infrastructure expenditures in Hong Kong appears to be large.
Because payments received through land leasing accounted for 69 percent of the total
land revenues, I argue that the value captured from land contracts played an important
role in financing public works.
Conclusion
After constructing the percentages of land-value capture and the percentage of
land revenues in public infrastructure expenditures, I combine these two indicators and
place the outcomes in one of the quadrants in Figure 5-1. I discovered that the Hong
Kong government captured, on average, 39 percent of the land-value increments
occurring between 1970 and 1991 from land leased in the 1970s. This captured value
accounted for a large proportion of the total annual land revenues for the same period.
Specifically, payments received from land leasing paid about 55 percent of the average
annual infrastructure expenditures. Combined with the money collected from the
property tax and rates, the Hong Kong government seemed capable of funding a large
percentage--80 percent--of its annual public works expenditures by land revenues.
Based on these results, I place Hong Kong somewhere in the middle of Quadrants II
and IV in that public investments are considered to be sustainable. In Hong Kong, the
government did not borrow any money from the World Bank or other international aid
agencies. Major public infrastructure projects are financed either by government land
revenues or internally generated funds.
- 119-
Given the exceptional ability of the government to self-finance public
infrastructure, the Hong Kong land-leasing system may, indeed, be a valuable model
for other countries to follow. Yet, to emulate the " model," we must first understand
the necessary institutions that support the system. Moreover, I must show which of
the four mechanisms of land-value capturing works best, what transaction costs are
associated with each mechanism, and how the involved parties minimize these costs.
These are the issues that I will consider in Chapters 6 and 7.
CHAPTER 6
INITIAL AUCTION AND LEASE MODIFICATION
According to some analysts, one major advantage of adopting a leasehold
system is the possibility of capturing the future increases in land value. I emphasize
the retainment of the future increases because governments, normally, cannot obtain
much money by leasing land to private developers when the development of the real
estate market is at its initial stage. At this stage, land prices are normally low. Land
prices will increase when the economy grows. The state will reap the financial gains
of increases in land prices only if it can capture this subsequent appreciation in land
value. In Chapter 5, I argued that the Hong Kong government was capable of
capturing the land-value increments; the purpose of this and the next chapters is to
examine how the government did that.
In this chapter, I focus only on payments received from the four mechanisms,
which I called the lease revenues in Chapter 5. I first offer a general view on the
relative significance of land rent and different premia in lease revenues between 1970
and 1990.1 Certainly, funds generated from the property tax and rates, which account
for about one-third of the total land revenues, will affect the aggressiveness of the
government in capturing the land value through land leasing. Yet, they are not part of
the mechanisms specified in the land contracts; therefore, I will not deal with them
here. Second, I present results of my regression analysis of the data gathered from my
contract-based case studies. The purpose of my analysis is to examine the correlation
between the percentages of land-value capture and other potential determining factors,
such as the premia collected from lease modifications and rent. Finally, I apply the
transaction-costs concept to identify the costs associated with the land-value capture at
the initial auctions and during contract modifications. I then utilize the framework
1 In Chapter 5, I used 1991 as the terminal year. Here I use 1990, because the
government was revising the 1991 figures for premia received from different
mechanisms when I was conducting my research in Hong Kong in 1993. Hence, I
was not able to collect the 1991 data for my analysis. I do not expect that the
omission of the 1991 data significantly affects my arguments.
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developed in Chapter 3 to analyze how the involved parties use different strategies to
minimize these costs. I will discuss the land-value capture during the lease renewals
in Chapter 7.
Lease Revenues Collected from the Four Mechanisms
To have an overview of how the government captured the land value using the
four mechanisms, I analyzed data published by the Hong Kong government. In
Table 6-1, I show the total payments received by the government between 1970 and
1990 for three different premia and land rent. Among the three premia, payments
received from the initial land auctions accounted for the largest percentages of the
total premia. Ninety-one percent of the total premia was from the initial auctions.
Within this 21-year period, none of these years had percentages of less than 60
percent. Especially during the 1980s, premia from the initial auctions contributed
more than 90 percent of the total annual land premia. (There are problems with these
data, which I will discuss later.) In terms of the percentage of the total lease
revenues, premia from initial auctions accounted for 90 percent during the study
period.
For payments from lease modifications and renewals and land rent, their
percentages in the total premia and lease revenues were, relatively, much smaller than
for money received from the initial auctions. The percentages of payments from lease
modifications in total premia and lease revenues were both 8 percents between 1970
and 1990. For individual years, the percentages of modification premia in total premia
ranged from less than 0.1 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 1977.
Funds collected from lease renewals accounted for only 2 percent of the total
land premia and total lease revenues. The biggest percentage of payments received
from lease renewals in total premia occurred in 1972, which was 18 percent. In 1981
and 1982, the percentages dropped to their lowest level and were only 0.3 percent.
Land rent had the smallest average percentage of the total lease revenues, which was
only 1 percent. All these data suggest that between 1970 and 1990 the government
Table 6-1. LEASE REVENUES OF HONG KONG: 1970 -1990
(Millions of 1991 HK Dollars)
PREMIA COLLECTED FROM
Initial Leases Lease Modification Lease Renewal
Amount % of % of % of % of
Private % of Total % of Total % of Total Total Total
Public Treaty Total Lease Total Lease Total Lease Total Land Lease Lease
Year Auctions Grants Premia Revenues Amount Premia Revenues Amount Premia Revenues Premia Rent Revenues Revenues
1970 321.5 71.9 67.7 65.3 98.2 16.9 16.3 89.1 15.3 14.8 580.6 21.6 3.6 602.2
1971 770.0 75.7 67.0 65.8 214.6 17.0 16.7 202.0 16.0 15.7 1,262.3 22.8 1.8 1,285.0
1972 739.4 20.0 64.8 62.8 204.7 17.5 16.9 208.6 17.8 17.2 1,172.7 37.4 3.1 1,210.1
1973 2,037.0 24.1 84.2 82.5 204.7 8.4 8.2 183.5 7.5 7.3 2,449.3 47.9 1.9 2,497.2
1974 824.4 62.5 76.1 72.4 204.4 17.5 16.7 73.5 6.3 6.0 1,164.7 60.0 4.9 1,224.7
1975 661.4 58.2 73.7 70.3 215.3 22.0 21.0 42.2 4.3 4.1 977.0 47.3 4.6 1,024.3
1976 707.6 136.4 74.6 71.4 218.4 19.3 18.5 68.7 6.1 5.8 1,131.1 50.4 4.3 1,181.4
1977 951.0 75.2 62.9 60.9 401.9 24.6 23.8 203.1 12.5 12.1 1,631.2 54.1 3.2 1,685.3
1978 1,934.4 2,625.4 85.1 84.2 636.3 11.9 11.7 163.9 3.1 3.0 5,360.1 57.7 1.1 5,417.7
1979 3,042.5 1,149.0 83.4 82.5 750.7 14.9 14.8 85.1 1.7 1.7 5,027.4 52.8 1.0 5,080.2
1980 5,758.3 292.7 84.9 84.2 993.8 13.9 13.8 79.4 1.1 1.1 7,124.2 62.8 0.9 7,187.0
1981 19,831.1 1,455.6 92.6 92.3 1,640.5 7.1 7.1 62.3 0.3 0.3 22,989.5 60.8 0.3 23,050.4
1982 15,342.6 1,932.9 92.5 92.2 1,331.1 7.1 7.1 60.2 0.3 0.3 18,666.8 61.9 0.3 18,728.7
1983 7,234.2 981.4 92.7 92.0 551.7 6.2 6.2 96.9 1.1 1.1 8,864.2 64.4 0.7 8,928.6
1984 2,767.6 549.8 90.4 88.7 291.8 8.0 7.8 60.2 1.6 1.6 3,669.5 71.4 1.9 3,740.8
1985 4,646.1 973.1 84.2 83.3 1,021.3 15.3 15.1 33.3 0.5 0.5 6,673.8 71.3 1.1 6,745.1
1986 4,115.0 2,347.1 95.4 94.2 277.6 4.1 4.0 35.1 0.5 0.5 6,774.8 84.5 1.2 6,859.3
1987 3,796.7 386.4 94.9 92.9 172.7 3.9 3.8 51.3 1.2 1.1 4,407.0 94.4 2.1 4,501.4
1988 5,010.4 222.8 99.0 97.2 11.7 0.2 0.2 40.4 0.8 0.8 5,285.3 97.9 1.8 5,383.2
1989 8,125.0 n.a. 99.2 98.0 34.1 0.4 0.4 34.2 0.4 0.4 8,193.3 101.6 1.2 8,294.9
1990 9,259.1 n.a. 99.6 98.2 3.6 0.0 * 0.0 * 35.0 0.4 0.4 9,297.8 131.3 1.4 9,429.1
TOTAL 97,875.2 13,440.3 90.7 89.7 9,478.9 7.7 7.6 1,908.0 1.6 1.5 122,702.3 1,354.3 1.1 124,056.6
* Value less than 0.05.
Sources: Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services and the Accounts of Hong Kong, 1970-1990
Annual Report of the Land Registrar's Office of Hong Kong, 1970-1990
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obtained the major part of its lease revenues from premia collected from the initial
auctions.
Two factors, however, complicate the interpretation of these numbers. One
problem is that before 1981, the government gave lessees the option to pay their
premia for the initial leasing of land in installments, which I discussed in Chapter 4.
The major purpose of this scheme was to encourage investment in the property market
that was very sluggish in 1969. In Table 6-1, the percentages of total land premia
gathered from initial auctions between 1970 and 1979 were relatively smaller than in
some of the other years, because they include only the installments received, not the
total premia generated, from initial auctions.
Moreover, lessees, for instance, could pay their premia for lease renewals by
installments for up to 80 years in 1957 but only for up to 21 years after 1960.
Because the government spread the collection of premia for lease renewals over a long
period, premia collected from this mechanism can appear smaller than premia from the
initial auctions during my study period. Yet, the sum of all installments can still be a
significant amount of money. Premia for lease modifications are usually not paid in
installments. Only when the premium for lease modifications was more than HK$10
million could lessees pay the premium in 10 equal installments with an interest charge
of 10 percent annually.
With the payments from the initial auctions and lease renewals stretching over
a longer period and, thus, appearing smaller, the percentages of premia collected from
lease modifications in total lease revenues could appear larger than they should be in
Table 6-1. Hence, these figures may underestimate the percentages of premia
collected from the initial auctions and lease renewals in the total lease revenues.
Another problem is that these figures underestimate the lease revenues
collected by the government between 1984 and 1990. As I mentioned earlier, starting
in 1984, all revenues collected from land transactions are now divided between the
current government and the future Chinese administration of Hong Kong. The existing
Hong Kong government has been depositing its share of lease revenues into a special
fund account, called the "Capital Reserve Fund," for the purpose of financing public
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infrastructure. For the share that the Chinese government takes, it deposits it into a
bank operated in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Annual Yearbook, 1984). Owing to this
arrangement, there were apparent decreases in lease revenues collected by the existing
government between 1984 and 1990. These figures, however, did not take into the
account the share of lease revenues that the future government of Hong Kong
collected. This omission may, therefore, underestimate these figures by up to 50
percent.
Due to these two complications, premia received from the initial auctions
should be higher than 90 percent of the total lease revenues between 1970 and 1990.
To study further the exact percentages, I examined the data that I gathered from my
case studies. Moreover, from these macro data, I cannot tell whether the government
chose to rely on the initial auctions or had to employ this method due to some
inherent difficulties of capturing land value through other mechanisms. In other
words, the government could have captured a large portion of land value by
negotiating with lessees for more money during lease modifications and renewals; yet,
because revenues generated from the initial auctions, the property tax, and rates were
sufficient to cover a major part of the public works expenditures, the government
might not have been aggressive in demanding additional payments from lessees when
they modified and renewed their leases. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the
dynamics of land-value capture at a more micro level. To do that, I present results of
the regression analysis on data gathered from my contract-based case studies.
Regression Analysis of the Percentages of Land-Value Capture
In Chapter 5, I calculated the percentages of land-value capture for selected
land sites leased between 1970 and 1979. Although I identified the differences in the
percentages of land-value capture among these land parcels, I did not provide any
explanation for the variations. In order to explain these different outcomes, I will use
a simple regression model to identify the possible correlations between the percentages
of land-value capture and other variables, such as the lot size, floor-area ratio,
location, land uses, and date-of-issue. More specifically, I want to test the hypothesis
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that premia collected from lease modifications have a significant impact on the sizes
of the percentages of land-value capture.
The specification of the regression model is as follows:
PLVC = 1+ $2AREA + $3DATE + $4 MOD + $5FAR + $06 FFICE +
P7RESIDENTIAL + 08HK + I 9KLN + J 10HOTEL + f1IND +
$ 12RETAIL + 13SUPER + 14RENT + e
where
PLVC = Percentage of Land-value Captured 2
AREA = Area of Land Parcel in Square Meters
DATE = Date Contract Issued
MOD = The 1991 Present Value of Premia Collected From
Modifications of Contract Conditions
FAR = Floor Area Ratio
OFFICE = 1 if classified as Office Building Site0 otherwise
RESIDENTIAL = 1 if classified as Residential Site0 otherwise
HK = 1 if located in Hong Kong Island0 otherwise
KLN 1 if located in Kowloon PeninsulaK0 otherwise
HOTEL = 1 if used for Hotel Purposes0 otherwise
IND = 1 if used for Industrial Purposes0 otherwise
RETAIL = 1 if used for Retail Purposes0 otherwise
SUPER = 1 if used for Supermarket Purposes10 otherwise
RENT = The 1991 Present Value of the Total Amount of
Annual Land Rent Collected from the
Date-of-issue to 1991
With the model, I measure: (1) the relative importance of the independent variables in
determining the sizes of the estimated percentages and (2) the correlation between the
percentages of land-value capture and various other independent variables. In
2 See Chapter 5 for the formula of the PLVC.
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Table 6-2, I show the results of my regression analysis. I list all the independent
variables according to their estimated significant t statistics in an ascending order.
There are three interesting observations from these results. First, premia
collected from lease modifications (MOD) do not seem to be an important factor in
explaining the sizes of the percentages of land-value capture (PLVC), thus disproving
the hypothesis. Among all the independent variables, only two have significant t
statistics smaller than 0.05. These variables are the date-of-issue (DATE) and the area
of the land parcel in square meters (AREA). For the rest of the variables, their
significant t statistics are larger than 0.05. This indicates that these variables are
insignificant in helping me to interpret the differences in the PLVC among selected
cases. More importantly, the estimated significant t statistics for MOD is 0.452, which
is much higher than 0.05.
In reviewing the correlation coefficients for PLVC with all other independent
variables in the model, I again find no strong correlation between PLVC and MOD.
The correlation coefficient for the two variables is 0.033. The standardized beta
coefficient for MOD is also very small, 0.059. These results show consistently that
MOD is insignificant in determining the size of the PLVC. Based on these statistics, I
find no strong evidence to support the hypothesis that premia from lease modifications
have any correlation or that they have important impacts on the percentages of land-
value capture for selected land sites in my study.
Second, land rent does not seem to have an impact on the PLVC. The
estimated significant t statistics for RENT is 0.622, and the correlation coefficient
between RENT and PLVC is only -0.097.
Third, the significant t statistic for the variable DATE (date-of-issue) is very
small, which suggests that it is a very important variable in explaining the sizes of the
PLVC. Besides, DATE has a very strong positive correlation with the PLVC, with a
correlation coefficient of 0.679. In other words, the later that a contract was issued
between 1970 and 1979, the bigger the percentage of land-value capture would be. I
also find that DATE has the largest standardized beta coefficient, which is 0.744. In
Table 6-2. RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON FACTORS DETERMINING
THE PERCENTAGES OF LAND-VALUE CAPTURE
(Ranked by Significant t Statistics)
Standardized
Beta Significant Correlation
Variables Symbol Coefficient Coefficient t-Statistic t Coefficient
Dependent Varaible
Percentage of Land Value Captured PLVC
Independent Variable
Constant -2673.846
Date of issue DATE 2.192E-07 0.744 8.343 0.000 0.679
Area of Land Parcel (in Sq. m.) AREA -0.005 -0.259 -2.865 0.005 -0.216
Used for Retail Purposes RETAIL -24.312 -0.184 -1.074 0.286 0.006
Located in Kowloon Pennisula KLN 7.037 0.110 1.031 0.306 0.170
Premia from Contract Modification MOD 6.155E-07 0.059 0.756 0.452 0.033
Floor Area Ratio PR 0.508 0.065 0.577 0.565 0.061
Used for Industrial Purposes IND -11.012 -0.138 -0.510 0.612 -0.362
Land Rent RENT 2.410E-05 0.043 0.495 0.622 -0.097
Used for Supermarket Purposes SUPER 12.590 0.083 0.492 0.624 -0.054
Used for Residential Purposes RESIDENTIAL 10.016 0.186 0.46 0.647 0.071
Used for Commerical Purposes OFFICE -9.087 -0.152 -0.444 0.659 0.167
Used for Hotel Purposes HOTEL 4.770 0.032 0.207 0.836 0.072
Located in Hong Kong Island HK 0.246 0.005 0.041 0.968 0.073
N =92
R square = 0.616
Adjusted R square = 0.552
Source: Calculated by the author using data gathered from 92 randomly selected land contracts
(Table 5-2) and the SPSS statistical computer program.
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other words, among all independent variables, DATE seems to be the most important
variable in increasing the percentages of land-value capture.
These findings have important implications on our understanding of how the
Hong Kong government employed land leasing to retain the future increases in land
value. The capturing of a fairly large amount of the land-value increments was mainly
due to the government's ability to lease land gradually. According to my regression
analysis, the government captured higher percentages of the increased land value from
land sites leased in the more recent years within the period that I selected my sample.
Indeed, the variable DATE is a proxy for measuring the government's ability to
capture the increased land value by regulating the timing of land disposition. The
government determined the supply of land based on its projection of the demand for
land for a period of five years. It then scheduled the land auctions to lease land to
private developers. By regulating the supply of land, the government could influence
the value of land in the market. In a real estate market where land prices were
increasing rapidly, the government could retain a large portion of the surplus land
value by contracting land slowly. For countries that are thinking of raising public
revenues through land leasing, this result suggests that the timing of land disposition is
critical.
In addition, premia obtained from lease modifications were not important in
determining the percentages of land-value capture in Hong Kong for two reasons.
First, leaseholders might not want to redevelop their properties because of unfavorable
market conditions during my study period. They, therefore, did not modify the
conditions of their leases significantly. This could then explain why the amount of
premia collected from lease modifications was small. This plausible explanation does
not seem to apply to the Hong Kong case. At least for the 1970s, the real estate
market of this city-state grew rapidly. Based on available data, the value for land sites
used for residential, commercial and retail purposes had, on average, a two-digit
annual growth rate, as shown in Table 6-3.
Second, as I stated in Chapter 5, the building cycles in Hong Kong were
relatively short, ranging from six to ten years (Jao, 1974, p. 251). I studied the
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Table 6-3. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH OF LAND VALUE
IN HONG KONG FOR LAND SITES OF VARIOUS USES
Annual
Type of Period of Percentage
Land Uses analysis Growth
Residential
Class A 1970-1979 62.5
Class B 1970-1979 17.7
Class C 1974-1978 39.6
Commercial
Class A 1971-1979 60.3
Class B 1977-1978 25.4
Class C 1976-1979 49.4
Industrial 1969-1975 1.2
Hotel 1972-1978 9.8
Retail 1976-1978 86.8
Source: Calculated by the author using data gathered from land
contracts issued between 1970 and 1979.
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selected cases in my sample for lease modifications from the dates that these land
were leased (mainly between 1970 and 1979) to 1991. The study period is long
enough to cover, at least, one building cycle. For these reasons, I expect that some
holders of selected contracts modified the conditions of their leases between 1970 and
1991.
Indeed, of the land contracts that I examined, 45 of them (about 49 percent)
had been modified. For some land contracts, leaseholders modified the conditions
several times between 1970 and 1991. The total number of modifications is 78. In
Table 6-4, I illustrate the nature of the modifications for these contracts.
Among all these modifications, 55 percent of them were related to extensions
of deadlines to fulfill the building covenants. Moreover, lessees of eleven (out of 92)
land contracts that I examined had applied several times for the same extension. In
the land leases, the government established a provision to specify the amount of time
that lessees needed to complete the development. The purpose of this provision was
to avoid speculation in the land and real estate markets. In principle, this condition
would prevent land developers from deferring the development of land for the future
rises in prices of residential and commercial properties. Because I did not intend
originally to study land speculation under the Hong Kong leasehold, I did not collect
data that would help me determine whether the lease condition is effective in
controlling speculation. This is an important topic that requires thorough study in the
future.
In terms of capturing land value through lease modifications, although there
were many revisions of lease conditions, not all the premia collected from these
modifications were of a significant amount. Only 17 out of the 78 modifications had a
premium of over HK$1 million (US$130 thousand). It was not the lack of revision of
lease conditions that led to a, relatively, smaller amount of premia being collected
from lease modifications than from the initial auctions. In fact, the government did
not collect much money from relaxing lease restrictions for leaseholders. Of course,
the total premia from lease modifications of HK$82 million (US$10.5 million) is still
a large sum of money. Yet, comparing the amount to premia collected from the initial
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Table 6-4. LEASE MODIFICATIONS OF SELECTED LAND CONTRACTS IN HONG KONG:
1970 -1991
Premium
Modification
Lot Number File No. Initial Amount Date Nature of the Modification(1991 HK dollars)
IL8239
IL8242
KIL9669
IL8223
KIL9673
IL8506
NKIL5769
IL8453
IL8392
IL8454
IL8359
IL8413
KIL10591
NKIL5736
NKIL5734
KILl 0547
IL8429
KILl 0548
IL8424
IL8389
IL8425
KIL10474
IL8390
IL8416
-o
IL8414
NKIL5623
IL8240-41
NKIL5620
IL8357
"a
C/S9793
C/S9782
C/S9776
C/S9761
C/S9607
C/Si 1362
C/S1 1300
C/SI 1244
C/Si 1242
C/S11211
C/SI 1202
C/S11194
C/S11178
C/S11157
C/S11140
C/S11113
C/S11100
C/Si 1092
C/Si 1084
C/Si 1066
C/Si 1062
C/Si 0983
C/Si 0974
S0
C/Si 0950
C/S1 0909
C/Si 0801
C/El 0804
C/Si 0780
C/Si 0706
13,153,927 1,999,506
2,192,321 49,174
38,708
47,808,262 421,488
" 1,298,403
" 216,839
" 6,151
7,126,798 nil
9,266,429 57,740
" 245,218
208,681
" 338,330
" 218,376
135,375,663 848,489
116,036,283 1,722,048
1,605,168,578 33,772
125,954,484 44,553
307,206,059 4,503
102,402,020 3,516,603
5,324,905 38,368
292,460,168 51,480
4,096,081 17,160
41,780,024 700,130
888,214
20,480,404 343,201
114,280,654 51,480
68,814,157 1,098,243
" 8,918,394
602,123,875 116,036
" 5,142
1,026,833
" 66,851
" 12,099,750
" 72,599
9,461,947 37,752
253,752,204 4,049,773
" 11,827,427
516,106,178 1,701,865
" 58,018
178,486,720 3,504,189
" 1,170,845
27,888,227 235,940
" 209,353
" 209,353
20,344,691 4,010
37,729,937 393,330
21,992,839 27,431
34,699,813 274,619
" 274,619
" 137,310
1975 Extending private right of way
1973 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1977 Changing land use
1973 Changing infrastructure requirements
1976 Changing infrastructure requirements
1987 Changing plot ratio
1987 Changing plot ratio
Subdivision
1985 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1985 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1986 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1987 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1987 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1982 Building watchman's quarters
1981 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1983 Paying premium by lump sum instead of installment
1985 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1983 Building watchman's quarters
1981 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1981 Deferring the premium payment
1980 Paying premium by lump sum instead of installment
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1981 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1980 Relaxing height restriction
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1981 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1979 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1982 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1989 Extending walkway
1989 Administrative fee
1990 Changing plot size
1990 Administrative fee
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1982 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1978 Changing building design
1979 Administrative fee
1983 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1984 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1979 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1980 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1984 Building a cafeteria
1975 Lot extension
1976 Extending private right of way
1978 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1978 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1979 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
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Table 6-4. LEASE MODIFICATIONS OF SELECTED LAND CONTRACTS IN HONG KONG:
1970 -1991 (Continued)
Premium
Modification
Lot Number File No. Initial Amount Date Nature of the Modification
(1991 HK dollars)
C/Si 0700 48,872,976
C/S1 0694 54,249,003
" "P
C/S10691
C/S1 0656
C/Si 0650
C/Si 0583
C/Si 0547
C/Si 0532
C/Si 0526
C/S1 0419
C/Si 0390
C/Si 0343
C/Si 0334
C/Si 0294
C/Si 0151
C/Si 0114
"
12,218,244
65,945,283
48,107,625
23,243,010
24,324,080
25,945,685
72,972,240
97,176,321
59,188,595
57,954,553
38,050,969
27,513,778
10,147,315
11,462,708
"
137,310
61,441
58,018
409,608
193,394
61,441
638,200
58,018
858,668
1,717,337
3,747,972
168,339
193,394
471,881
382,779
184,938
5,142
nil
329,173
617,198
82,293
21,621
1,610,193
941,894
nil
40,540
58,540
694,920
158,348
7,424,100
72,599
1979 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1978 Increasing the number of stories
1979 Reducing number of car parking spaces
1978 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1979 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1978 Building a 4-storey car parking spaces
1979 Lot extension
1979 Lot extension
1978 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1979 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1978 Reducing number of car parking spaces
1971 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1978 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1978 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1977 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1977 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1982 Building a canteen
Reducing number of car parking spaces
1976 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1976 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1976 Changing building design
1974 Extending private right of way
1976 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1977 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
Relaxing height restriction
1974 Reducing number of car parking spaces
1973 Extending private right of way
1976 Changing land use
1975 Extending the time to fulfill building covenants
1990 Changing plot ratio
1990 Administrative fee
Source: Gathered from the 92 randomly selected land contracts issued in the 1970s, Table 5-2.
IL8366
IL8364
NKIL5493
NKIL5598
IL8358
NKIL5566
NKIL5540
NKIL5539
KIL10277
KILl 0220
NKIL5436
IL8304
NKIL5392
IL8303
IL7954
IL8287
"
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auctions for the 92 cases (which was HK$11.5 billion and was equivalent to US$1.5
billion) and the average amount spent on public works annually between 1970 and
1991 (which was about HK$14 billion and was equivalent to US$1.8 billion), premia
from lease modifications played an insignificant role in capturing the land value and
financing the infrastructure expenditures in Hong Kong.
Combining my analyses of the government published data and the case studies,
I find that the government recouped the increased land value mainly from the initial
auctions. To explain these different outcomes of land-value capture among the
mechanisms, I apply the transaction-costs concept to identify the problems associated
with each mechanism. I exclude the collection of land rent, because the government
has never employed this mechanism to recoup the surplus land value. Instead, it treats
land rent as a symbolic payment to characterize its landlord-tenant relationship with
lessees in Hong Kong. In Table 6-5, 1 summarize the transaction costs that the Hong
Kong government faced in capturing the land value using the three mechanisms. As I
discussed in Chapter 2, transaction costs are difficult to quantify. Hence, I only state
whether these costs are low or high. When I mention that the transaction costs of a
particular mechanism are low, I imply that the parties can reduce these costs without
being involved in a prolonged controversy. When the transaction costs are high, I
mean that the problems are difficult and require the involved parties to provide
tremendous efforts to diminish them.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the initial auction and lease
modification. I will review contract renewal in Chapter 7. Because the same factors
affect the costs of maintaining government's legitimacy and integrity for all three
mechanisms, I do not separate the discussion for each mechanism here. For the other
transaction costs--delineation, negotiation, and enforcement costs, which are distinct
among the three mechanisms, I will discuss them for each mechanism individually.
Costs of Maintaining Government's Legitimacy and Integrity
The costs of preserving the Hong Kong government's legitimacy and integrity
(hereafter referred to as government costs) in managing and leasing public land
Table 6-5. TRANSACTION COSTS OF THREE MAJOR MECHANISMS OF LAND-VALUE CAPTURE
Costs of Maintaining the Costs of Delineating the Parties' Costs of Negotiation Costs of Enforcement
Mechanism Legitimacy of Government Rights to Benefit from Land
Initial Auction Low Low Low Low
Lease Modification Low Low High Low
Lease Renewal:
Renewable Leases Low High High High
Non-renewable Leases Low Low High High
Source: Complied by the author.
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seemed to be low during my study period. In fact, I found no evidence to show that
the Hong Kong government was corrupt and "inefficient" in managing public land.
Three factors may explain why government costs were low: (1) the British's
objectives of colonizing Hong Kong, (2) the governing style of the government, and
(3) the prevention of corruption.3
Objectives of Colonizing Hong Kong
During its occupation of Hong Kong, the British government has focused on
promoting the economic development of this city-state rather that exploiting its
resources. The primary objective of the British government in governing Hong Kong
is to foster economic growth and enhance its commercial interests in the colony (Lau,
1982, p. 7). The Hong Kong government has retained in Hong Kong all land revenues
generated from land development and invested them primarily in public infrastructure
to facilitate commercial and industrial development. Hence, the situation of Hong
Kong represents a major difference from the historical development of some colonies
in other parts of the world, where natives were forced to work in plantations and
engage in unequal trade to provide inexpensive primary inputs for England and other
parts of Europe (Bastin and Benda, 1968). To show that the Hong Kong government
did not act as a rent seeker despite the fact that it owns and controls all land, I must
show historically the primary objective of the British government in occupying Hong
Kong.
It was during the period of rapid colonization that the British occupied Hong
Kong. The primary motive was to establish a seaport so that British companies could
trade with China (Lau, 1982, p. 7; Miners, 1991, p. 14). The British merchants
trading in the South Coast of China wished to establish a place where they could
3 The description of the Hong Kong government is partly based on research of
other scholars. Presently, I was only able to cross-check this information with primary
data that are related specifically to the role of the government in land leasing. I could
not ascertain the accuracy of all secondary information, because a detailed study of the
general operation of the State in Hong Kong is beyond the scope of this study.
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anchor and repair their ships with complete security. Besides, the British government
wanted to secure a base for the British Royal Navy to protect its commercial interests
in China. When the British won the First Opium War in 1842 and seized Hong Kong
Island, its began to build its military force. It forced China to open its door to foreign
trade and to concede the rights of British consuls to try British subjects in their own
courts.
The British merchants began to invest in Hong Kong. Merchant houses, such
as the Jardine Matheson, established their headquarters in the colony, and banking,
insurance, and accounting services developed. In 1880, Hong Kong handled 21
percent of China's exports and 37 percent of its imports; these percentages increased
to 40 and 42 percent in 1900, respectively (Haggard, 1990, p. 116). Capital was
poured into the Hong Kong economy by the British merchants. Owing to the heavy
British investments, the priority of the government was to protect its financial holdings
by promoting the political stability and economic prosperity of this city-state. The
purpose of colonizing Hong Kong was, therefore, not to expropriate resources from the
colony.
After the Second World War, the Communists took over China, which created
a huge influx of refugees to Hong Kong. Within days, the population of the colony
increased from 600,000 to 2,360,000 (Miners, 1991, p. 34). Due to the destruction
done by the war, the sudden increases in population, and the threat of invasion by the
People's Republic of China (PRC), the Hong Kong government saw an urgent need
for a strong industrial base to generate funds for the reconstruction of public
infrastructure to accommodate the needs of the masses. This sense of urgency led the
government to take a more active role than before in the provision of public housing
and infrastructure. In the fifty years since the end of the Second World War, the
government has provided public housing for about one-half of the population, almost
three million people. It has invested in public infrastructure, such as roads,
communications, port facilities, and water supply, with a high degree of financial
independence from the British, the Asian Development Bank, and other foreign aid
agencies.
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As I argued in Chapter 5, the government generated funds to finance its
infrastructure investment largely through land leasing. In some British colonies,
resources and money were taken away by their colonial masters. I examined the Hong
Kong government annual budget for the period from 1964 to 1991 and did not find a
significant transfer of funds from Hong Kong to Britain. In regards to its policy in
managing land revenues, the Hong Kong government did not seem to fit the
description of a rent-seeking state. Certainly, analysts can argue that the government's
provision of public housing and infrastructure was a means to maintain a supply of
low-wage labor for the industrial elites or the British firms. Thus, the real purpose of
its policy could have been to consolidate the political support of the elite groups in the
colony. Yet, to prove whether or not this argument is true is beyond the scope of my
study. What I assert here is that the government seemed to reinvest the captured land
revenues in public goods in Hong Kong rather than to remit them to Britain.
Governing Style
I described briefly in Chapter 2 that Hong Kong is not a democracy. Here, I
provide a more detailed discussion of the Hong Kong political system. In Hong Kong,
the Governor is not elected by the Hong Kong people, but he is appointed by the
British government. The term of the appointment is five years and can be extended.
The Governor who served the longest term--ten and a half years-- was Sir Murray
MacLehose. According to the Letters Patent--part of the Hong Kong constitution, the
Governor can appoint, promote, and dismiss any officials, command the army, grant
Crown land to any parties, and legislate any laws according to his own judgement. If
the Governor exercises his authority up to its full legal limits, he could impose his will
arbitrarily on all operations of the government and completely reverse past policies
(Lau, 1982, p. 27; Miners, 1991, p. 69).
There are, of course, built-in mechanisms that safeguard against such willful
actions of the Governor. First, if any Governor attempted to abuse his power, he
could be dismissed by the Prime Ministry of Britain. Although the British government
has never dismissed a Governor before, its ability to exercise this power, certainly,
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could deter any Governor from misusing his authority. Second, the Governor needs to
seek cooperation from bureaucrats. The Hong Kong government is a large
bureaucracy and has well-established rules and procedures for formulating and
administering public policy. Although the Governor has the power to dismiss
officials, the exercise of this power is not always the best strategy to motivate civil
servants to carry out his decisions. Especially, newly appointed Governors need the
full assistance and support of officials who have been working for the government for
many years and who know the politics of "how to get things done." Finally, the
Governor must take into the account the possible reactions of interest groups to and
the public opinion on new policy initiatives. He will try to avoid any policy that
aggravates the masses. Any public protest against its policy may invite unfavorable
publicity and provoke inquires from London on the competency of the Governor in
administering the colony's affairs (Miners, 1991, pp. 69-72).
Because public opinion is an indicator of the Governor's performance, the
administration is eager to seek consultation from the public. Endocatt (1964) argues
that consultations are so intensive in the process of public policy making that he
characterizes the governing style of Hong Kong as "governing by discussion." In
major policy areas, the government has established advisory committees to gather
inputs from the involved parties (Endocatt, 1964, p. 238-239; Miners, 1991, pp. 106-
111). The most relevant Committee for this study are the Land and Building Advisory
Committee which replaced the Special Committee on Land Production and the
Building Development Advisory Committee in 1985 (Hong Kong Year Book, 1985).'
The chairperson and some members of the committee are from the private sector.
Most of them represent professionals and business interests in land and real estate
4 There are many other committees set up to oversee the formulation and
implementation of land policy in Hong Kong. They include, for instance, the Land
Development Policy Committee, Compensation Review Committee, and Valuation
Committee. These committees mainly coordinate interdepartmental efforts in land
policy making, and their members are mostly officials from various government
departments.
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development. The committee has established sub-committee to study issues related to
real estate development and land supply and legislation. Government officials,
including the Secretary and Assistant Secretary for the Planning, Environment, and
Lands Branch, the Secretary for Economic Services, and directors of key governmental
departments related to land development, are also members of this committee. The
function of this committee is to advise the Governor on issues related to the public
and private needs of land, land utilization, formulation of land-development programs,
and regulations of planning, buildings, and the construction industry. The
recommendations provided by this committee have an important bearing on land
policy making in Hong Kong. It produces annual reports for the Governor to project
the 5-year plans for the production and supply of land in the colony. Its suggestions
will, thus, affect the supply and the leasing prices of land and the amount of lease
revenues that the government can generate.
Besides, consulting the major interest groups, the government also tries to
reach out to the common people. In 1968, the government established the City-
District-Officer (CDO) Scheme. The purpose of creating the CDO Scheme was to
institute a form of local government with which the people can communicate and
associate. King (1975, p. 436) argues that the CDO Scheme has removed the
information gap between the government and the people. Residents can forward their
complaints about the general living conditions of their districts directly to the District
Officers. These officers will, in turn, bring their grievances to the related departments.
According to King (1975, p. 435), the District officers of the Kwun Tong District
settled 204 out of 256 cases of grievances received in 1971. It is through these
channels that the government gathers public opinion for policy making.
In addition, the government established two more channels to gather inputs
from the masses--offices of the Urban Council and the Unofficial Members of the
Executive and Legislative Councils of Hong Kong (UMELCO). The former is run by
the elected members of the Urban Council, which is responsible for sanitation, sports,
cultural activities, and urban services. The latter is set up by the government so that
citizens' complaints may pass directly to the Legislative and Executive Councils for
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better policy making.5 According to Lau (1982, p. 152), the total number of cases
brought to the attention of the office of the Urban Councils increased from 2,792 in
1968 to 10,294 in 1978, an increase of 269 percent. Although there are different
interpretations of these data in terms of how "successful" these local organizations are
in assimilating public opinion, these government actions indicate, at least, the
government's willingness and attempt to take public preferences into consideration in
formulating public policy.
The public attitude towards the government also contributes to the governing
style found in Hong Kong. Before 1982, the Hong Kong people appeared almost
apathetic to politics and the operation of the government. Endacott (1964, pp. 229-
241), Hoadley (1973), King (1975, p. 424), Lau (1982, p. 1-17), and Miners (1991, pp.
32-40), all agree on the fact that opposition towards the State in Hong Kong was,
remarkably, infrequent. Under the British rule, there were only three outbreaks of
rioting. Only one of them was connected with discontent over the policy of the
government.6 Most people in Hong Kong seemed to be occupied exclusively with the
pursuit of their own (materialistic) interests and those of their immediate family circle
(Miners, 1991, p. 33). They took little interest in matters relating to government's
policy. Indeed, when the government tried to organize elections for Urban Councils in
1981--the only elections of officials to manage environmental, public health, and
recreational matters at the district level, the turnout rate of voters was low. Out of an
estimated potential electorate of 440,000, only 34,381 (about 8 percent) registered.
Among these registered voters, only 18 percent actually voted (Miners, 1991, p. 33).
This political attitude of the masses gave the government considerable leeway to
exercise its authority over the formulation and implementation of public policies. As
' See Miners (1991, pp. 53-177) for a detailed discussion of the government
structure in Hong Kong.
6 In 1966, the government approved the proposal submitted by the Star Ferry
Company that operated ferry services between the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon to
raise its fare. This decision aroused public anger, and the protest resulted in a riot.
- 141 -
long as the Hong Kong government maintained a steady economic growth, the
population would not interfere or be concerned with the ways that the government
achieved this objective (Haggard, 1990, pp. 115-125, Miners, 1991, pp. 34-35). There
are two possible reasons for this apathetic public attitude towards the government that
are related to government costs.
The first reason is connected to the cultural heritage of Confucianism.
Confucianism has long been thought to have died out in the 19th century; in fact, it
has lingered on in the attitudes and behavior of people in most Asian countries.
Confucian thought is less concerned than Western theory with how to structure
restraints on the power of the State. It does not encourage the masses to exercise their
sovereignty over the government or even over the selection of the leaders. According
to the Confucian writings, the ruler should treat her/his subjects like children. A
benevolent ruler would act justly and provide security for her/his subjects who, in turn,
would have confidence in the ruler and obey the law willingly. If a ruler mistreats
her/his people, s/he violates the "mandate of heaven." When a ruler loses her/his
legitimacy, people take action to remove her/him from power. The rise and fall of so
many dynasties in the history of China are illustrative.
In a 1986 survey, researchers found that 73 percent of respondents still agreed
that the Hong Kong government should treat the people like parents treated their
children (Lau and Kuan, 1988, p. 83). Yet, this attitude varied among age groups,
with the younger generation favoring a more democratic and participatory form of
decision making in public policy (Miners, 1991, p. 36). The attitude of political
apathy also changed in the mid-1980s. With the forthcoming return of Hong Kong to
the PRC, the people of Hong Kong are now more concerned with elections and other
government operations. Political parties are more active and vocal in expressing their
demands on issues related to the political structure and human rights after the PRC
takes over Hong Kong in 1997. This sudden political activism is, mostly, due to the
lack of confidence in the future of Hong Kong rather than the dissatisfaction with the
performance of the current regime.
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The second reason is related to the "meritocratic" structure of the Bureaucracy
(Vogel, 1991, pp. 93-95). Bureaucrats in a Confucian society are less constrained by
legal precedent. Top officials can change rules by new decrees, and local officials are,
in effect, judges as well as administrators. The bureaucrats gain their legitimacy
through meritocratic selection. The traditional gateway to officialdom is through
examinations. In ancient China, scholars studied long and hard and had to pass local,
state, and nation-wide examinations before they could serve the emperors.
In Hong Kong, examinations remain the crucial gateway to prosperity for
young people. The importance of entrance examinations for gaining admission to the
better schools and universities and, subsequently, to good jobs and government
positions are strikingly similar to the traditional practice. This structure ensures that
the most talented people are channeled to key positions in the government. Indeed,
some of the ablest graduates from University of Hong Kong, the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, and other colleges took jobs in the government. The government has
been willing to expand the percentage of local officials in its administration. The
percentage of local officers to the total number of public officials in Hong Kong
increased from 2.4 percent in 1950 to 44.4 percent in 1978 (Lau, 1982, p. 53).
The government also provides its officials with a well-rounded training. Before
the government assigns major responsibilities to officials, it sends them to the best
universities overseas for graduate studies and to different departments to gain diverse
experiences. Besides, government jobs, normally, have high security, competitive
remuneration, and generous housing and other fringe benefits.7
By being staffed with some of the most talented people in Hong Kong, the
government has been able to foster economic growth and provide public goods to meet
the demand of the population. The administration has also been very effective in
handling sudden emergencies and disasters, such as the big fire in Skek Kip Mei
7 I gathered this information from my interviews with government officials of
Hong Kong. At present, I am not able to cross-check this information with published
data.
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(which led to the development of a massive public-housing program) and other
catastrophes caused by "typhoons." In a survey conducted in 1985 by Lau and Kuan
(1988), 61 percent of a total of 767 people interviewed thought that the government's
performance was "good." If the government had appeared to be incompetent and
corrupt, this would have provided a greater incentive for the public to press for
democracy and more public participation.
These achievements of the Hong Kong government contrasted sharply with the
conditions found in Mainland China during the 1970s and the 1980s. With the
political upheavals, such as the Cultural Revolution, and the divergence of the living
standards between Hong Kong and the PRC, the Hong Kong people believed that
living under the British rule would be a better alternative than under the PRC. In their
1985 survey, Kuan and Lau (1987, p. 98) investigated the level of "trust" of the Hong
Kong people placed on the governments of Hong Kong, Britain, and the PRC. They
found that 84 percent of the 767 respondents trusted the Hong Kong government. On
the contrary, only 53 and 42 percent of the same respondents thought that they trusted
the government of Britain and the PRC, respectively. In an opinion poll taken in
1982, researchers found that 85 percent of the respondents preferred a British
administration after 1997 and only 4 percent wanted Hong Kong to return to the PRC
(Cheng, 1984, p. 85).8 With the recognition that they would be better off by
maintaining the status quo, the people of Hong Kong continued to accept the rules and
policies of the government despite the absence of democracy and formal public
participation in policy making. Owing to these unique relationships between the State
and the civil society, the costs of maintaining the legitimacy and integrity of the
government in terms of electing officials and monitoring their performance appears to
be low.
8 This result was based on interviews of 998 individuals aged 20 or older. These
interviews were conducted by the Survey Research Hong Kong Ltd. in 1982 (Cheng,
1984, p. 83).
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Prevention of Corruption
Hong Kong, like many countries, was not immune from corruption. As the
economy experienced rapid economic growth during the 1970s, emerging rules and
regulations created opportunities for enforcement agents to receive bribes in exchange
for "convenience." It is especially true in Hong Kong where gift-giving is a tradition,
and personal relationships are considered far more important than formal contracts or
law in governing transactions.
During my field research in Hong Kong, I reviewed major Chinese and English
newspapers, court cases, and revisions of land policy from 1970 to 1991.9 I did not
find a single case of corruption related to land leasing or a major land policy designed
to target corruption. Instead, there were many reported cases about corrupt police
officers. The government has taken important legal actions to remedy corruption in
the police force. In 1971, the government legislated the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance. Under this ordinance, any government official who maintained a
"disproportionate" standard of living and possessed excessive pecuniary resources
without a "reasonable" explanation could be prosecuted for corruption (Kuan, 1981, p.
32). This new provision had important implications in fighting corruption, because it
shifted the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant. If a defendant could
not provide explanations for her/his sources of income or wealth, the judge could find
her/him guilty without the testimony of any witness.
Moreover, in 1974, the government established the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) to implement and enforce the ordinance aggressively
(Wong, 1981). It is an independent agency that reports directly to the Governor. The
ICAC has prosecuted successfully several major corrupt police officers, educated the
public about their roles in anti-corruption campaign, and reduced effectively the
9 Under the library system of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, some
newspaper articles are organized by subjects rather than by titles of the newspapers.
Articles related to corruption are filed together regardless of the newspapers to which
they belonged. I, thus, do not have an accurate count of the number of newspapers
that I reviewed.
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amount of corruption in the colony. From 1974--the first year of its operation--to
1976, the ICAC indicted 585 cases out of the 3,483 nonanonymous corruption-related
reports (Wong, 1981, pp. 61-64). If, indeed, there was severe corruption in leasing
public land, the incident would have been reported because of the aggressive actions
taken by the government to fight this crime. There is, thus, no evidence to indicate
that corruption was a serious problem in land leasing between 1970 and 1991.10
In fact, there was little opportunity for land officials to take bribes at the initial
auctions, through lease modifications, and during lease renewals. In the 1970s,
corruption was most severe in the Hong Kong Royal Police Force and the then Public
Works Department (Faure, 1981, pp. 133-165; Lee, 1981, pp. 167-198). The former
was responsible for upholding law and order and the latter for enforcing the Building
Ordinances. Officials in the Lands Department who managed public auctions and
lease renewals and modifications were not enforcement agents. In the public auctions,
land developers gave bids for the land contracts openly, which did not create any
major opportunity for corruption.
For lease renewals, modifications, and private treaties, if the amount of
premium involved was over HK$10,000 (equivalent to US$1,282), land officials had to
submit the proposal or application to the Valuation Committee for review. The
committee was composed of the Government Land Agents, Chief Estate Surveyors of
the Rating and Valuation Department, estate surveyors of the involved developers or
lessees, and surveyors of the Lands Department. For a premium that was larger than
HK$40 million (US$ 5 million), all involved officials would discuss the case in the
Valuation Conference. In addition to the above-mentioned officials, senior officers
from the Planning Department and Transportation Department were involved in the
10 Certainly, corruption is notoriously difficult to prove, especially when the
transaction is complex and involves a huge sum of money. When two parties see the
mutual benefits of exchanging payment for convenience, there is no incentive for them
to disclose their illegal arrangements. Without any people stepping forward to report
corruption, the government would have no case against a corrupt official. Hence, I
need detailed case studies to investigate corruption in land leasing, which is beyond
the scope of the study.
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determination of the amount of premium and the other general conditions of the land
contracts. Hence, as the monetary amount of the transaction got larger, more senior
officials from various departments would be involved." This, in turn, reduced the
opportunity for corruption in land leasing. Owing to the tight internal control over the
determination of land premia, corruption did not seem to be a serious problem in land
leasing. As I discussed earlier, the government has maintained competitive salaries
and packets of fringe benefits for civil servants, especially for senior officials. These
generous remunerations reduced the temptation of taking bribes by public officials to
supplement their incomes. Besides, it increased the opportunity costs of corruption;
because if an official were caught, s/he would lose a secure and well-paid job.12
In sum, government costs of land-value capture under the Hong Kong leasehold
system did not seem to be high during my study period. The government did not
capture the land value for the benefit of the British government; instead, it used the
revenues mainly to finance public infrastructure in Hong Kong. Despite the fact that
the political system of Hong Kong was not democratic, the government was not totally
indifferent to public opinion. Besides, the bureaucracy that is responsible for land
leasing appeared to be well-organized, with tight internal control over the prevention
of corruption. Although government costs were low in Hong Kong, there were other
types of transaction costs of capturing land value associated with each mechanism. I
discuss the initial auction next.
Initial Auction
Between 1970 and 1991, the delineation, negotiation, and enforcement costs of
land-value capture at the initial auction were low. The only problem that the
" I gathered this information from personal interviews with Hong Kong
government officials.
12 In my interviews with officials and scholars in Hong Kong, when I asked about
corruption, interviewees repeatedly provided this argument to explain how the
government discouraged civil servants from taking bribes.
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government encountered was challenges from industrialists and land developers
concerning the limited supply of land. Because, as I argued in Chapter 5, timing of
land disposition is critical for the land-value capture, the government's ability to
overcome these challenges deserves attention. In this section, I first show why the
above-mentioned three types of transaction costs were low. I then apply my
framework to illustrate how the government defended its land-supply policy.
Delineation Costs
In Hong Kong, the State owns all land; thus, it is clear who has the rights to
benefit from the increased land value before the land is leased to private individuals.
During my study period, the costs of delineating the parties' rights to benefit from
land at the initial auctions were low. In the public auctions, the amount of premium
that the government could obtain was determined by competitive bidding among land
developers. Moreover, competition helped the government to decide to whom it
should assign the land rights. In essence, the bidder who could pay the highest price
would get the rights to develop, use, and benefit from land for a specified period of
time.
Negotiation Costs
The negotiation costs of allocating the land value were also low at the public
auctions. The method of auctioning land rights created a competitive environment that
minimized the negotiation costs. Before the auction, the government drafted the land
contracts, which specified the types of land rights contained in the leases. It then
distributed these contracts to all interested parties. Conditions in the land contracts
were not negotiable. If the land rights specified in a land contract did not suit the
need of a developer, s/he could not bid for the lease. At the public auction, if the
government found that the bidding price for a parcel of land was too low, it could
withdraw the land leases from the auction. Similarly, if developers thought that the
bidding price was too high, they could stop competing for the land. No lengthy
negotiation on the terms and the premium of the lease was required.
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Certainly, this method only worked when land developers did not form a
coalition in bidding for the land. In Hong Kong, with leasing prices set at billions of
Hong Kong dollars, only developers with sufficient capital or financial backing from
major banks could go to the auctions to bid for the land. Between 1970 and 1991,
there were ten major companies dominating the real estate market in Hong Kong.
Although the number of major players was small, there is no evidence to show that
these developers collaborated with each other in holding down the leasing prices in the
public auctions. In fact, these companies were in possession of a lot of land (Rosario,
1994, p. 62). Any decrease in the auction prices of land might reduce the value of
their assets and, in turn, affect the stock prices of these companies.
Enforcement Costs
There were, normally, no enforcement costs of capturing land value by
auctioning land leases. The government required the lessee to pay 10 percent of the
premium as a downpayment at the closing of the auction and the rest of the payment
in one lump sum within 30 days. Only in the 1970s did the government allow
leaseholders to pay their premia in installments. Because of the high rate of default,
the government terminated this policy in 1981. (See Chapter 4.)
In sum, the government was able to utilize a "market-like" mechanism to
capture the land value at the initial auctions. Because the land rights were clearly
delineated, and the negotiation and enforcement costs were low, market forces were
instrumental in assisting the government to capture the land value. Although all the
transaction costs appeared to be low, this situation was far from the ideal contracting
environment described according to the Coase Theorem. Instead, the Hong Kong
government had a better bargaining power than land developers, because it could
control the land supply. Yet, this power of the government was not uncontestable. In
the next section, I explain how developers resisted the government's control over land,
and what strategy the government used to maintain its land-supply policy.
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Strategy of Formulating Land-Supply Policy
Real estate developers and industrialists challenged, occasionally, the
government policy of land supply. From reviewing the records of the meetings of the
Legislative Council from 1970 to 1991, I found that some members of the Council
constantly requested the government to release more land for industrial development.
They asserted that restrictions on the supply of land would increase production and
housing costs in Hong Kong. These effects would, in turn, draw businesses away
from Hong Kong and impose financial hardships on the public in locating affordable
housing. In order to examine how the interplay of the government's and the lessees'
strategies shaped the reformulation of rules for releasing land, I apply the framework
that I developed in Chapter 3.
Possessing the ownership of land did not enable the government to coerce the
business communities into accepting its control over land supply. The government
realized that it needed the private sector to invest capital in land. Terminating the
contractual relationships with the private sector would only reduce the possibility of
generating public funds from land leasing. It would, therefore, be unwise for the
government to disregard the discontent of industrialists over its land-supply policy.
Unable to dismiss complaints from the lessees, the government was left with
the option of persuasion. To convince the public and the discontented parties that
their concerns were taken into consideration and that the design of the land policy was
based on the general benefits of all Hong Kong people, the government took three
actions. First, the government established the Special Committee on Land Production
to study issues related to the production and the supply of land in 1977. I discussed
the functions of this committee earlier and will not repeat them here. In short,
members of this committee collected inputs from both the public and private sectors
and recommended to the Governor on the timing of land supply. This committee, in
turn, created the opportunities for the private sector and the government to reconcile
their differences on the land-supply issues.
The second action of the government was to grant most industrial land to
private individuals by private treaties, rather than by auction, between the 1960s and
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the 1970s. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, in the private treaties, the parties determined
the premia for leasing land through negotiations rather than competitive bidding in
public auctions. Without other competitors bidding up the lease price, land premia for
industrial land could be lower than land sites for residential and commercial uses.
With this special treatment for industrialists to satisfy their needs for land, the
government tried to gain their support for its land policy.
Finally, the government took major steps to persuade the general public that its
land policy worked for their best interest. The government used land revenues to
finance public housing and other infrastructure. By satisfying the demand for housing
and basic infrastructure of the population, the government's policy of land supply
gained its validity.
For the developers who opposed the land-supply restrictions, they did not have
the power to force the government to release more land, because the State owned the
land. Exit would not be an option, because they could not find other suppliers that
could provide less expensive land in the colony. Moreover, the Hong Kong economy
continued to grow, even though the government remained strict on its land supply.
Developers, thus, could not convince the majority of the public that the restrictions on
land supply had severe and direct ramifications on their livelihood. Unable to generate
enough support to resist the government's land-supply policy, the private sector had to
work within the constraints imposed by the government. The government could, thus,
regulate the land supply and, in turn, had the ability to capture the increases in land
value.
Apparently, the ability of the government to control land supply did not depend
solely upon its ownership of land and the use of coercion. If the government had not
used persuasion to gain support from the public by investing the land revenues wisely
in public goods, the masses who did not benefit from the land policy might,
eventually, have challenged its validity. Hence, it was the use of persuasion that
engendered the power of the Hong Kong government to control land supply and, in
turn, allowed it to exercise this power to recoup the land value. This is important for
policy makers who are experimenting with leasehold systems, because the legal power
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of owning land does not guarantee the possibility of capturing the land value. Instead,
they should also focus on the use of persuasion to establish legitimacy of their control
over land. As the Hong Kong case indicates, the allocation of land revenues to benefit
a large segment of society was an effective action to persuade the public of the
legitimacy of the government's land policy.
Lease Modification
For property redevelopment or improvements, lessees need to apply to the
government for modifying the conditions of their land leases if they requires land
rights that are not specified in the contracts. There are, broadly defined, two types of
lease modifications. The first is the "minor" revisions of lease conditions, which
require little negotiation. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, the government has established
standardized procedures and formulas to calculate premia for these modifications, such
as extending the time to fulfill the building covenants specified in the leases, reducing
parking spaces, and removing restrictions on industrial land uses.
The second is the "major" revisions. For instance, when redevelopment
requires the combination of two land lots, lessees must surrender the old leases to the
government for an exchange of a new contract and pay an additional premium.
Because the government will issue a new contract, the relevant parties must negotiate
on the terms and the premium of the lease. This type of lease modification is most
complex. Another form of major modification, which does not require the issue of a
new land contract, is the removal of height restriction. The methods of assessing the
premia for these lease modifications is provided in Chapter 4.
Delineation Costs
Delineation costs for the two types of lease modifications were low during my
study period. The additional premia paid for lease modifications were for the
acquisition of the new development rights that were not contained in the initial land
contracts. The State owned these unassigned development rights; thus, the parties
should have had no problem of defining who had the right to benefit from these
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development rights. Although it was clear that the government owned the land rights,
its ability to capture the increased land value was hindered by the costs of negotiation
involved in lease modifications.
Negotiation Costs
Negotiation costs of minor lease modifications were low, because officials
could just set the premia based upon an established formula." For major lease
modifications, the government and developers might disagree on the amount of
premium due to their different estimates of: (1) the land value before and after
modification, (2) the construction costs, and (3) the discount rate used to calculate the
interest cost of investment capital during the construction period. These were the
issues that the parties needed to settle in their negotiations.
Despite the fact that disagreements emerged, the parties adopted some
standardized techniques to estimate the required premium for changing lease
conditions in Hong Kong. There was a well-established group of professionals, called
estate surveyors, who assisted the parties in reducing the costs of negotiating premia
for lease modifications. Two major organizations oversaw and licensed the practice of
estate surveying in Hong Kong--the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors (HKIS) and the
Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, Hong Kong Branch (RICS). Among various
services provided by different types of estate surveyors, the "general-practice"
surveyors rendered advise for negotiation on lease modifications and renewals. Some
surveyors represented private developers, and some worked for the government. Most
of the key officials in the Land Departments were estate surveyors and members of the
HKIS and the RICS. Because the number of members of the two organizations was
small, surveyors who worked for the government knew those practicing in the private
13 Certainly, there are other types of negotiation costs, such as obtaining the
approvals from the Buildings Department, the Transport Department, and the Town
Planning Board. Although these negotiation outcomes would affect the amount of
premium paid to the government, they are costs related to redevelopment and not to
land-value capture. Hence, I do not discuss them here.
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sector very well." Some surveyors worked for the government for several years and
then entered into private practice. All these surveyors learned the same techniques of
estimating premia in their training and went through several rigorous qualifying
examinations to become members of the profession.
Owing to these professional standards and personal acquaintance between the
public and the private surveyors, they could communicate effectively with each other
using the same technical terms. In my interviews with the public and private estate
surveyors, they admitted that this mutual intelligibility helped them to convey
effectively to each other the rationale behind their assessments of premia for contract
modifications. With some common understanding of how premia should be
determined, persuasion became a viable option to influence the outcome of negotiation
and to reduce the chance of resolving conflicts through court ordering. A developer
with whom I interviewed indicated that he normally started the negotiation with the
government informally before he submitted the application for lease modifications.
Through personal communications, he might be able to influence the perception or
judgement of the government's estate surveyors on their calculation of the premium.
This, in turn, might affect the amount of money that he needed to pay to the
government.
In fact, the major negotiation problem in redevelopment was not due to the
bargaining between the government and developers. Instead, negotiations between
developers and lessees or tenants involved in the acquisition of the land rights were
most problematic. These negotiation costs were associated with the transfer of land
rights and not with the determination of modification premium. Yet, these costs had
directly impeded the ability of the government to capture the land value through lease
modifications.
A developer who did not hold the lease of the land for redevelopment had to
purchase the land rights from the existing lessees. In Hong Kong, most of the
domestic residents live in multi-storey buildings. In this type of building, an owner of
4 At present, the HKIS has about 1,200 members and the RICS has about 1,400.
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an individual unit is considered to be a sublessee of the land lease. In my study,
between 1970 and 1991, I found that when the government did not assign and divide
land rights and obligations of the sublessees explicitly, the land lease had undivided
holderships. Hong Kong developers knew that negotiations involving a large number
of sublessees could be costly and time-consuming.1 5 In the negotiations, leaseholders
could refuse the offer of the developers. There was no rule that required individual
leaseholders to observe the majority decision. Individual lessees could withdraw from
the agreement and hold up the entire redevelopment project.
The developers then had to bargain with non-cooperative parties individually.
If the number of uncompromising parties were large, negotiation costs in terms of time
and effort could be very high. When the negotiation costs were so high that it became
more expensive to get land by purchasing land rights from existing lessees than
leasing land at the public auctions, developers might give up the redevelopment
projects.
I know a case where a developer wanted to redevelop a six-storey, pre-war
building in North Point. Foreseeing that North Point would be a fast-growing
residential and retail district, the developer decided to purchase the existing property
and redevelop it into a 20-storey apartment building. The first problem that the
developer faced was to negotiate with each existing tenant in the building for
purchasing their apartments and land rights. One of the 12 tenants living in the
building refused the offer from the developer and demanded a higher price. Because
of this refusal, the whole project was held up. Without resolving the problem of
buying the property and the land rights from one existing leaseholder, the developer
was unable to apply to the government for relaxing the height restrictions and
redeveloping the leased land. Hong Kong developers with whom I talked admitted
that negotiations with the lessees on the selling price of their leased rights and with
existing tenants on their compensations for relocation were very complex. For them,
these negotiation costs were the major deterrence to initiating redevelopment projects.
" I gathered this information from personal interviews with Hong Kong developers.
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Enforcement Costs
Finally, the costs of enforcing the payment of premia for lease modification were
low. The government would not grant permits for construction if developers did not
pay the premium in full. In this way, the government bore almost no risk of default
by developers if the redevelopment project failed. In sum, all four types of transaction
costs of land-value capture through contract modifications were low, except the costs
of negotiation. The government has tried to exercise its legislative power to devise
rules to minimize the negotiation costs. I discuss these efforts in the next section.
Intractable Negotiation Costs for Lease Modification
From the standpoint of the government, the negotiation problem between
developers and lessees in land redevelopment impeded its ability to recoup the
increased land value through contract modifications. Urban land that was leased for
low-density residential purposes in the past would have a much higher value for, say,
commercial uses today. Unable to demolish the out-dated structures and redevelop the
land, the government could not allocate land to its most profitable economic uses and
benefit from the potential financial gains. The government, therefore, had an incentive
to minimize these negotiation costs.
Currently, the government does not seem to be able to solve the problem by
exercising its legislative power. These issues of urban redevelopment under the
leasehold system in Hong Kong is an important subject that warrants a thorough study
in the future. This topic, however, is beyond the scope of this study. Yet, the issue is
related closely to land-value capture; I, therefore, describe briefly how the government
tried to minimize these costs.
The government established the Urban Renewal Pilot Scheme between 1969
and 1983 and formed the Land Development Corporation in 1983 (Bristow, 1984, pp.
218-242). In the Urban Renewal Pilot Scheme, the government designated the Urban
Renewal Districts where it demolished the older traditional Chinese settlements and
squatters and repossessed the land for redevelopment. Using its legislative power, the
government established the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance to deal with matters
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related to compensating the dispossessed property owners and displaced tenants. The
government then assembled the land, constructed the required public infrastructure,
and leased the land to private developers for redevelopment.
The implementation of these government schemes was not without problems
and criticisms. Although the Crown Land Resumption Ordinance might assist the
government to repossess and assemble land for urban redevelopment, the repossession
of land had to be for "public purposes" only. Besides, the government needed to
compensate the lessees or the existing tenants when it took land. The negotiations on
the amount of compensation between the government and other related parties also
generated high negotiation costs. Unable to rely totally on its legislative power, the
government created the Land Development Corporation to assist the negotiations
between developers and the lessees on the transfers of land rights. To persuade every
lessee to give up her/his land rights took a long time. Employing persuasion was,
normally, not practical if the project was to be implemented with a relatively short
time frame (Townland Consultants Ltd., 1991, p. 7).
The strategy of exit used by the lessees to hold up the negotiation increased the
negotiation costs. The availability of land from the public auctions also allowed the
developers to employ exit to get land for development from the government rather
than through existing lessees. Consequently, the strategy of exit made profitable land
transactions untenable. Without the cooperation of the existing lessees, developers
could not assemble land and apply for lease modifications. This explains why the
premia collected from lease modifications were insignificant in my contract-based case
studies between 1970 and 1991.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I review outcomes of land-value capture under the four
mechanisms. Of these mechanisms, the Hong Kong government relied mainly on the
collection of premia from the initial auctions to recoup the land value. Based on the
data gathered from my contract-based case studies and government publications, I
found that a major portion of the lease revenues was from the initial auctions. Premia
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from lease modifications accounted for only a small percentage. Although lessees had
modified their leases, these modifications were minor. Lessees paid, relatively, much
less money to revise their lease conditions than to lease land in the auctions. I argue
that this outcome was because of the nature of transaction costs associated with the
two mechanisms.
The costs of maintaining the government's legitimacy and integrity in capturing
the land value through land leasing did not seem to be high for all mechanisms, in
general, and for the initial auctions, in particular. The costs of delineating,
negotiating, and enforcing the parties' right to benefit from land for the initial auctions
were also low, because land rights were fairly well-defined at this initial stage of land
contracting. More importantly, the Hong Kong case shows that it was not the
proclamation of state ownership of land that allowed the government to control land
supply and, in turn, recoup the land value. Instead, legitimacy of ownership was
derived from persuasive actions. By allocating the revenues to meet the demands for
housing and infrastructure of the masses, the government gained its legitimacy of
regulating land supply and of using land as a source of revenues. These factors
explain why the government could generate most of the lease revenues by auctioning
public land.
For lease modification, among all four types of transaction costs, only the
negotiation costs associated with the transfers of land rights from the relevant lessees
to developers were high. Even if private developers were willing to pay an additional
premium to modify lease conditions for redevelopment, difficulties in assembling land
discouraged them from engaging in such an undertaking. This illustrates why I did
not find any major modifications on lease conditions in my contract-based case
studies.
Although the government tried to minimize these negotiation costs by
exercising its legislative power, its actions did not seem to reduce the negotiation
costs. Developers who found that negotiations with lessees were too costly turned to
the public auctions to obtain land for real estate development. Lessees who tried to
negotiate for a better price for their land rights employed exit as their strategy to hold
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up the project. Unable to eliminate the option of exit for both parties, the government
was not able to utilize the opportunity during lease modifications to capture the
increased land value.
CHAPTER 7
CAPTURING LAND VALUE DURING LEASE RENEWALS
In Chapter 6, I discussed the initial auctions and lease modifications. The
purpose here is to examine the transaction costs associated with the land-value capture
during lease renewals. In principle, the government can demand an additional
payment from leaseholders when they extend their expiring leases. The government
should have no problem in doing that, because there is a contractual agreement
between the government and leaseholders that the granting of the development rights
is only for a specific period. When the contracts expire, lessees must return the land
rights to the government. If lessees do not agree to pay the premium for extending
their leases, the government can take back the land.
In this chapter, I examine this proposition by studying two incident-case
studies. My first case concerns a prolonged controversy that occurred between 1968
and 1973 over the reassessment of land rent when leaseholders renewed their leases. I
call it the "land-rent controversy." The dispute over how the level of rent should be
determined triggered a series of incidents that finally led to major government
concessions.
For my second case, I reviewed the government policy in granting new leases
to holders of nonrenewable leases when these land contracts expired. (See Chapter 4
for the distinction between renewable and nonrenewable leases.) Historically, the
government compromised on demanding premia at the full market value for issuing
new contracts to nonrenewable leaseholders. To examine these two cases, I identify
the transaction costs of the two types of lease renewal and then apply the framework
to study how the involved parties minimize these costs.
Land-Rent Controversy in Extending Renewable Leases
The issuing of the renewable land leases began in 1899. As I have described
in Chapter 4, the then Secretary of State in Britain, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain,
instructed the Hong Kong government not to grant any more 999-year leases. Instead,
the term of the leases was to be 75 years. There were strong protests from the
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Chamber of Commerce and from the public over his decision. In view of the public
protests, he instructed the Colonial Secretary to grant the right of renewal to
leaseholders when their 75-year leases expired. Under this provision, leaseholders
could renew their leases for a term of another 75 years with a reassessment of the land
rent conducted by the Director of Public Works. Leaseholders did not have to pay
additional premia or fines to renew their expiring leases (Scholes, 1967, pp. 282; Hong
Kong Hansard, 1973). In Chapter 6, I showed that the costs of maintaining
government's legitimacy and integrity of land leasing in Hong Kong were low. I also
stated that the reasons are applicable to all mechanisms; thus, I will not repeat the
discussion here.
Delineation Costs
The delineation of the right to benefit from land during lease renewals was
complicated. Once the government leased the development rights of land to other
individuals, it became unclear what portion of the increased land value belonged to the
State, and what portion belonged to the lessees. As I have argued repeatedly, only in
theory can the contracting parties specify in advance how to divide the land-value
increments in the land contracts. When information is imperfect, and contingencies
are unaccounted for, the parties must renegotiate to settle any dispute over the initial
agreements on the allocation of land value.
In the 1970s, the government and the lessees disagreed on how to divide the
increased land value during lease renewals. Despite the fact that they drew up an
agreement in their initial contracts that the government would set a new land rent for
renewal based on the full market value of the land, the unexpected large rises in land
value made this agreement unenforceable. Lessees believed that they purchased the
right to renew and, thus, should not pay a high land rent to continue their uses of the
land. The government thought that it should set a new level of rent according to the
rule specified in the land contracts. This disagreement created tremendous costs for
both the government and the lessees to renew their land contracts.
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The land-rent controversy erupted in 1967 concerning a land site in Tsim Sha
Tsui--a major commercial and tourist area in Kowloon. Mr. Chang Lan Sheng, the
leaseholder of a lot, wanted to exercise the right to renew his renewable lease. The
government and Mr. Chang, however, disagreed on what a fair and reasonable rent
should be. The dispute was further intensified by the large difference in rent that Mr.
Chang had to pay before and after the renewal of his lease. The original land rent
before the renewal was only HK$76. The rent increased to HK$60,764 (approximately
800 times) after Mr. Chang renewed his lease (Scholes, 1967, p. 282; Wu, 1973, p. 4).
The huge difference between the original and the new rent level was, in part,
due to the rapid increases in land value. The value of the land had increased many
times due to multiple factors, such as leaseholders' investments, the government's
provision of public facilities and infrastructure, general increases in the demand for
land, and possibly a restricted land supply. These changes in the land value altered
the perception of the contracting parties' entitlement to this increased land value and,
thus, their expectations of their share of the future stream of income from land
development. There was no channel or opportunity for the concerned parties to
express their realization of these changes and reconcile any differences. As stipulated
in the land leases, the government would not exercise its right to obtain a certain
portion of the increased land value by reassessing the land rent until the renewable
leases expired and were renewed. As the discrepancy between the government's and
Mr. Chang's expectations on each other's rights to retain the increased land value
grew wider, the dispute over the distribution of this land value intensified.
Considering that the total amount of the new rent was equivalent to a premium,
Mr. Chang sued the government for breaching the conditions of his lease. In 1967,
the case, Chang Lan Sheng vs. Attorney General, appeared before the local appeals
court. Judge Scholes (1967, pp. 282-314) found that the provision of the renewable
leases did not empower the government to charge the full market value of the land as
new rent. Judge Scholes, therefore, decided that the government had violated the lease
conditions by calculating the new rent based on the full market value of the land.
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The government appealed to the full court in 1968, with Judges Rigby, Blair-
Kerr, and Huggins deciding on the case. These three judges reversed the decision
made by Judge Scholes and decided that the rent fixed by the Director of Public
Works was fair and reasonable (Huggins, 1968, pp.487-499). Mr. Chang appealed to
the Privy Council in London; however, his appeal was denied (Wu, 1973, p. 5).
Winning these series of court battles, the government thought that it had the
legitimate power to set rent for lease renewal according to its formula. It issued a
consolidated statement in 1969 to clarify the methods of fixing the rents for the
renewed leases (Sing Tao Morning Post, 1969). It confirmed that the new rent for
extending the renewable leases would be calculated based upon the full market value
of the land amortized at 5 percent over the term of the leases. It would then add the
"Zone Crown Rent" to the amortized figure to derive the annual rent payment. (I will
define Zone Crown Rent later.)
The courts' ruling, however, did not settle the dispute between the government
and the lessees over the level of new land rent for contract renewals. Leaseholders
who tried to renew their leases after Mr. Chang's case challenged the government's
rights through political channels. Their actions, eventually, made the courts' decisions
unenforceable. I will discuss these actions in detail when I examine the resolution of
the land-rent controversy later in this chapter.
Negotiation Costs
The negotiation costs of capturing the land value during the extension of the
renewable leases were high. These high costs were mainly due to the difficulties of
drafting land contracts that could account for all contingencies and contain explicit
provisions on how to deal with unexpected circumstances when they arose. In the
land-rent controversy, lessees argued that the wording of the lease-renewal provision in
their leases was vague. They said that the government had misled them. They did not
expect to pay such a high level of rent after they renewed their leases. I interviewed
some real estate developers who were active in the protests at that time. Some of
them claimed that, based on the terms of the land contracts, they never expected to
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pay land rent several hundred times more than the original amount to renew their
leases.
There were two major ambiguities in the wording of the provision in governing
the renewal of the renewable leases. First, it was unclear about what constituted a
"fair" and "reasonable" rent and, second, how to differentiate a "fine" from a
"premium" (Scholes, 1967, pp. 289-296; Hong Kong Hansard, 1973). Before
elaborating on what was a reasonable rent, I have to explain the two types of rent that
the government established at the time of the controversy--the "Zone Crown Rent" and
the "reassessed" rent. The Zone Crown Rent was the rent set for a specific district (or
zone), which was used by the government for establishing new leases. In other words,
rent for leased land within a particular district would be the same. In granting land
leases, the government normally collected premia from lessees for obtaining the
development rights to the leased land. In addition to the premia, the government also
collected a small amount of Zone Crown Rent annually from leaseholders that usually
was not related to the market value of the land. Moreover, the government did not
adjust the Zone Crown Rent to reflect the current market value of the land in the
district. The reason for collecting only a small amount of rent was that lessees had
already paid the land premia; therefore, lessees should not pay a high rent for the
leased land.
To reassess an annual rent for the renewed leases, the government employed a
different formula to calculate the new amount of rent that lessees needed to pay. Part
of the reassessed rent was calculated based on the full market value of the land
amortized at 5 percent over the term of the renewed leases (normally 75 years). The
government then added the Zone Crown Rent to the calculated yearly payment to
derive the total annual rent for the renewed lease. I call this the reassessed rent.
From the government's point of view, it was the latter method that the Director of
Public Works should use to calculate the rent for extending the renewable leases. The
government believed that it would be fair and reasonable to calculate the reassessed
rent based on the full market value of land. Conversely, leaseholders asserted that
they should only pay the Zone Crown Rent, based on two reasons.
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The first is that because they had already paid for the right to renew their
leases when the contracts were first established, it would be unfair for them to pay for
the option again. The second reason was related to the other major ambiguity of the
provision, namely the definition of a "fine" and a "premium." Leaseholders argued
that the reassessed rent for their renewable leases was equivalent to a premium. At
that time, leaseholders of new leases were given the option to pay their premia in
installments over 21 years. Because the government calculated the reassessed rent
based on the amortization of the full market value of the land, the rental payment was
very similar to the annual premium installments. The only difference was that the
number of annual payments (normally 75 installments) was larger for the renewed
leases than for the newly established leases. Because the government had specified
explicitly in the land contracts that leaseholders would not have to pay any fine or
premium for renewing their leases, the government would breach the lease condition if
the new rental payment was, indeed, a "disguised" premium.
These ambiguities surfaced when the parties tried to apply the contractual
agreements to allocate the unanticipated rapid increases in land value. Because the
contracts were "incomplete"--meaning that the provisions did not anticipate the rapid
increases in land value, the parties disagreed with each other on the original rules for
the allocation of land value and had to renegotiate to resolve their differences. The
dispute was not over whether the government should share with leaseholders some
portion of the increased land value in the form of land rent; the issue, instead, was
about what was the appropriate amount. Although both parties recognized each other
rights to enjoy the benefits from land development, they did not know how to
delineate these rights. When negotiations broke down, disagreements led to political
confrontation.
Enforcement Costs
In 1973, the government faced great difficulties in enforcing the lease
conditions for determining the land rent for lease renewals. The government's
perception that it could set land rent according to its formula led to political
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confrontations between the government and leaseholders. The conflict involved many
leaseholders and organized industrial and business associations. There were about
5,000 leases up for renewal at approximately the same time (Hong Kong Hansard,
1973; Yeh, 1994, p. 5). Leaseholders of the expiring leases were horrified to find that
the new amount of rent for their renewed leases would be several hundred times more
than they paid currently. They began to organize and criticize the government policy
on the determination of the new rent for lease renewal. As I just discussed, there were
ambiguities in the wordings of the contractual agreements on rent determination.
Negotiations involved in settling disagreements between the government and lessees
were difficult. Besides, because so many leases were up for renewal at that time, the
government did not have the capacity to negotiate and settle disputes over land rent
with these lessees individually. Due to these factors, the government encountered high
costs in enforcing the contract conditions for determining the land rent.
Owing to these high transaction costs, the involved parties had to renegotiate
and devise new rules for allocating the increased land value during lease renewals. In
the next section, I apply my framework to examine the strategies that the parties used
to shape the outcomes.
Resolution of the Land-Rent Controversy
Although the government won the legal battles in 1967 and 1968, the court
rulings did not conclude the issue of determining land rent for the subsequent lease
renewals. When the number of renewable leases up for extension increased to about
5,000 during that period, more leaseholders were affected and unsatisfied with the
government's policy of calculating the reassessed land rent. The affected leaseholders
began to challenge the government policy.
During several months of agitation, the attitudes of the government had been
that of indifference to the complaints of the public. Two factors contributed to this
government attitude. First, the government believed that its actions were absolutely
legitimate. When the contracting parties first established the land contracts, both
agreed that the Director of Public Works would determine a fair and reasonable rent
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for lease extension. Second, this rule was affirmed by the decisions of the courts.
The government thought that it had the legal power to coerce the lessees to accept the
terms of the contracts.
Owing to these two reasons, the government did not employ the strategy of
persuasion to convince the lessees to comply with the established agreements. It also
did not see the need to negotiate with the leaseholders for any adjustment of the
reassessed land rent. It is true that if both the government and lessees did not agree
on the level of rent for renewal, they could terminate their leases. Exit, however, was
not an option, because there was a provision in the land contracts that allowed the
lessees to renew their leases for another 75 years. Most lessees thought that they had
paid for the right to renew and wanted to exercise this right. This situation led the
government to think that the most appropriate strategy to deal with the confrontation
was to maintain a firm position and exercise its legal power to set the land rent for
lease renewal at the full market value.
In view of this unyielding position of the State, some business groups began to
organize themselves to resist the government's lease renewal policy. Because the
government won the case against Mr. Chang Lan Sheng in the dispute over the
determination of land rent, the lessees knew that it would be difficult to challenge the
government by appealing to the courts. Instead, they organized public protests (voice).
In order to generate support, they first used persuasion to enlist the public and
business organizations to join them to voice their grievances.
The Chinese Manufacturers' Association (CMA), an active opponent to the
government, organized a meeting at the City Hall Garden Restaurant. Representatives
from 247 associations attended. These associations included, for example, the Chinese
General Chamber of Commerce, Council of Hong Kong and Kowloon Kai Fong
Association, and the Real Estate Association. All were well-respected groups and
influential in public policy making related to economic development and land. At the
meeting, the CMA convinced these business groups that the lease-renewal policy
would, inevitably, increase the costs of doing business in Hong Kong. If the Crown
rent increased by several hundred percent, high rental costs would hurt the profitability
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of their business. Representatives of 247 associations signed a petition, which was
later sent to the Governor (Wu, 1973, pp. 7-9).
To gain more support from a wide spectrum of the Hong Kong society, the
CMA extended its persuasion strategy. It brought its case to the public by means of
press releases, mass meetings, and letters to various officials. With additional public
attention, two important groups also joined the protest, namely the Federation of the
Hong Kong Industrialists (FHKI) and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
(HKGCC). Both groups were headed by "Unofficial" members of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council--Mr. Tse-Kai Ann and Mr. Gerald M. B. Salmon.1 Ann (Hong
Kong Legislative Council, 1972, pp. 742-743) reported that the FHKI and HKGCC
conducted a study jointly in which they revealed the potential and expected burden
imposed on manufacturers by the government policy. He threatened that this financial
hardship would lead to insolvency, unemployment, labor disputes, and even social
unrest. Salmon (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1972, pp. 744-751) argued that the
government should not rely on the decisions of the Privy Council to justify its policy.
The rulings were based only upon one case. Instead, the government should consider
the impacts of its policy on all segments of society, especially owners of small
factories, tenants, and small property owners. He asserted that these were the people
who would be hurt the most if the government charged a high rent.
With these two unofficial members challenging the government openly in the
Legislative Council, other unofficial members, such as Dr. Sze-Yeun Chung, Oswald
Cheung, Pak-Chuen Woo, and Wai Szeto, who had remained silent before began to
join the protest. The arguments that the CMA and its allies made in the press and
mass meetings were presented in the Legislative Council meetings by these unofficial
members, details of which are given in the Official Report of Proceedings of the Hong
Kong Legislative Council (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1972). According to
1 Unofficial members of the Legislative Council are appointees of the Governor to
the council who are not civil servants. They could be members of some professions,
trade unions, or social organizations.
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Miner (1991, p. 146), it was a rare occasion that all unofficial members of the
Legislative Council opposed a policy of the government. Although these unofficial
members knew that the Governor could ignore objections from the unofficial members,
they still decided not to support any bill related to the reassessment of renewed rent.
The debate on the issue continued for two weeks. These unofficial members
successively rejected a series of government proposals.
Their use of persuasion, finally, generated enough support, and the lessees
began to utilize voice to challenge the government directly. The CMA and its allies
decided to voice their discontent to the government by also threatening the possible
exit of some industries. The CMA sent a letter with the petition to the Governor
signed by all the participating associations. In the letter, the CMA argued that because
industrialists were facing problems of rising costs in production, a further increase in
land rent would force them to relocate to other Asian countries. This would definitely
slow the industrial development of the colony (Sing Tao Morning News, 1971a,
1971b). The CMA also threatened that there would be a possibility of social unrest if
the government was unwilling to compromise. Besides, an unofficial member of the
Legislative Council, Dr. Chung, reported that if the land rent were to increase by 200
to 1,500 times, the Exchange Bank Association would expect a rapid increase in the
number of defaults. To protect their shareholders and depositors, banks might have to
recall their bank loans and disrupt the economic prosperity of Hong Kong (Hong Kong
Legislative Council, 1972).
The public pressure and the opposition of the unofficial members of the
Legislative Council severely undermined the government's strategy of using coercion
to set rent for lease renewals according to the rules specified in land contracts.
Reluctant to disturb the economic and political stability of the colony, the government
announced its first concession, consisting of four parts. First, there would be a
reduction of the overall reassessed rent by 20 percent. Second, leaseholders would
have to pay only 50 percent of the reduced rent in the first year, and another 10
percent would be added to the payment in each subsequent year until the full amount
of the reduced rent was paid. Third, the government would use an interest rate of 4
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percent instead of 5 percent to amortize the full market value of land. With a lower
interest rate, the amortized annual payment would be less. Fourth, leases subjected to
rent control would be renewed without any increase in land rent (Hong Kong Annual
Yearbook, 1972; Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1972, p. 782).
Although the government considered its concession to be very generous, the
CMA and its allies were still dissatisfied with the modifications. After debating
intensively on the appropriate charge in meetings of the Legislative Council, the
government was finally persuaded to set the reassessed rent at 3 percent of the rental
value of the renewed property. Members of the Legislative Council approved the
government proposal and passed the bill into law. The 1972 Crown Lease Ordinance
took effect on December 14, 1973. The public protest subsided.
In this case, although judges of the Privy Council and local courts decided that
the government had the legal right to set the reassessed rent, their rulings did not seem
to determine the outcome of the controversy. There were strong social and political
forces that went against these legal decisions. To some extent, this case shows that
conflict resolution for land contracting in Hong Kong did not rely solely on the legal
institutions. Instead, the outcome was dependent upon the strategies used by the
involved parties.
The lessees were able to employ persuasion to convince and recruit members
of various segments of society to join their protests. When the organizers convinced
the major portion of the public and business organizations that the policy of lease
renewal would have significant negative impacts on their livelihood, they gained
tremendous strength in resisting the coercion of the government through voice. The
resistance of the protestors was reinforced by the threat to exit by some businesses.
Although the political system of Hong Kong was hardly democratic, the government
was extremely sensitive to public opinion (Miners, 1991, p. 206). There had been bad
experiences of public outcry that led to social unrest. These crises made bad publicity
for the colony, frightened foreign investors, and led to unwelcome ministerial and
parliamentary concerns from London on the colony's affairs. The danger of any
similar outburst was a strong reason to avoid antagonizing the public. The ability of
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the lessees to use persuasion, voice, and exit effectively allowed them to resist the
government and revise the rules of calculating land rent for extending the renewable
leases.
The new rule of determining land rent, which was set at 3 percent of the rental
value of the property, would reduce the costs of negotiation and enforcement, provided
that the government could maintain a generally agreed-upon and updated assessment
of the rental values of properties in Hong Kong. If there was no disagreement
between the government and the lessees on the rental value of the involved property,
rent for lease renewal would be just 3 percent of the estimated value. No lengthy
negotiation would be needed.
In fact, the Rating and Valuation Department of Hong Kong maintains updated
estimates of the rental values of properties in Hong Kong. It publishes its
assessments, categorized by locations and types of building, annually. Whenever there
is a general reassessment of rental values, it announces its results. Whenever there is
a dispute on the assessment of the rental values for a property, the government may
recalculate its estimate. This process continues for three months. After that, the
resulting estimates are used to determine the reassessed land rent, rates, and other
valuation purposes. Calculating reassessed land rent based on 3 percent of the rental
value of property lowers the chance of disagreements between the government and the
lessees and, thus, minimizes transaction costs. Moreover, this rule is simple and,
hence, easier to enforce.
The resolution of the land-rent controversy indicates that the legal system may
not always play an important role in minimizing transaction costs. This outcome
affirms the argument of some New-Institutional-Economic scholars, which I discussed
in detail in Chapter 2. Again, similar to the situation of capturing land value at the
initial auctions, ownership of land does not guarantee that the State can capture the
land value. The attempt by the Hong Kong government to recoup the land value
during lease renewals was not successful, given the concessions that it made. Thus,
when the government tries to capture the land value, it must examine how the lessees
will react to its action, and what strategies they may employ to counter the policy.
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For the Hong Kong case, a better understanding of these dynamics might have led the
government to choose persuasion as a strategy to deal with the public protests, which
may have reduced the level of confrontation. In the case of the regrant of the
nonrenewable leases, I will show how a different context and transaction costs led the
parties to use a distinct set of strategies to devise rules to minimize costs of capturing
the land value.
Regrant of Nonrenewable Leases
When nonrenewable leases expired, leaseholders did not have the right to
renew their leases. To continue the existing contractual agreements on their rights to
use and develop land, they had to apply for new contracts. In Hong Kong, this
procedure is called the regrant of nonrenewable leases. Analysts would expect that the
possibility of demanding payments from leaseholders for regranting the nonrenewable
leases would be relatively easier than for extending the renewable leases, mainly
because, legally, the government and lessees had agreed that the land rights were
granted for only a specified time. When leases expired, the land rights along with all
improvements would revert to the government (Yeh, 1994, p. 5). If the lessees wanted
to maintain their land rights, they had to negotiate with the government for the regrant
of new leases. The government could (1) refuse the applications if it needed the land
for public purposes, (2) repossess land and compensate leaseholders only for the
building, and (3) charge a premium at the full market value of the leased land for
issuing new leases to lessees (Roberts, 1975, p. 44; Sin, 1987, pp. 12-13). Because
the government legally owned the land after the nonrenewable leases expired and had
the power to refuse applications for regrant, it should have had a good bargaining
position in renegotiating premia with leaseholders. The experience of granting new
contracts to holders of nonrenewable leases in the 1970s, however, shows that this was
not the case.
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Delineation Costs
During my study period, the problem of delineating who had the right to
benefit from land seemed to be less problematic for the nonrenewable leases than for
the renewable leases. There was no provision in the nonrenewable leases that allowed
the lessees to renew their land rights at the end of the lease term. Legally, it was
fairly clear that the government possessed all the land rights when leases expired.
Yet, the costs of negotiating and enforcing these legal rights impeded the
government's ability to capture the increases in land value during the regrant of
nonrenewable leases.
Negotiation Costs
The negotiation costs of determining the premium for the regrant of
nonrenewable leases were high. Negotiations between the government and
leaseholders and among multiple-holders of a single land lease were very complex.
As I discussed in Chapter 6, it was not unusual in Hong Kong that a building
contained more than 100 units and, thus, many sublessees. When the land lease
expired, it would be necessary for each holder to subscribe to a joint written
application and to agree collectively on the basic terms of the regrant. It was
sometimes very difficult for all the co-owners to agree among themselves even to
apply for a new lease.
One main issue was how to divide the required premium and rent of the new
lease among themselves. In the negotiations among the sublessees, no party had a
better bargaining power than the other, because the land rights and the attached
obligations specified in the leases were equally divided among the owners of the
apartments in the building. No one could impose her/his will on other parties and
force them to agree on the terms of regrant. When the negotiations involved a large
number of parties who had different perceptions on what the appropriate amount of
premium should be, and how much they could afford to pay to the government, the
parties might face a great difficulty in persuading each other to work towards a
generally agreed-upon premium for the regrant of their expiring leases. If sublessees
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did not reach an agreement and file an application, the government could not initiate
any negotiation with them on the new conditions for the regrant. It would only take
one sublessee to hold up the procedure of applying for a regrant by refusing to sign an
application.
Aside from the above-mentioned problem, lessees claimed that they could not
afford to pay the high premium for the regrant. The government, in principle, could
take back the land; yet, it needed to compensate the lessees for their buildings erected
on the land. Negotiations for the amount of compensation also incurred high costs.
All these negotiation costs made the enforcement of the government's right to capture
the land value during the regrant of the nonrenewable leases difficult.
Enforcement Costs
During the 1970s, lessees had to pay very high premia to renew their leases
because of the rapid increases in land value in Hong Kong. In some cases, the net
income received by owners from renting their buildings was insufficient to pay the
premia for regrants. This was especially true for buildings that were subjected to rent
control. The government introduced the rent-control legislation (the Landlord and
Tenant Ordinance) in 1947 and expanded it gradually to cover all residential properties
in 1980. Virtually, all rental properties, except for certain luxury accommodations, in
Hong Kong were subjected to rent control (Bristow, 1991, p 136). Because the
government restricted the rent increases, rental income received by the property
owners did not adjust to the inflationary land prices. When rental income fell far
behind the increases in land prices, income received from renting was insufficient to
cover the required regrant premium.
For owner-occupied buildings with only a few co-proprietors, each owner was
responsible for a large share of the premium, which could also be beyond her/his
financial capability. Legally, the government could evict the lessees who refused or
were incapable to pay the additional premia and rent. Yet, acting like an
unsympathetic landlord might engender disapprovals from Hong Kong citizens. Due
to the lessees' resistance, the government was not able to enforce the rules for
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capturing the land-value increments during the regrant of the nonrenewable leases.
As shown earlier by the aggregate data in Table 6-1, premia gathered from
lease renewals accounted for only 2 percent of the total lease premia collected from all
mechanisms of land-value capture. Combining these historical data and incidents, I
conclude that the government did not capture the land-value increments during lease
renewals or regrants. I suspect that the land-rent controversy deterred the government
from imposing a premium at the full market value of land in regranting nonrenewable
leases. Possibly, the government did not want to face another public outcry in
negotiating the premium for regranting the nonrenewable leases with leaseholders.
Reducing the Negotiation Costs on the Terms of Regrant
When multiple sublessees were holding a nonrenewable lease, these parties had
to negotiate among themselves first on the term of the regrant before they applied to
the government. Because the number of involved parties could be very large in Hong
Kong, deadlocks in negotiations occurred and hindered the procedures of regrant. One
way a lessee would negotiate the terms of the regrant in her/his favor was to hold up
the process by "exiting the bargaining table." Because all the sublessees needed to
sign the regrant application, the parties thought that exit from the negotiation would
create enough of a threat that the other parties would compromise. Yet, when all the
negotiating parties took a similar strategy, collaboration among them became
impossible.
In March 1972, the government devised a new procedure to minimize the
problem. Using its legislative power, the government established the Crown Rent and
Premium (Apportionment) Ordinance. Under this ordinance, when sublessees reached
no agreement on the terms of regranting a new contract for an expired nonrenewable
lease, the government could issue a new lease to the Financial Secretary Incorporated
(FSI). The FSI was a public organization created to manage all government estates.
According to the Crown Rent and Premium (Apportionment) Ordinance, the FSI could
repossess the leased land and seize the building. It then offered the sublessees the
assignment of their shares of the land rights and the ownership of their apartments that
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they formerly owned. In the offer, the FSI stated what proportion of the new land rent
and premium each sublessee had to pay. If the sublessee of the expiring lease
accepted the offer, the FSI would make the assignments to her/him. Both parties then
registered their arrangements in the Land Registry. Besides, these lessees had to
established a "deed of mutual covenants," regulating the respective rights and
obligations among themselves of the common areas and the management of the
building. For the sublessees who refused the offer, the FSI could either auction their
apartments or rent them to other parties.
The government relied on the methods stipulated in the Crown Rent and
Premium (Apportionment) Ordinance to facilitate the regrant of the nonrenewable
leases. There had been no significant challenge from the lessees, because the
government mainly applied this method to situations when leaseholders were
themselves involved in disagreements. Unable to act collectively, resistance to this
legislation, as I speculate, could never engender enough resistance to the government's
actions. Although this method resolved the problem of a stalemate in the negotiation
among sublessees, the assignment of the leased rights of land and the ownership of the
apartments were, legally, very complex. Usually, it required considerable expertise
and a tremendous amount of time to carry out the procedures. This legislation, though
imperfect, lessened the problem of an overrapid exit of the lessees from the
negotiation. To avoid the government from using its coercion to impose a premium
on them or repossess their properties, the leaseholders were more willing to use
persuasion than exit to negotiate with each other. In this case, the law was
instrumental in lowering the transaction costs. Although the government lowered the
negotiation costs, it faced high enforcement costs of demanding premia from lessees
during the regrant of the nonrenewable leases.
Unenforceable Right of Capturing Increased Land Value During Regrant
In 1973, land prices in Hong Kong were extremely high. Lessees who wanted
a regrant for their nonrenewable leases found suddenly that they had to pay an
extremely high premia. As I discussed earlier, for the lessees whose properties were
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subjected to rent control, income generated could not pay for the high premia imposed
by the government. To ease the burden of the leaseholders, the government allowed
regrantees to pay their premia in 21 annual installments, with an interest charge of 10
percent per annum. The government considered this to be a compromise, although the
best lending rate at that time was about 8 percent. This government concession,
however, did not solve the problem, because the lessees still had to pay the huge
premium to continue their uses of the land.
Without any contractual agreement in the land contract that they could continue
their leases, the lessees had no legal justification to challenge the government in
courts. They did not want to give the land back to the government, because the
negotiations with the government on the compensation for their buildings were also
costly. Besides, there were relocation costs, and land prices in general were very high
in other parts of Hong Kong. The lessees would have to pay more to obtain a similar
parcel of land located in the same area if they gave the land back to the government.
Put differently, exit from the contractual agreements with the government was not
usually viable. The only strategy that they could employ was to persuade the
government that they were not able to pay the premia demanded by it. The argument
of the lessees was convincing. Because of the high land prices, the level of rental
income that the lessees could earn did not justify the payment demanded by the
government for the regrant of the nonrenewable leases.
After the land-rent controversy, the government recognized that its ability to
demand payments from the lessees during lease renewals was not unlimited. To avoid
a similar public protest, it was reluctant to exert its power to charge high premia for
the regrant of the nonrenewable leases. It also could not just terminate the contractual
relationships with the lessees by rejecting their applications of regrants, because it had
to justify that the repossession of land was for a public purpose. The only option was
to negotiate and compromise. It accepted the lessees' reason that they could not
afford the high premium for lease renewals. The government announced in September
1975 that it would offer two options to holders of nonrenewable leases to pay for their
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premia for regrants.2 First, similar to the former policy, leaseholders could pay their
premia in 21 annual installments with a yearly interest charge of 10 percent. Second,
they could choose to pay the government an annual payment that was equal to 70
percent of the net rental income earned from their rental properties. In order to do
that, lessees had to maintain their buildings in the current uses. If leaseholders wanted
to redevelop their properties, they had to apply to the government for a regrant of their
expired leases and pay a premium at the full market value of the land.
Lessees normally selected the latter method, because the payment of 70 percent
of the rental income was lower than an annual premium installment. These options
were also offered to lessees who occupied their own properties. If these lessees chose
the second option, their annual payment to the government would be assessed based
on an estimated net rental income of their properties subject to rent-control legislation.
The Executive Council continued the concessionary policy for three years and
reviewed it in 1978. It then extended the policy for another two years and scheduled
to reexamine it again in 1980. In August 1980, the Executive Council decided that the
policy should continue until the government lifted the rent control. It also established
the policy that the government should increase all assessed net rental income by 21
percent every two years. This increase was equivalent to the maximum allowable rent
increase for buildings subject to the rent-control regulation. These decisions of the
Executive Council made the concessionary policy a permanent feature of regranting
new land contracts to holders of nonrenewable leases.
In this case, despite the fact that the government had the legal rights to land,
the conflict between the government and the lessees related to the land-rent
controversy deterred it from using coercion. Under such a situation, the government
was more willing to listen to the lessees and able to compromise. The lessees also did
not think that they had the ability to challenge the government in the courts, because
2 1 gathered this information from interviews with officials of the Planning,
Environment, and Lands Branch in the summer of 1993.
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their land rights legally ceased when their leases expired. They were, thus, less
demanding to the concessionary policies proposed by the government.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I studied the politics involved in lease renewals and regrants
between the 1970s and the 1980s. For the renewable leases, the land-rent controversy
in 1973 shows the potential political problems of negotiating additional payments with
leaseholders during lease renewals. Although the government tried to capture the
increases in land value by demanding premia from lessees, the public resistance
towards its policy led finally to some major government concessions.
The outcome was due to the high transaction costs of capturing the land value
during the extension of the renewable leases. The delineation, negotiation, and
enforcement costs of the government's right to reap the benefit of increased land value
were high. Moreover, lessees were able to employ effectively a combination of
persuasion, voice, and exit to resist the government's demands. Although the outcome
of Mr. Chang's case set a legal precedent for settling disputes over the allocation of
land value for similar cases, lessees used persuasion to engender enough support to
challenge the legal rulings at the collective-decision level. The government tried to
exercise its legal power to capture the land value, but it was not able to overcome the
public resistance. It, thus, compromised. The interplay of strategies that the parties
used, in turn, determined the outcome of the land-value capture during the extension
of the renewable leases.
Capturing land value during the regrant of the nonrenewable leases was not
easier in the 1970s. At least two factors increased the negotiation and enforcement
costs. The first factor is when many parties had collective interests in a single lease,
there were problems of deriving agreements among them on the terms of the new land
contracts. The government was able to use its legislative power to formulate new
rules to force the lessees to agree among themselves. In essence, if the lessees could
not come up with an agreement, the government would take action to reclaim land and
reassign the land rights to the involved lessees individually. This legislation, to some
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extent, acted as a threat to discourage the lessees from using exit as a strategy to
shape the outcome of the negotiation to their benefits.
The second factor, which was an unresolvable problem, was that lessees
claimed that they could not pay the premia. Because the government wanted to avoid
a public outcry and the negotiation costs associated with determining the compensation
for the displaced lessees, it was unwilling to exercise coercion to take back land. This
made the rule of allowing the government to recoup the land-value increments during
the regrant of the nonrenewable leases unenforceable. As the lessees were able to
persuade the government that they could not pay high premia, the government
compromised with lessees by deferring the collection of premia for regranting the
nonrenewable leases at the full market value. These two cases explain why the premia
collected from lease renewals accounted for only 2 percent of the total lease revenues
between 1970 and 1990.
In retrospect, the politics involved in the lease renewals during the 1970s has
had an important implication. In 1984, the governments of Britain and the People's
Republic of China (PRC) realized that the uncertainty of the future of Hong Kong
undermined the confidence of the public. Property owners were concerned with
whether the future government would renew their land leases expiring in 1997. The
confidence crisis led to a major decline in building activities, and the land prices
dropped in the property market.
To deal with the situation, the British and the PRC governments issued the
Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. In this joint declaration, both governments
agree that they will extend all renewable and nonrenewable leases that will expire
before or on June 30, 1997 for another fifty years. Leaseholders do not have to pay
any additional premium. The government only charges an annual rent calculated at 3
percent of the rateable (rental) value of their properties. The government will adjust
the rent level only when it reassesses the rateable value in the future. In essence, to
charge a premium at the full market value for renewing land leases in Hong Kong, the
government must wait for another 50 years. Whether the future government of Hong
Kong can negotiate with leaseholders for a renewal premium at the full market value
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is an issue that needs to be studied in the future. At this point, based on the history of
the land policy of Hong Kong, capturing the land-value increments during lease
extensions and regrants is politically untenable. This may be even more difficult in
2047 when most of the land leases will become due simultaneously.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
Whenever I discuss this research with my colleagues, they always ask, "so,
should other governments adopt a leasehold system similar to the one in Hong Kong
to manage public land?" I guess that readers may have the same question. The
question is very complex, and it deserves a thoughtful answer. The purpose of this
concluding chapter is to summarize what we know currently and what we need to
research in the future in order to have a satisfactory answer to the question.
In the preceding chapters, I examined three aspects of the Hong Kong
leasehold system: (1) the portion of the surplus land value that the Hong Kong
government captured by leasing public land, (2) transaction costs associated with the
land-value capture, and (3) the minimization of these transaction costs. I first
summarize my findings related to these three issues and also relate them to the
existing literature. I then discuss the possible policy implications of the lessons
learned from my study. Finally, I propose some future research.
Land Value Captured Through Land Leasing
In this study, I found that the Hong Kong government captured about 39
percent of the increased land value occurring between 1970 and 1991 from land sites
leased in the 1970s. More importantly, the captured value financed an average of 55
percent of the government annual expenditures on public works. Along with the
money collected from the property tax and rates, the government funded 80 percent of
the average annual public infrastructure expenditures. This seems to exceed, by many
magnitudes, the amount of recovery of costs on infrastructure that city governments in
other developed and developing countries could achieve.
Analyzing this "success" story more carefully, I found that the way that the
Hong Kong government recouped the land value does not fit the predictions provided
by scholars. They assert that the State can capture the land-value increments by
negotiating with lessees for payments when they establish, modify, and renew their
land contracts. Among these mechanisms, the Hong Kong government seemed to rely
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mainly on premia collected from the initial auctions. Because the government released
land gradually into the market, it was able to benefit from the rapid appreciation of
land prices. Conversely, money gathered from payments for lease modifications was
much less. For land-value capture during lease renewals, the government also could
not demand payments from lessees by charging additional premia and a high land rent.
As for the annual land rent, the government did not use it to retain the increased land
value; thus, money collected from land rent was insignificant.
Transaction Costs of Land-Value Capture
These different outcomes of land-value capture were related to the transaction
costs associated with each mechanism. For the initial auctions, transaction costs of
capturing land value were low. The Hong Kong government's involvement as a
contracting party did not generate high costs. The government was mainly concerned
with political stability and the economic development of Hong Kong. It employed
land policy as an instrument to raise funds for building public housing and other
infrastructure to promote economic and social development. The ability of the
government to provide adequate public infrastructure gave it legitimacy to raise funds
by auctioning land. This method of assigning land rights utilized the competition
among bidders to determine openly the land premia and, thus, minimize the
negotiation costs and the opportunity for corruption. Owing to the low transaction
costs of capturing the surplus land value by auctioning land, the government generated
90 percent of its total lease revenues from this mechanism between 1970 and 1990.
For lease modifications, only negotiations on the determination of premia for
major revisions of lease conditions incurred high costs. The parties might disagree on
the amount of premium due to their dissimilar forecasts of the real-estate-market
conditions and/or use of different assessment methods. The government and the
lessees, hence, had to negotiate in order to determine a mutually agreed-upon premium
for lease modifications.
In addition to these negotiation costs, there was another type of negotiation
costs that severely impeded the government's ability to recoup the increased land
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value through lease modifications. These costs were not related to land-value capture,
but were connected to the transfer of land rights from lessees to developers for land
redevelopment. When developers did not possess the leases of the land that they
wanted to redevelop, they had to purchase the land rights from the existing lessees
before they could apply to the government for lease modifications. Leaseholders could
use the strategy of exit to hold up the whole project in order to bargain with the
developers for better deals. When the negotiation costs were high, the developers
would abandon the project and not attempt to modify the land contracts. The
opportunity for the government to recoup the land-value increments by revising lease
conditions would also be lost. In my contract-based studies, I found that no major
lease modification occurred. Premia collected from leases that were modified were of
an insignificant amount.
In extending the renewable leases, the government and lessees encountered
high costs of delineating and negotiating their rights to benefit from land, because the
initial contractual agreements on how to determine the renewed land rent were
ambiguous. The lessees thought that they had already purchased the right to renew
their lessees and, thus, should not pay a high land rent. The government believed that
it had the legal right to carry out the initial lease agreements and to charge a new land
rent at the full rental value of the property. This disagreement was manifested in
public protests. It took four years and a series of public confrontations between the
government and the lessees to settle their disputes.
Moreover, the government faced high enforcement costs to exercise its rights
specified in the land contracts. Many leases expired simultaneously at the beginning
of the 1970s, and the government did not have the capacity to enforce its contractual
rights by negotiating with the lessees individually. Due to these high transaction costs,
the government did not collect much money from extending the renewable leases.
For the regrant of the nonrenewable leases, the costs to the parties of
negotiating and enforcing the initial lease agreements on lease renewal were also high.
First, negotiations among lessees on the terms of the regrant were difficult. To apply
for a regrant, all holders of the involved land lease had to agree on the amount of
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premium and other conditions for renewal. Because the number of involved parties
was normally large in Hong Kong, the negotiations incurred high costs. When lessees
could not agree among themselves and apply for the regrant, the government could not
collect much money from this mechanism. Second, the lessees resisted paying the
high premia by claiming that they were not capable of making the payments.
Unwilling to use coercion, the government was not able to enforce the lease
agreements that allowed it to charge additional premia and land rent for the regrants.
Transaction-Costs Minimization
Both the government and the lessees attempted to lower the transaction costs of
dividing the land-value increments so that they could continue their dealings. In the
Hong Kong case, no single predominant institution helped to reduce these costs.
Instead, outcomes of rule revisions were dependent upon the interplay of strategies
employed by the involved parties. The parties carried out their strategies through
legal, social, or political channels. Because the choice of strategy was based heavily
on the context, different institutions, such as the markets, the polity, and the law,
played a distinct role in minimizing transaction costs at a different time.
The interplay of the parties' strategies illustrates why the government failed to
recoup the land-value increments during the extension of the renewable leases.
Although the government tried to coerce lessees into paying a high land rent by
exercising its legal power backed by court rulings, the lessees were able to counter the
government's coercion by a combination of strategies. They first persuaded different
segments of society to join their resistance against the government's demands. When
they gained enough support, they then used voice to oppose the government policy at
the collective level. The tactic of voice was later reinforced by the threat of exit by
business groups. These strategies engendered tremendous political pressure on the
government, and it finally compromised. Through this process, new rules were
devised to lower the transaction costs of allocating the increased land value in order to
allow the parties to renew and continue their contractual relationships after the leases
expired.
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In the regrant of the nonrenewable leases, the government attempted to
minimize the costs associated with negotiations among sublessees by legislating a new
law. With this law, the government forced the lessees either to agree among
themselves or it would seize lessees' properties for reassignments of land rights. This
law seemed to deter the lessees from using the strategy of exit to hold up the
negotiations. Although the government could lower the costs of negotiation among the
lessees, the new law might generate costs if the negotiation among lessees still broke
down. The government would have to enforce the law by negotiating with individual
leaseholders to determine the portion of the premium for which they were responsible
and their obligations of maintaining the common areas of the building. These
negotiations were lengthy and legally complex.
The government and the lessees also lowered the negotiation costs of
determining the payment for lease modification by devising a set of standardized rules
for assessing the premium. They established the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyor and
the Royal Chartered Surveyor to administer these rules. Members of these two
organizations worked for both the public and private sectors. By creating a commonly
agreed upon set of rules for assessing land and property values and a mutually
intelligible language, persuasion became the most effective strategy to lower the
negotiation costs.
The attempts of the government to reduce transaction costs were not always
"successful." The government also tried to use its legislative power to establish law so
as to lower the negotiation costs of acquiring land rights by developers from lessees
for land redevelopment. Yet, its legal power did not go beyond the repossession of
land for public purposes. Because these negotiation costs were not directly related to
the land-value capture, though they had significant implications on the issue, I do not
deal with them in detail in this study. In the last section of this chapter, I will propose
this as a future research topic.
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The Hong Kong Case and the New Institutional Economics
Theories of the New Institutional Economics do not explain two aspects of the
Hong Kong case. First, in Hong Kong, the government's involvement in land leasing
did not seem to increase transaction costs. Despite the fact that the Hong Kong
government owned and controlled all land, there was no evidence of an attempt by
government officials to maximize their own benefits at the expense of impeding the
private incentives to invest in land and real estate. Moreover, the government did not
have uncontestable power to seize all benefits from lessees. Conflicts arising from the
distribution of land value were generated mainly from unforeseeable events, such as
the rapid increases in land prices. As I noted earlier, in the extension of the renewable
leases, increases in land value caused disagreements between the government and
lessees on how to divide the land benefit. Owing to public pressure, the government
yielded to popular demands.
The government did not maintain its control over land by using coercive force.
Instead, it gained its legitimacy of being the landowner by persuasive actions. Its land
policy did not just benefit the political powerful groups or the business elite, but it
also generated land revenues to build public goods for the masses. Unlike the State
portrayed by Hobbes (1651), North (1981), Libecap (1989), and other scholars, the
Hong Kong government did not behave like a predator or a rent seeker.
Certainly, I am not trying to argue that the New-Institutional-Economic theories
of the State are wrong, because scholars normally describe the State as a third party
rather than a contracting party. The important aspect of my study is that it shows how
the government acting as a landowner affected the allocation of the surplus land value.
It appears that public ownership of land in Hong Kong did not increase transaction
costs. On the contrary, the government who owned the land had a vested interest in
land development and, thus, an incentive to use its legislative power to lower
transaction costs.
Second, some New-Institutional-Economic scholars argue that legal institutions
are deficient in minimizing transaction costs of contracting. This argument seems
valid only in one incident in the Hong Kong case. In the land-rent controversy that I
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described in Chapter 7, although the courts found that the government had the legal
right to set a high rent for renewing land leases, the final settlement of the dispute
through political confrontations reversed the judges' rulings totally. This shows that in
order to enforce court rulings, politics has to be taken into consideration. Conversely,
in the case of regranting the nonrenewable leases, the establishment of legislation that
forced sublessees to agree among themselves on the terms to renew their expiring
lease helped to reduce the negotiation costs. Put differently, in the Hong Kong case,
there is no consistent evidence to prove whether or not law can lower the transaction
costs of land leasing.
I argue that the reason why the existing theories cannot explain the Hong
Kong experience coherently is because they neglect the process of institutional change.
Most theories focus only on identifying the "appropriate" (or "inappropriate")
institutions to minimize transaction costs based on some behavioral assumptions of
actors involved. In theory, analysts can design "rationally" which institutions should
be established to reduce the costs of transacting. Yet, in the actual process of
reforming the existing institutional arrangements, the interplay of strategies employed
by the relevant parties who want to protect their benefits could shape outcomes
drastically. These outcomes could be totally different from what analysts have
designed and expected initially. This creates difficulty in explaining how the
contracting parties lower transaction costs by devising new or reforming the existing
institutions through time.
Results of transaction-costs reduction in the Hong Kong case shows that a good
understanding of the process of rule revisions is important. In designing institutions,
such as the markets, the polity, and law, to govern economic exchanges, it is not
sufficient for policy makers just to identify which institutions are able to reduce
transaction costs. What they need is a framework that helps them to understand the
complex process of institutional change. I have developed a possible framework in
this study and applied it to examine the Hong Kong case. In the next sections, I
discuss how the lessons learned from the experience of land-value capture in Hong
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Kong and my framework may assist policy makers there and elsewhere in formulating
land policy.
Policy Implications
There are at least two potential policy implications of this study. First, the
experience of Hong Kong represents one of the many possible models of capturing
land value through public land leasing. Although Hong Kong is unique, officials in
other countries can use its experience as a basis to design their own system of land
leasing. Second, policy makers may apply the framework to identify transaction costs
of land contracting and the plausible outcomes of minimizing these costs. I discuss
the Hong Kong approach first and then state how my framework may help policy
makers and analysts to adjust and apply the approach.
The Hong Kong Approach
In Hong Kong, the government's approach to capture the land value through
land leasing was to collect as much money as possible from lessees at the beginning
of the leases. It could not negotiate regularly with lessees on the level of rent and
payments for lease modifications and renewals. More importantly, capturing land-
value through land leasing does not mean that the government could not collect a
property tax. In fact, payments from the property tax and rates accounted for the
second largest portion of total land revenues in Hong Kong.
In countries that are experimenting with the leasehold systems, policy makers
must think carefully about which mechanisms they will employ to capture the future
increases in land value. If they find that the institutional settings in their countries are
similar to Hong Kong and want to follow the Hong Kong approach, they must
schedule their disposition of land carefully. They should not lease land rapidly when
land has a low value. Obtaining a nominal amount of money for leasing the land
rights in the beginning may impede the government's ability to capture the land value
in the future.
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To capture the land value at the beginning of the leases, the government may
have to restrict land supply. Analysts have argued that restricting land supply will
have negative impacts on the economy. Moreover, if capturing the land-value
increments after the initial auctions is politically difficult, governments may just
gradually sell the land rights to private individuals. This will allow the State to obtain
higher prices than by leasing land because buyers of the land will own all land rights
for an unlimited time.
Restricting Land Supply. The issue of whether or not the government should
control the land supply is a thorny one. In Hong Kong, one argument was that the
government should not restrict land supply. Limiting the land supply would drive up
land prices. Developers would then pass part of the increases in land prices on to
consumers in the form of higher prices for housing and commercial and industrial
properties. This, in turn, would increase the costs of living and dampen economic
development.
Analysts who made this argument, however, did not consider how the
government utilized the captured land value. In this study, I showed that the
government used the money to build public infrastructure, such as highways, sea
terminals, and public housing. With a population of six million people, it was almost
unthinkable that the government could provide all this public infrastructure with a high
degree of fiscal independence from its colonial master and foreign-aid agencies.
In terms of whether the restriction on land supply will hinder economic
development, I showed in Chapter 2 (Table 2-1) that the Hong Kong economy has
been experiencing a rapid rate of growth since the 1960s. Certainly, there are many
other factors that led to this exceptional phenomenon, and it is not the subject of my
study. Yet, what I can say is that the government's involvement in managing, even
controlling, public land did not seem to impede seriously the economic growth of this
city-state.
It is undeniable that land prices in Hong Kong are among the highest in the
world. This may be due partly to the general land policy of the government, and
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partly because of the limited availability of developable land to accommodate its huge
population. There are two potential problems of high land prices. The first is that this
high price increases the level of difficulty in finding affordable housing for the low-
and middle-income groups. As I argue repeatedly, the Hong Kong government has
dealt with this problem by allocating part of the land revenues to build public housing.
The provision of public housing has lessened the burden of high housing costs on the
poor. Half of the population (three million people) is living in public housing or
apartments subsidized by the government through the grant of land at below-market
values. Recently, the government began to expand its housing program to build
apartments for the middle-income group to purchase at below-market values. Indeed,
the land-supply policy of the government may, partly, contribute to the rise in land
prices. Yet, its land policy also serves as a function of redistributing some land
benefits from the hands of the more affluent people to those of the urban poor.
The second effect of high land prices is the potential barrier to entry into the
land market. High land prices will allow only developers who are financially capable
to bid for land at the public auctions. The limited access to the land market may give
developers the power to control the supply of residential and commercial properties.
With only a few players in the land market, developers may form a coalition to lower
their bids for land at the public auctions. This, in turn, may lower the leasing prices
and thus reduce the portion of the land value that the government can capture. This is
an issue of which the Hong Kong government and officials of countries who are
experimenting with the Hong Kong land-leasing system should be aware.
Selling Land Gradually. There are three important considerations to selling,
instead of leasing, land gradually. First, the viability of the four mechanisms of land-
value capture available under the Hong Kong leasehold system may change through
time. During my study period, the government relied on the initial auctions to recoup
the land value. It does not mean that the government will not depend more on the
other mechanisms in the future. Especially, when the supply of land is limited, future
public and private development may exhaust all the undeveloped land in Hong Kong.
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Although the government presently continues to "reclaim" land from the sea, this
method of creating land may not always keep up with the pace of urban development.
Land reclamation requires intensive capital investments and takes a lengthy process to
complete. When the availability of land diminishes at the public auctions, this option
of retaining the land value will become less viable. The government may then take a
more aggressive approach to recouping the increased land value from other
mechanisms rather than from the initial auction.
This flexibility does not exist under a freehold system, because private
individuals hold all the land rights. Under such a system, the government must count
on the levy of property taxes and other land-value-capture techniques to recoup the
land-value increments. Certainly, the possibility of retaining the land value from lease
renewals and modifications will depend upon the context, the nature of transaction
costs at that particular moment, and the strategy used by the parties to minimize these
costs. It may again prove to be politically untenable in the future. Yet, these options,
at least, remain open for the government under the leasehold system when it retains
the ownership of land.
Second, capturing the surplus land value is only one of the three major
functions of public land contracting. As I discussed in Chapter 4, it can achieve other
policy objectives, such as reserving land for public purposes and managing urban
growth. Analysts must understand the general effectiveness of land leasing in
achieving these various goals before they can conclude whether to lease or sell land.
My results only show how the Hong Kong government captured a large portion of the
surplus land value through public land leasing. They do not explain whether the
government should or should not use land contracting to organize land-tenure
arrangements.
Finally, the constitutions of some countries, such as Hong Kong and some
Central and Eastern European countries, do not allow for private ownership of land.
Unless policy makers decide to change the constitution, which may involve high
political and economic costs, selling land as private property remains as an
inconceivable option in these countries.
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A Framework for Analyzing Public Land Leasing
Most countries would not possess the type of institutional arrangements found
in Hong Kong. Officials, therefore, must modify the Hong Kong approach in order to
adopt some aspects of it to their countries. To determine whether countries should or
should not adopt the leasehold systems, in general, and the Hong Kong approach, in
particular, policy makers may wish to use the framework that I have developed here.
First, analysts should identify the four types of transaction costs of public land leasing
that I proposed in Chapter 2 under a particular context.
Analysts should not assume that the costs of maintaining the legitimacy of
government to negotiate land contracts (government costs) are always high. One
reason why I add these costs explicitly to the other types of transaction costs
postulated by the New Institutional economists is to help analysts investigate the actual
costs of government involvement in land leasing. If, for instance, government costs
are high, analysts should determine how the involved parties can minimize these costs.
In devising new rules to minimize transaction costs, they should account for the
strategies that all involved parties may use to shape the process of rule formation. If
bureaucrats have the power to exploit the public land-leasing system, analysts should
investigate how the "central" government and other parties can use different strategies
to prevent these officials from abusing their power over land. Governments may
employ the public auctions to make the process of allocating land rights more
transparent to all involved parties. They can also exercise their legislative power to
formulate stringent anti-corruption laws. As the Hong Kong case indicated, lessees
were not totally powerless in land contracting. They resisted the government's
coercion by using voice, exit, and/or persuasion. The result of lowering government
costs depends on the interactions of the parties' strategies.
The potential benefits of keeping the ownership of land in the hands of the
State may justify the costs of preventing the government from abusing its control over
land. I mentioned earlier that leasehold systems may provide some additional viable
alternatives for the government to capture the land-value increments, besides property
taxes and other techniques. When the State owns all land, it does not have to
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purchase land from private landowners to build low-income housing for the poor.
Analysts should evaluate all "costs" and "benefits" carefully before deciding on which
land-tenure arrangements their countries should adopt.
If the costs of delineating the parties' land rights are high due to some
incomplete land contracts, policy makers should focus not just on designing a legal
system to minimize these costs. They must also investigate how the relevant parties
may react to legal rulings in a particular context. If court decisions engender a false
sense of power to the parties and eliminate the possible use of persuasion to resolve
conflicts, disputes may be manifested into public protests. The Hong Kong land-rent
controversy is a good example. It shows that land leasing was not based solely on
contractual agreements between the government and leaseholders enforced by the legal
institutions. Instead, politics of negotiation played an important role. Whether
governments can capture the land-value increments by land rent and/or payments from
lease modifications and renewals will depend upon the political and economic
institutional settings of particular countries.
In countries where economies are developing rapidly, the government is
sometimes trying to attract investments by granting land to foreign and domestic
investors at concessionary prices. The government then attempts to capture the
increases in land value after the economy has been developed. In that case, the
government must draft the conditions of the land contracts carefully in order to avoid
high negotiation costs in the future. They should be certain that there are provisions
in the leases that allow them to negotiate with leaseholders on the allocation of
benefits generated from land development. These provisions have to be as precise as
possible. Any ambiguity in the language may lead to unexpected difficulties in future
negotiations between the State and leaseholders.
The parties may minimize these costs by adapting the "relational" contracting
approach. Because no one can foresee all future contingencies in contracting, most
contracts are incomplete documents in governing the contractual relationships among
the involved parties. In business contracts, for example, the parties normally insert
some "general clauses" in the contracts that form a framework of contemplating means
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to settle unexpected disputes. For public land leasing, the government and lessees can
also specify in the land contracts the procedures that the parties must follow to
renegotiate the terms of the leases when contingencies arise. They can establish a
schedule in order to review and update periodically their agreements on how to divide
the land value and to incorporate new landuse restrictions into the lease conditions as
the planning regulations change.
Depending upon the land uses, a shorter lease term, such as 25 years, with the
option to renew may be more appropriate than the 99-year lease term. These lease
structures will allow the contracting parties to reassess their land rights and maintain a
regular dialogue between them to discuss and adjust their perceptions on each other's
rights to land. Certainly, a short duration of the leases may generate insecurity, but
the option to renew will minimize this problem. Besides, short lease terms may
increase the negotiation costs, because the government must renegotiate with lessees
when leases expire fairly often. Yet, with adjustments made incrementally to the
contractual agreements, it may avoid the problems of negotiation found in the Hong
Kong land-rent controversy. This is especially important for places where land value
is rising rapidly. A shorter lease term may avoid the potential disputes between the
State and lessees over the allocation of future increased land value by allowing the
parties to identify and reconcile their different expectations on each other's land rights
through regular negotiations. For countries that are undergoing political and economic
reforms, not only would political confrontations undermine the stability of property-
rights arrangements of land, but it could also disturb the prospect of the reforms.
Future Research Topics
Land leasing has seemed to allow the Hong Kong government to capture the
surplus land value. Despite the current knowledge about land leasing, I have to do
additional research before I can determine whether or not adopting land leasing is
desirable in general. There are, at least, four major research areas that I need to
investigate thoroughly.
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Extension of the Hong Kong Study to Other Cities
The first topic is to investigate whether my findings related to the surplus land
value capturing in Hong Kong is a universal phenomenon. I can apply the framework
developed in this study to analyze public land leasing in Singapore, because this city-
state is, to some extent, comparable to Hong Kong. Although not all land is owned by
the Singapore government, there is a large portion of land that is held under public
leases. In terms of land area, Hong Kong is twice the size of Singapore. Hong Kong
has a population of 6 million, while Singapore has only about 3 million. Both Hong
Kong and Singapore are city-states in Southeast Asia with few natural resources; yet,
both experienced rapid economic growth since the 1960s. Both cities were once under
the domination of the British during the 19th century.
The major difference between Hong Kong and Singapore is the degree of
government involvement in industrial development. Relatively speaking, the State of
Singapore has developed a more active policy to intervene in the economy. Public
enterprises dominate the business activities in this city; whereas the Hong Kong
government relies more on private initiatives to develop and invest in the economy.
One purpose of such a study would be to examine whether the government of
Singapore encounters transaction costs of land contracting similar to those found in
Hong Kong. The other purpose would be to test how applicable my framework is in
analyzing the minimization of these transaction costs in Singapore.
Conflict Between Urban Planning and Lease Conditions
Another important issue that goes beyond the capturing of surplus land value is
the conflict between urban planning and the lease conditions. As I mentioned in
Chapter 4, in Hong Kong, lease conditions stipulated in land contracts cannot be
adjusted easily to reflect changes in the zoning plan. Once the government and the
lessees establish the lease conditions, the government cannot alter them until the leases
expire. Lessees, of course, can change lease conditions by paying additional premia.
Yet, when the government tries to change lease conditions due to revisions of the
zoning plan, it is unclear whether it needs to compensate leaseholders.
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Moreover, the procedure of repossessing land from lessees for public purposes
in Hong Kong is complicated by the contractual agreement between the government
and leaseholders. In the contracts, the government agrees that the lessees possess
certain land rights for a specific time. If the government takes land or imposes new
conditions before leases expire, it will violate the contractual agreements. Some
analysts argue that statutory laws always override contractual agreements; thus, the
government should be able to take land and not worry about the agreements that it
previously made with leaseholders. Yet, the loss of public confidence in the leasehold
system is undesirable. Although land is publicly owned in Hong Kong, the
government also relies on private initiatives to develop land and real estate. Any
reduction of private investment in land will hinder the growth and stability of the
Hong Kong economy.
This is an important topic that governments in other countries should be aware
of when adopting a leasehold system. Indeed, if governments want to use the lease
conditions to manage urban growth, they must establish a detailed and well-designed
master plan. Conditions of the leases must be based on the master plan. Governments
should also add some provisions in the land leases that specify the procedures and
rules for negotiation when there are changes in the master plan and, thus, the lease
conditions. The questions of how governments can do that will require an in-depth
analysis of the Hong Kong case or other leasehold systems in the world.
Urban Redevelopment Under a Leasehold System
The negotiation problems found in Hong Kong related to the acquisition of
land rights and assembly of land for urban redevelopment are, indeed, very similar to
those found in other countries. The issues of holding out and disputes over
compensations are common. The question is: does land leasing in Hong Kong
complicate (or ease) the problems of negotiations involved in urban redevelopment?
In theory, under the Hong Kong leasehold system, the government can deny
lessees' applications for the regrant of their nonrenewable leases. It can then take
back land and compensate the lessees for the building only. Thus, land leasing should
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reduce the amount of compensation that the government needs to pay to lessees in
repossessing land.
One problem of this scheme is that the government must wait for leases to
expire before it can assemble land for urban renewal. If it wants to take land before
the leases expire, its action will breach the land contracts. Could the government
establish a general clause in the land contracts that will allow it to repossess land
before the leases expire? If so, what are the implications of such a lease condition on
land leasing? How should the government calculate the amount of compensation if
the repossession of land is for public purposes or redevelopment? Should it
compensate the lessees based on the land rights granted and specified in the land
contracts, or should the compensation be estimated based on the future uses of the
land? These are some of the major questions that I need to investigate. Besides, it is
unclear what type of resistance the government will encounter from lessees in land
repossession, even though it, legally, owns all the land rights when land leases expire.
Land Leasing to Special Industries
I could also study the use of land leasing to grant land to special industries.
This issue is especially important for officials in some countries who are using land as
public capital to attract foreign investment. Because leasing land to special industries
is based on negotiation between the government officials and the selected
industrialists, the allocation of land resources will rely heavily on the discretion of
these civil servants. The question is: what are the institutional mechanisms that can
ensure the granting of valuable land to "appropriate" industries? Some institutional
arrangements are needed that will safeguard the parties from any possible favorism
and corruption. When land transactions involve a large amount of money, the
temptation of taking or giving bribes is high.
In my study, I examined only the assignment of land rights at the public
auctions, because it represents the major method that the Hong Kong government uses
to allocate land rights to private individuals. The government has also formulated a
policy to grant land sites to selective industries by establishing private treaties. By
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understanding how the government selects the special industries and what the
procedures are in negotiating the premium, governments in other countries may be
able to design a better system of land disposition to attract special industries.
By studying these issues in detail, I will be able to provide a reasonable answer
to the question of whether or not governments in other countries should adopt a
leasehold system. Public land leasing is a complex subject. My current study
represents only an initial step towards a large research topic. I hope that my work
will stimulate more empirical and theoretical research on this subject. More
importantly, I hope that my findings, though related only to one aspect of land leasing,
will help policy makers to make better judgments in formulating land policy that will
affect the livelihoods of many people for a very long time.
APPENDIX A.
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF LAND-VALUE CAPTURE
Among many methods of land-value capture, there are four techniques that are
most often used in the United States and developing countries: (1) special
assessments, (2) exaction, (3) valorization charges, and (4) land readjustment. In this
appendix, I briefly discuss the potential shortcomings of these techniques in order to
provide some quick references and the background for my discussion of the land-
value-capture issues in Chapter 1. Readers should refer to the articles and books that I
cite here for more detailed discussions of the pros and cons of these methods.
Special Assessment
Ideally, a special assessment is the application of the principle that those who
benefit from a public project should pay for it. Special assessments are mostly used to
build residential streets, sidewalks, and an occasional sewer. Property owners within
the "affected" community who are "benefited" by public-infrastructure improvements
must pay for them (Misczynski, 1978, pp. 311-335).
There is, at least, one technical problem. Government officials can apply
special assessments only to local public projects in which benefits are related (or can
be traced) particularly to some parcels of land. Officials cannot apply this technique
to public investments, such as highways and seaports, that have no easily identifiable
beneficiaries of the project. In fact, benefits of many public projects are neither totally
"local" nor "general." There are problems of defining a local or a general benefit, and
this, in turn, may make the recapturing of the increased land value using a special
assessment difficult.
Exaction
With the ability of local governments to levy taxes constrained by their state
constitutions, officials are turning their power to control land use into a power to
generate revenue. As Altshuler and G6mez-Ibairiez (1993) argue, "regulation for
revenue" has become an important way to provide public infrastructure to
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accommodate urban growth in the United States and other Western countries (Jacobsen
and McHenry, 1978, pp. 342-366). An exaction grants a permit to a developer for
developing land under the conditions that s/he must provide certain public
infrastructure. An exaction may be in-kind or financial. In-kind exactions require
developers to contribute land, construct public facilities, or provide public services.
Financial exactions are in the form of "impact" fees. The rationale for demanding
exactions from developers is that the "costs" created by their new development should
be accounted for in the total costs of their projects.
Some analysts argue that an exaction is a form of government extortion or
"zoning for sale." This system grants a great deal of discretion to local officials and
could create the opportunity for bribery. Besides, the ability of developers to pay for
the exaction is dependent upon the market conditions. The bargaining position of the
government to demand the provision of infrastructure will be weak in a real estate
market that experiences a downward trend. (Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez, 1993).
Valorization Charges
In developing countries, governments have also used other methods besides
property taxes to capture land-value increments. A valorization charge (also referred
to as a betterment tax) is one of them. It represents a system of taxation that is
designed to recover costs of public works from affected property owners.' In
principle, the valorization charges are proportional to the benefits that property owners
gained in public projects. Due to the resistance to the general increase in taxation to
finance public infrastructure, valorization charges have the comparative advantage of
being more equitable by levying taxes only on project-specific areas.
' The concept of a valorization charge is somewhat different from a betterment
tax. While policy makers attempt to use a valorization charge to recover only the cost
of infrastructure provision, they normally use a betterment tax to recapture all the
increment in land values associated with government projects. In practice, however,
this distinction is usually blurred.
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The major challenge to a policy maker is using valorization charges to
apportion the total costs of a project to the affected property owners. In Bogota, for
example, the State allocates the charges based on a complex coefficient system and ten
features of each property that are considered to be most important in determining
value. The calculated coefficients just reflect the differential economic impacts of the
project on property in relation to the distance from the project, lot sizes, topography,
land use, and the socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood. Analysts then
convert these coefficients into measurements of benefits received by each parcel and
then allocate the budget costs to each parcel accordingly. See Doebele, et al. (1979,
pp. 76-80) for the application of this technique in Bogoti.
Valorization is technically and administratively complex because an accurate
measurement of the specific impacts on land values of public works separated from
other influences is very difficult (Shoup, 1978, p. 75; Doebele et al., 1979, p. 90).
Besides, the collection of valorization charges is costly and difficult. The lag between
the time expenditures are made and the time costs are recovered may also lead to
liquidity problems.
Land Readjustment
Another method employed with some success in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is
land readjustment (Doebele, 1982; Acharya, 1982, pp. 103-117). In land readjustment,
the role of the government is similar to a developer, and the development is mainly
financed by the increased value of the developed land. When an area is "ripe" for
development, the government declares a "land readjustment project." In the project,
the government prepares a detailed development plan, subdividing the area into
sections for public use and private development. The State then assembles land from
owners of the project. Landowners do not receive any cash compensation; instead, a
portion of their land is returned to them with the provision of services. The amount of
land that owners receive depends on the "cost-equivalent rate." This rate is
determined by the amount of land for public use and the costs of providing services to
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the land.2 Under this arrangement, the government can recover the project costs by
selling the served land and also obtain land for urban infrastructure with no exchange
of cash. Because the served land commands a high value in the market, the
government can usually use the land returned to owners to compensate for the amount
of land they lost.
Public leasehold system may have at least two advantages over these methods.
I have discussed these advantages in Chapter 1 and will not repeat them here.
2 See Doebele (1982) for a detailed discussion of the technical aspects of calculating the
cost-equivalent rate.
APPENDIX B.
THE TERRITORY OF HONG KONG
The Territory of --
>,HONG KONG
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Source: Miners, Norman. 1991. The Government and Politics of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
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APPENDIX C.
CALCULATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF LAND-VALUE CAPTURE
In this appendix, I explain the calculation of the percentage of land-value capture
(PLVC) in detail. The equation for calculating the PLVC for a specific land parcel is:
Prmjs + Prmmdl + R - LV70
PLVC =
LV9 1 - LV 70
where
PLVC = Percentage of Land-value Capture
Prms = Premium from Initial Public Auction
Prmmgd = Premium from Lease Modifications
R = Annual Rent
LV70 = Estimated 1970 land value
LV9 1 = Estimated 1990 land value
I simplify the equation by removing LV70 from the nominator and denominator.
The equation becomes:
Prmj + Prmad + R
PLVC =
LV9 1
In the simplified equation, I only have to estimate the 1991 land value to assess the
PLVC.
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